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Abstract 
One of the fundaments of associative learning theories is that surprising events drive 
learning by signalling the need to update one’s beliefs. It has long been suggested 
that  plasticity  of  connection  strengths  between  neurons  underlies  the  learning  of 
predictive  associations:  Neural  units  encoding  associated  entities  change  their 
connectivity  to  encode  the  learned  associative  strength.  Surprisingly,  previous 
imaging studies have focused on correlations between regional brain activity and 
variables of learning models, but neglected how these variables changes in inter-
regional connectivity. Dynamic Causal Models (DCMs) of neuronal populations and 
their  effective  connectivity  form  a  novel  technique  to  investigate  such  learning 
dependent changes in connection strengths. 
In the work presented here, I embedded computational learning models into DCMs to 
investigate how computational processes are reflected by changes in connectivity. 
These novel models were then used to explain fMRI data from three associative 
learning studies. The first study integrated a Rescorla-Wagner model into a DCM 
using  an  incidental  learning  paradigm  where  auditory  cues  predicted  the 
presence/absence  of  visual  stimuli.  Results  showed  that  even  for  behaviourally 
irrelevant  probabilistic  associations,  prediction  errors  drove  the  consolidation  of 
connection strengths between the auditory and visual areas. In the second study I 
combined  a  Bayesian  observer  model  and  a  nonlinear  DCM,  using  an  fMRI 
paradigm where auditory cues differentially predicted visual stimuli, to investigate 
how predictions about sensory stimuli influence motor responses. Here, the degree of 
striatal prediction error activity controlled the plasticity of visuo-motor connections. 
In a third study, I used a nonlinear DCM and data from a fear learning study to 
demonstrate  that  prediction  error  activity  in  the  amygdala  exerts  a  modulatory 
influence on visuo-striatal connections.  
Though postulated by many models and theories about learning, to our knowledge 
the work presented in this thesis constitutes the first direct report that prediction 
errors can modulate connection strength.   5 
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Outline and Aims  
The aim of this thesis was to assess the role of prediction errors and connectivity 
changes in associative learning, using a combination of formal learning models and 
DCM  for  fMRI.  A  range  of  associative  learning  tasks  was  used  with  increasing 
behavioural relevance of the associative relationships. This thesis is organized as 
follows: 
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction – This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part gives 
a brief overview of the field of associative learning, and discusses in more detail the 
role  of  prediction  errors  and  synaptic  plasticity.  The  second  part  describes  and 
compares  classical  reinforcement  learning  models  and  Bayesian  ideal  observer 
models, both of which were used to model the behavioural and fMRI data described 
in this thesis.  
Chapter 2 –Methods – This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part describes 
DCM, including both the original formulation and a novel extension which allows 
for second order modulation. Both these tools will be used for hypothesis testing in 
the subsequent chapters. The second part describes Bayesian model selection, which 
is used to decide which of a group of models is the best model for a given dataset. In 
subsequent chapters this tool is applied to both DCMs and behavioural data.  
Chapters 3-5 – Results chapters – These chapters describe the experimental work: 
the aims, the hypotheses / models tested, the set up and the outcomes of three studies. 
The specific goals of each study were the following: 
￿  To investigate associative learning of task-irrelevant associations, at the level 
of the sensory cortex, and more specifically to test for changes in connectivity 
between the sensory areas involved (Chapter 3). 
￿  To explore stimulus independent and stimulus bound surprise processing when 
subjects learn dynamically changing relationships between sensory stimuli and   13 
to identify an underlying second order connectivity model for the SPM results 
(Chapter 4). 
￿  To  investigate  prediction  error  processing  in  an  aversive  reinforcement 
learning paradigm, the connectivity parameters of the underlying causal model 
(Chapter 5). 
Chapter 6 – General Discussion and Conclusion – This chapter provides a general 
discussion and the conclusions of this work; presents its contributions to the field; 
and suggests directions for future research.   14 
Chapter 1 
1.   Introduction  
Introduction 
In order to interpret incoming sensory information and predict future events, our 
brains need to construct models of the world that represent how external events are 
causally linked. In his 1898 dissertation on animal intelligence, Edward Thorndike 
first proposed a theory of associative learning in animals (Thorndike E.L., 1898). He 
posed the so-called ‘law of effect’, arguing that learning consists of the establishment 
of associations that are formed when responses are followed by rewards. This theory 
formed the basis of a century of stimulus-response and stimulus-stimulus associative 
learning.  
It is easy to see how predicting relevant stimuli in the environment such as food and 
predators can boost adaptive fitness, allowing one to seek out juicy fruits and avoid 
painful shocks in cognitive neuroscience experiments. However phenomena like the 
mismatch negativity and sensory preconditioning (see Section 1.1.2 and 3.1) show 
that the brain’s predictions about the environment are not limited to behaviourally 
relevant  stimuli.  One  hypothesis  is  that  sensory  perception  rests  upon  active 
prediction  of  the  environment  rather  than  just  passive  reception  of  sensory 
information.  Here,  sensory  perception  is  a  recurring  input-match-prediction  loop 
where  beliefs  about  the  environment  are  continuously  updated  to  predict  future 
sensory inputs.  
After decades of animal research into the neural mechanisms of associative learning 
in animals, functional neuroimaging has allowed for extension of these investigations 
to  human  subjects.  This  thesis  combines  two  recent  developments  in  human 
functional  magnetic  resonance  imaging  (fMRI)  methods:  (i)  the  use  of  formal 
associative  learning  models  to  explain  measured  BOLD  responses  and  (ii) 
physiologically  motivated  models  of  brain  connectivity.  Changes  in  connectivity 
have long been thought to be central to the physiological implementation of learning   15 
(see (Hebb, 1949)), and in the work presented here, associative learning models are 
embedded  in  physiological  models  of  connectivity  to  investigate  changes  during 
associative learning. Within this novel framework associative learning is investigated 
in  three  paradigms,  in  which  the  probabilistic  stimulus  associations  range  from 
affectively neutral to noxious, static to changing, and incidental to task relevant.  
This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part I will give an overview of the 
fundaments of associative learning, including the notion of prediction errors in both 
reward  and  non-reward  based  contexts,  the  hypothesis  of  predictive  coding  as  a 
fundamental  mechanism  of  brain  functioning,  and  the  neurophysiological 
mechanisms underlying associative learning. The second part of this chapter then 
describes  classical  and  Bayesian  learning  models,  and  their  advantages  and 
limitations for investigating associative learning processes. 
1.1 Associative learning 
Behavioural  research  on  how  humans  and  animals  learn  to  predict  positive  and 
negative  stimuli  in  their  environment  was  pioneered  by  Ivan  Pavlov  in  the  late 
nineteenth  century.  Originally  studying  the  digestive  system  and  the  chemical 
composition of saliva, Pavlov observed that dogs started salivating before food was 
actually delivered. Upon closer examination it transpired that the salivating response 
commenced when a bell was rung by his assistant to indicate that the food was ready. 
Pavlov abandoned the study of saliva chemistry in favour of further investigating this 
‘psychic secretion’ response, as he termed it.  
In classical, or Pavlovian, conditioning, a motivationally significant unconditioned 
stimulus  (US;  the  food  stimulus,  often  also  termed  ‘reinforcer’),  elicits  an 
unconditioned response (UR; salivation). When an affectively neutral conditioned 
stimulus (CS; the bell) regularly precedes the US, the CS will eventually also elicit 
salivation  as  a  conditioned  response  (CR)  (see  Table  1.1).  This  formation  of 
stimulus-stimulus associations is fundamentally important as it allows animals and 
humans to predict and prepare for biologically important events.  
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Later experiments showed that temporal pairing of a cue and reinforcer alone is not 
enough to learn a cue-outcome association. This was demonstrated by a phenomenon 
called ‘blocking’ ((Kamin LJ, 1969), see Table 1.1). In the first stage of a blocking 
paradigm, an initially neutral cue A is paired with a reinforcer, and another neutral 
cue  B  is  presented  but  never  paired.  After  stage  1,  A  will  elicit  a  conditioned 
response, but  B will not. In a second  stage, A is presented  in combination with 
another cue X, and B with Y, and both compound cues are repeatedly paired with the 
reinforcer. After stage 2, Y will elicit a conditioned response, whereas X will not, 
even though both cues have been paired with a reinforcer equally often. This can be 
explained  by  noting  that  for  the  AX  compound,  The  reinforcer  could  be  fully 
predicted by  A  alone, rendering  X  redundant, whereas for the BY compound,  B 
could not explain the reinforcer, leaving it ‘free’ to be associated to Y. This suggests 
that  when a reinforcer is completely predicted by the cue(s), no  further learning 
occurs; in other words, A had ‘blocked’ learning an association between X and the 
reinforcer. 
Based on this effect, Kamin concluded that simply pairing of the cue and reinforcer 
is not enough; the presence of the reinforcer has to be surprising in order to establish 
an association (Kamin LJ, 1969). This notion of surprise lies at the heart of nearly all 
associative learning theories. The basic idea is that a mismatch between predicted 
and actual outcome signals that the internal model’s predictions are wrong and need 
to  be  updated.  Such  surprising  events  are  known  as  prediction  errors.  The  next 
section  reviews  accumulating  neurobiological  evidence  that  the  brain  indeed 
processes surprising events differently from predicted events  
1.1.1  Neuronal prediction errors 
1.1.1.1 Dopamine & Ventral striatum 
Dopamine (DA) neurons in the ventral striatum in macaques strongly increase their 
firing rate when salient or rewarding stimuli are presented. These rewarding stimuli 
can be primary rewards, such as food and water, but also arbitrary cues that are 
predictive  of  primary  rewards  (Ljungberg  et  al.,  1992;Romo  and  Schultz,  1990). 
These DA responses generalise to stimuli that are perceptually similar to the reward-
predicting  cues,  and  the  responses  show  other  characteristics  that  parallel  those   17 
reported in behavioural studies, such as blocking (see Table 1.1 ; (Waelti et al., 
2001)). 
In  a  seminal  series  of  studies,  Schultz  and  colleagues  carefully  investigated  the 
nature of this phasic dopamine firing during classical conditioning using single unit 
recordings in the macaque ventral tegmental area (VTA) (Mirenowicz and Schultz, 
1994;Mirenowicz and Schultz, 1996;Romo and Schultz, 1990;Schultz, 1998). When 
a monkey is first presented with an arbitrary visual cue followed by a juice reward, 
the dopamine neurons strongly increase firing in response to the reward, but not in 
response to the cue (see Figure 1.1). Over time, as the monkey learns the cue-reward 
association,  firing  rates  increase  when  the  cue  itself  is  presented.  This  response 
parallels the behaviourally observed conditioned response to the cue, which has now 
become a reward in itself. Furthermore, as the association is learned, rewards evoke 
progressively smaller increases in firing; when the reward is fully predicted, firing 
rates  no  longer  increase.  Finally, firing  rates  decrease  to  below  baseline  when  a 
predicted  reward  is  omitted.  This  pattern  of  responses  suggest  that  what  the 
dopamine neurons respond to is not reward per se, but its prediction error. When the 
reward is presented before the association is learned, it is unpredicted and increased 
firing rates reflect the large difference between prediction and observed outcome. 
When  the  reward  is  fully  predicted  by  the  cue  it  elicits  no  response,  but  the 
presentation  of  the cue itself  is  surprising  and  does  elicit an  increased  response. 
When a predicted reward is omitted, the difference between the outcome (no reward) 
and prediction (reward) is negative, leading to a depression of responses.  
Further  research  has  shown  that  this  prediction  error  signal  is  sensitive  to  many 
different aspects of the reward stimuli. For example, prediction errors are specific to 
the context in which the association has been learned, (Nakahara et al., 2004), and 
firing rates in response to the cue are proportional to both the magnitude (Bayer and 
Glimcher,  2005)  and  the  probability  (Fiorillo  et  al.,  2003)  of  the  reinforcer. 
Furthermore, to maintain the reward sensitivity over a large range of values, the gain 
is adjusted to the variance of the reward value (Tobler et al., 2005). These and many 
other studies support the hypothesis that the DA neurons in the VTA signal aspects 
of reward prediction error (Schultz and Dickinson, 2000).  
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Figure  1.1. Dopamine firing reflects prediction errors.  Changes  in 
dopamine neuron firing reflect the prediction errors of appetitive events. For each 
panel, the top graph represents the accumulated spike count per time bin, and each 
dotted  line in represents one recording session,  where each dot  is a  spike.  CS  = 
conditioned stimulus, R = primary reward (juice) Top. Before learning, the juice 
drop is not predicted, resulting in a positive prediction error, and increased firing in 
response to the juice. Middle. After learning, the CS predicts the reward, and the 
dopamine neurons increase firing rate in response to the reward-predicting CS, but 
not to the predicted reward. Bottom. When after learning the reward-predicted CS is 
presented, but the reward is omitted, this results in a negative prediction error and 
suppressed firing of the DA neurons at the time the reward should have occurred. 
(From (Schultz et al., 1997)). 
 
Inspired  by  the  results  from  these  animal  experiments,  fMRI  studies  have 
subsequently shown that in humans the VTA also responds to the difference between 
expected  and  actual  rewards  (D'Ardenne  et  al.,  2008).  More  frequently  and 
prominently, however, these studies found reward prediction error responses in the 
ventral  striatum,  e.g.  in  the  context  of  primary  food  rewards  (McClure  et  al., 
2003;O'Doherty et al., 2003;Pagnoni et al., 2002;Rodriguez et al., 2006) to money 
(Abler et al., 2006;Hare et al., 2008;Seymour et al., 2007;Yacubian et al., 2007) and 
even attractive faces (Bray and O'Doherty, 2007). These findings can be explained 
by noting that (i) the ventral striatum is a primary target of dopaminergic projections 
from  the  VTA  (Joel  and  Weiskopf,  2000),  and  (ii)  the  BOLD  signal  reflects   19 
postsynaptic field potentials (and thus input to an area) more strongly than firing rate 
(and thus output from an area) (Logothetis et al. 2001). Thus, it is likely that ventral 
striatal BOLD activity in relation to reward prediction errors is partially, although 
probably  not  completely,  a  downstream  reflection  of  reward  prediction  error 
responses  of  DA  neurons  in  VTA.  A  recent  study  directly  linked  dopamine  and 
reward-seeking  behaviour  in  humans  (Pessiglione  et  al.,  2006).  Behaviourally, 
subjects  treated  with  DA  agonist  levodopa  were  more  likely  to  choose  more 
rewarding  actions  than  subjects  on  DA  antagonist  haloperidol.  Furthermore,  the 
striatal prediction error response to rewarding stimuli as observed in previous studies 
was modulated by dopaminergic drugs. The degree of this modulation determined 
how much the subject’s behaviour was affected by the drugs.  
The human and animal studies described above strongly support the hypothesis that 
DA  neurons  encode  reward  prediction  error  and  that  ventral  striatal  activity  as 
measured with fMRI reflects these prediction errors. This does not mean, however, 
that processing in the ventral striatum is limited to reward-based learning and is not 
involved  in  other  forms  of  associative  learning.  Conditioning  and  associative 
learning has long been dominated by animal research, and training animals to do 
behavioural tasks is inherently reward-based; one cannot simply ask a monkey or rat 
to press a button, they have to be rewarded to do so. As a result there has been a bias 
towards  reward-based  tasks,  and  comparatively  little  interest  in  investigating 
associative learning and striatal processing of affectively neutral and task-irrelevant 
stimuli. This has changed somewhat since the advent of human neuroimaging, and a 
few recent studies have given some hints as to the nature of striatal processing of 
affectively neutral stimuli. fMRI results showed that the ventral striatum responds to 
nonrewarding, unexpected stimuli (Zink et al., 2003) proportional to the salience of 
the  stimulus  (Zink  et  al.,  2006).  Furthermore,  activity  in  the  ventral  striatum 
increases in responses to cues predicting a novel, affectively neutral stimulus and to 
novel stimuli per se (Wittmann et al., 2007;Wittmann et al., 2008).  
These results suggest that rather than just coding rewards or reward prediction errors, 
the  striatum  may  have  a  more  general  role  in processing  salient  and  unexpected 
events.  One  of  the  proposed  functions  of  this  striatal  response  is  to  reallocate 
resources to unexpected stimuli in both reward and non-reward contexts (Zink et al., 
2006), which will be discussed in the next section.    20 
1.1.1.2 Affectively neutral prediction errors  
In a pioneering fMRI study of prediction error signals regarding causal associative 
learning  for  affectively  neutral  stimuli  subjects  learned  the  relationships  between 
various cues (fictitious drugs) and outcomes (fictitious syndromes) (Fletcher et al., 
2001). At the start of the experiment, when the environment was still unpredictable, 
activity in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and the putamen was 
high, and decreased as the associations were being learned. Furthermore, activity in 
the DLPFC was higher on trials with unexpected compared to expected outcomes. 
The  authors  suggest  this  response  pattern  reflected  ‘cognitive’  prediction  errors 
because  the  learned  associations  were  not  reward-based,  but  nevertheless  task-
relevant.  
In a subsequent study, Corlett et al. investigated prediction error responses for two 
well-known  conditioning  effects:  backwards  blocking  and  unovershadowing  (see 
Table  1.1;  (Corlett  et  al.,  2004)).  Subjects  were  instructed  to  predict  allergic 
reactions of a fictitious patient in response to certain food items. In a first stage, two 
food items A and X were presented together, followed by an allergic response. Two 
other food items, B and Y were also paired and followed by an allergic response. In a 
second stage A was presented alone, followed by an allergic response, and B was 
also presented alone, but not followed by an allergic response. Because A could fully 
account  for  the  allergic  response  observed  with  the  AX  compound,  X  became 
disassociated from the allergic response, which is known as backwards blocking. 
Conversely, because B could not explain the allergic response observed in the BY 
compound,  Y  alone  will  now  explain  the  allergic  response,  so  Y  has  been 
‘unovershadowed’ by B. If these processes indeed occur, then X followed by an 
allergic response and Y not followed by an allergic response will be more surprising, 
i.e.  have  a  larger  prediction  error,  than  vice  versa.  Indeed  Corlett  et  al.  showed 
exactly such a prediction error response in the striatum as well as in the same part of 
the right DLPFC (Corlett et al., 2004) as was demonstrated previously (Fletcher et 
al., 2001;Turner et al., 2004).   21 
Table  1.1.  Overview  of  conditioning  paradigms.  Overview  of 
conditioning paradigms described in the main text, showing the different training 
stages, the testing phase and the conditioned response during testing 
  Stage 1  Stage 2  Stage 3  Test  Response 
Classical 
Conditioning 
A ￿ reinforcer      A  + 
           
Blocking  A ￿ reinforcer  AX ￿ reinforcer    X  0 
Control  B ￿ nothing  BY ￿ reinforcer    Y  + 
           
Backwards 
Blocking 
AX ￿ reinforcer  A ￿ reinforcer    X  0 
Unover- 
Shadowing 
BY ￿ reinforcer  B ￿ nothing    Y  + 
           
Preventative 
Learning 
A ￿ reinforcer  AB ￿ nothing    B  - 
Superlearning  A ￿ reinforcer  AB ￿ nothing  BC ￿ reinforcer  C  ++ 
           
Higher order 
conditioning 
A ￿ Reinforcer  B￿A￿reinforcer    B  + 
           
 
Given that the ventral striatum responds to novelty, (Wittmann et al., 2007) and that 
in  the  study  by  Fletcher  et al.  unpredictability  and  novelty  were  correlated,  it  is 
possible that the observed striatal and DLPFC prediction error responses were simply 
due to novelty of the outcomes. However, Turner et al. showed that this was not the 
case in a very carefully controlled study employing the phenomena of preventative 
and superlearning (see Table 1.1; (Turner et al., 2004)). Here, in a first phase a 
stimulus gets associated with an outcome (A+). In the next phase a novel stimulus, is 
combined with A, but not followed by the outcome (AB-). This generates a negative 
prediction error, and B acquires a strong negative causal potential. In a third phase, 
the  B  is  paired  with  a third  stimulus and  followed  by  the  outcome  (BC+).  This 
generates a strong positive prediction error, and C acquires a very strong positive 
causal potential. When contrasting this with a standard blocking paradigm, in which 
the  stimuli  were  presented  the  same  number  of  times,  both  superlearning  and 
preventative learning events, which only differed from control events in terms of the   22 
size of the prediction errors, but not in terms of novelty, showed increased activity in 
the DLPFC as well as in the striatum.  
These studies demonstrated that prediction errors play a role in learning associations 
that do not involve reward prediction, and that both the striatum and the prefrontal 
cortex  are  involved  in  processing  these  ‘cognitive’  prediction  errors.  However, 
although unrelated to reward, these prediction errors are still relevant to the subject 
in  the  sense  that  their  task  is  to  make  accurate  predictions  and  making  correct 
predictions is rewarding in itself. Therefore, one cannot claim that learning here is 
entirely unrelated to any form of reward. Importantly, thought, the reward of being 
correct is entirely orthogonal to the presence or absence of the allergy outcome. This 
is  in contrast  with reward based studies where presence of the outcome (i.e. the 
reward)  always  results  in  a  positive  reward  prediction  error,  and  absence  of  the 
outcome  in  a  negative  reward  prediction  error.  Unlike  reward-based  prediction 
errors, the prediction errors observed in the studies discussed above are independent 
of  whether  the  error  was  in  the  positive  (unexpected  presence  of  outcome)  or 
negative (unexpected absence of outcome) direction. In other words, the prediction 
errors were unsigned, which might be explained by the fact that the actual outcome 
itself is not relevant, only how surprising this outcome was.  
Summarising,  in  circumstances  where  the  only  relevant  measure  is  how  much 
surprise the outcome engenders, i.e. for affectively neutral contexts, the dorsolateral 
prefrontal  cortex  and  the  striatum  encode  a  sign-independent  prediction  error 
((Corlett  et  al.,  2004;Fletcher  et  al.,  2001;Turner  et  al.,  2004).  It  should  be 
emphasised again though that the learned associations here are still relevant to the 
task. However, in recent years it has been suggested that coding of prediction errors 
is at the heart of every cognitive process, including low-level sensory perception 
(Friston et al., 2006;Rao and Ballard, 1999). The next section will discuss this theory 
of predictive coding as a basic mode of brain function. 
1.1.2  Predictive coding 
Why would the brain aim to predict irrelevant events and stimuli? The theoretical 
notion  of  predictive  coding  proposes  that  the  brain  has  two  primary  objectives: 
inference about the causes of sensory input and learning the relationship between the 
inputs and the causes. This is achieved by constructing a generative model of how   23 
causes in the world elicit sensory inputs; given some sensory inputs, this model can 
be inverted to recognise the causes of this input. In this scheme, each level of the 
processing hierarchy receives bottom-up sensory input from the level below and top-
down predictions from the level above (Garrido et al., 2009b). Prediction error, i.e. 
the difference between the true and estimated probability distribution of the causes, is 
minimised at all levels of the hierarchy by adjusting connection strengths through 
synaptic plasticity (Friston, 2005a)). 
One of the most basic and robust paradigms to demonstrate neuronal responses to 
unexpected stimuli is the oddball paradigm. Here, presentation of an oddball stimulus 
in a sequence of standard stimuli elicits a negative potential as measured using EEG, 
which is known as the mismatch negativity (MMN) potential. The MMN is observed 
in  all  sensory  domains  (auditory  (Baldeweg,  2006),  visual  (Stagg  et  al.,  2004); 
somatosensory (Akatsuka et al., 2007)) and can be understood in light of a predictive 
coding  framework  (Garrido  et  al.,  2009b).  Prediction  errors  are  minimised  by 
adjusting connection strengths through synaptic plasticity upon repeated presentation 
of  the  stimuli.  These  adjustments  are  reflected  neurophysiologically  by  the 
disappearance of the MMN (Baldeweg et al., 2006;Friston, 2005a), which is elicited 
again when an oddball is presented. This adjustment is also reflected by repetition 
suppression in the visual domain, as observed in fMRI (Summerfield et al., 2008). 
Here,  the  likelihood  of  stimulus  repetition  was  manipulated  and  repetition 
suppression was reduced in response to improbable compared to probable repetitions.  
There is increasing evidence that perceptual learning is just one of many processes 
that can be explained in a predictive coding framework (Friston et al., 2006;Garrido 
et  al.,  2009a;Rao  and  Ballard,  1999)  and  is  also  at  the  heart  of  higher  level 
processing: In an fMRI study, an expectation to see faces was induced by asking 
subjects to report whether presented stimuli were faces or not. Forward connectivity 
between face sensitive visual areas (FFA) to the frontal cortex to was modulated by 
the prediction errors. Incorrect predictions increased FFA ￿ prefrontal connectivity, 
whereas correct predictions increased prefrontal ￿ FFA connectivity (Summerfield 
and Koechlin, 2008). Other studies have shown predictive coding like mechanisms 
for sensory integration (Bays and Wolpert, 2007;Blakemore et al., 1998), predictive 
attenuation of tactile stimulation (Bays et al., 2006), and even for social interactions 
(Shergill et al., 2003;Wolpert et al., 2003). These findings support the notion that the   24 
fundamental function of the brain could be to encode an implicit and probabilistic 
model of the environment (Friston et al., 2006). 
1.1.2.1 Functions of neuronal prediction error signals 
The  effect  that  various  forms  of  prediction  errors  have  on  neuronal  functioning 
depends on several factors. Firstly, the specificity and scope of the projections of the 
prediction  error  encoding  neurons  determine  whether  the  signal  is  broadcasted 
widely, or selectively affects a small group of neurons. For example, cholinergic and 
dopaminergic  projections  from  the  nucleus  basalis  and  VTA  have  widespread 
connections to the cortex (Lewis, 1991). Resulting global error messages could then 
selectively affect neurons involved in processing information at the same time as the 
prediction error signal via postsynaptic neurons that act as coincidence detectors. 
Alternatively, the prediction error signal could be relayed only to a selected group of 
neurons, directly affecting behavioural reactions.  
Secondly, the way in which the neurons affect postsynaptic signalling might differ. 
The  postsynaptic  effects  may  be  very  short-lived  and  directly  affect  immediate 
behaviour  or  attention,  or  they  might  control  storage  of  predictions  by  inducing 
short-term  or  long-term  changes  in  synaptic  strengths.  Such  learning-dependent 
plasticity will be discussed in the next section.  
1.1.3  Plasticity during associative learning 
1.1.3.1 Synaptic plasticity during associative learning 
Already in 1949, Donald Hebb suggested that changes in connectivity are central to 
the physiological implementation of association learning (Hebb, 1949). The previous 
section  described how the  brain  actively  generates  predictions of sensory  signals 
based on an internal model of the world and compares those expectations to the 
actual  incoming  information.  Predictive  coding  theories  propose  that  prediction 
errors are minimised by adjusting the synaptic efficacies or connections strengths 
between different levels of the processing hierarchy.  
Brain connectivity is defined by three key properties: i) the current strength of a 
connection ii) the change in the strength of this connection over time, and iii) how 
this  change  is  controlled.  These  three  aspects  correspond  to  distinct   25 
neurophysiological  mechanisms.  For  glutamatergic  synapses,  the  main  excitatory 
synapses  in  the  brain,  connection  strength  depends  on  the  number  and  state  of 
AMPA  receptors  (Malinow  &  Malenka  2002). Changes  in  synaptic  strength,  i.e. 
plasticity, is regulated by NMDA-dependent mechanisms modulating the number of 
AMPA  receptors  expressed  at  the  synapse  (Genoux  and  Montgomery,  2007). 
Because of its unique molecular properties the NMDA receptor can function as a 
‘coincidence detector’ of afferent and efferent activity, and as such initiate synaptic 
plasticity.  Presynaptic  transmitter  release  concomitant  with  postsynaptic 
depolarisation allows a calcium influx through the NMDA receptors, which triggers 
trafficking  as  well  as  phosphorylation  of  glutamatergic  AMPA  receptors.  These 
properties make NMDA receptors ideally suited for associative learning processes 
that involve concomitant activity in different (e.g. sensory) areas of the brain. Indeed 
NMDA-dependent  mechanisms  have  been  found  to  play  a  key  role  plasticity  in 
learning and memory processes in the brain (e.g. see (Genoux and Montgomery, 
2007;Gu, 2002;Ji et al., 2005;Morris, 1989;Tye et al., 2008)).  
Finally,  synaptic  plasticity  itself  is  influenced  by  modulatory  transmitters  like 
dopamine, serotonin and acetylcholine, mainly through changes in NMDA receptor 
function  ((Gu,  2002),  see  Figure  1.1).  For  example,  dopamine  (DA)  and 
acetylcholine (ACh) regulate the trafficking, insertion and endocytosis of NMDA 
receptors  into  the  cell  membrane.  As  such,  cholinergic  mechanisms  strongly 
modulate  NDMA  dependent  LTP  and  LTD  in  visual  cortex  (Brocher  et  al., 
1992;Kirkwood et al., 1999) and auditory cortex (Metherate and Hsieh, 2003). The 
phosphorylation  of  the  NMDA  receptors,  which  determines  the  conductance 
properties,  is  modulated  by  DA  and  serotonin  (5HT)  receptors  (Jiao  et  al., 
2007;Salazar-Colocho et al., 2007;Wolf et al., 2003). In summary, excitatory brain 
connectivity is determined by (i) AMPA receptors, expressing synaptic strength, (ii) 
NMDA  receptors  controlling  synaptic  strength,  and  (iii)  modulatory  transmitters 
regulating this control (see Figure 1.2).  
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Figure 1.2. Modulation of synaptic plasticity.  Modulation  of  synaptic 
plasticity  of  excitatory,  glutamatergic  synapses  by  several  modulatory 
neurotransmitters  via  NDMA  signalling.  (Adapted  from  (Stephan  et  al.,  2006)). 
NMDAR = NMDA receptor, AMPAR = AMPA receptor, ACh = acetylcholine, NE 
= norepinephrine, 5HT = serotonin, DA = dopamine.  
1.1.3.2 Associative learning induced plasticity in the sensory cortex 
The previous section described the cellular mechanisms of synaptic plasticity that 
underlie associative learning processes. In line with behavioural observations, Friston 
suggested that when ‘value-dependent modulation is extended to the inputs of neural 
value systems themselves, initially neutral cues can acquire value’ (Friston et al., 
1994).  Here,  discriminative  conditioned  responses  are  accompanied  by  value-
dependent plasticity of receptive fields, as reflected in the selective augmentation of 
unit responses to valuable sensory cues. Electrophysiological and fMRI measures of 
activity in the sensory cortices indeed show such changes in CS processing as the 
cues become associated with affective outcomes: Neurons in the superior colliculus 
and auditory cortex are known to have a frequency to which they fire preferentially, 
known as the best frequency (Weinberger, 2007). Electrophysiological studies in rats 
and  big  brown  bats  have  shown  a  ‘centripetal’  best  frequency  shift  towards  the 
frequency of the conditioned tone when the tone is paired with an aversive stimulus 
such as a painful electric shock (Ma and Suga, 2005;Weinberger, 2004). Similarly, in 
humans, BOLD responses in the auditory cortex are enhanced in response to tones 
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paired with aversive outcomes (Thiel et al., 2002b;Thiel et al., 2002a). In contrast, 
however,  Morris et al.  observed  a  decreased  response  to  CS+  (CS  regularly  and 
consistently paired with an outcome) compared to CS- (CS never or rarely paired 
with an outcome) stimuli in a similar fear conditioning study using PET (Morris et 
al., 1998). At first this seems at odds with the electrophysiology results. However, 
the  electrophysiologically  observed  best  frequency  shift  results  in  a  small  and 
narrowly  tuned  increase,  which  is  accompanied  by  a  decreased  response  in  the 
surrounding  frequencies.  It  is  conceivable  that  this  decrease  swamps  the  small 
augmentation, so that a focal narrowing of the tuning curve as found in animals, 
actually results in a regional deactivation because of the courser spatial resolution. 
The direction of the observed changes notwithstanding, these results all point in the 
direction  of  conditioning  dependent  plasticity  in  CS  processing  in  the  auditory 
cortex.  
Similar findings were reported in the visual cortex, where BOLD responses in the 
visual cortex increased to a visual stimulus that had been associated with a noxious 
outcome  (Carlsson  et  al.,  2006).  Such  changes  in  perceptual  processing  are  not 
limited to aversive outcomes; Seitz et al. showed increased stimulus sensitivity when 
visual orientation gratings were paired with liquid rewards, even when subjects were 
unaware of the visual stimulus (Seitz et al., 2009).  
In conclusion, recent studies show plasticity in the sensory cortices for CS processing 
in the context of aversive or appetitive conditioning. It is unclear as to whether such 
changes also occur when associations between neutral stimuli are learned, a question 
that will be addressed in Chapter 3.  
1.1.3.3 The role of ACh 
ACh is one of the most important modulators of synaptic plasticity in the context of 
associative  learning  in  the  perceptual  domain.  For  example,  the  role  of  nucleus 
basalis  dependent  ACh  release  in  auditory  cortex  plasticity  has  been  extensively 
studied  in  aversive  conditioning  experiments  in  animals,  showing  receptive  field 
plasticity and behavioural memory formation to be mainly dependent on muscarinic 
receptors  (Weinberger,  2007).  Also  in  humans,  the  enhanced  BOLD  response  to 
tones associated with shocks is abolished upon administration of the ACh antagonist 
scopolamine (Thiel et al., 2002b;Thiel et al., 2002a). Furthermore, admistration of   28 
scopolamine abolished both behaviourally observed repetition priming as well as the 
associated repetition suppression in the visual cortex (Thiel et al., 2002c). Finally, 
interaction of ACh and NMDA dependent mechanisms appear to be crucial for long 
term consolidation of conditioning-induced synaptic plasticity (Ji et al., 2005).  
These findings are starting to elucidate the mechanisms by which cortical plasticity is 
regulated during conditioning and other forms of associative learning. The aim of the 
work  presented  in  this  thesis  was  to  create  biologically  plausible  models  of 
connectivity to asses connectivity changes during associative learning. In the future 
these models could be used to directly test the influences of the neuromodulators 
discussed  here  on connection strengths  and their  learning dependent-changes, i.e. 
plasticity (see Chapter 6) 
1.2 Models of associative learning 
This section starts with a general discussion of model-based analysis methods, and 
then review how two classes of computational models can provide a framework to 
investigate aspects of associative learning at the behavioural and physiological level.  
1.2.1  Model-based analysis methods 
A model is a representation that contains the essential structure of some event or 
process in the real world. In psychology and biology, 'models' are often informal, 
consisting of boxes with arrows between them, such as protein synthesis cascade 
models or the working memory model (Baddeley and Della, 1996). In mathematics 
and  physics,  ‘models’  are  more  formal,  in  the  form  of  equations  that  putatively 
underlie observed processes. In recent years systems neuroscience research has seen 
a strong increase in the use of formal modelling techniques concerning reinforcement 
learning (e.g. (Gläscher and Büchel, 2005;Pessiglione et al., 2006;Seymour et al., 
2004)), decision making (e.g. (Beck et al., 2008;Behrens et al., 2007)), and brain 
connectivity assessed by fMRI and electrophysiology (Chen et al., 2008;Kiebel et al., 
2008;Stephan et al., 2007a).  
Indeed both types of models adhere to the definition of a model as ‘a representation 
of  a  process  in  the  real  world.’  An  often  overlooked  fact  is  that  any  inferential 
analysis  of  data  essentially  tests  a  model.  Because  these  models  are  not  always   29 
explicitly described as such, there is a perceived distinction between model-based 
and other research. A good example of such unrecognised model testing is classical 
statistical inference. This is essentially a test of very simple models of the world: A 
one-sample  t-test  on  the  effect  of  variable  A  on  some  measure  B  effectively 
compares a model of the world in which A affects the generation of B, to a model of 
the world where A does not affect B. Here, the model of the world is simplified to 
the extent that it only contains A to predict B; any other factors that might affect B 
are considered ‘noise’, or errors in the prediction of the model. In summary, the 
recent increase in ‘model-based’ approaches in neuroimaging does not break away 
from classical analysis methods, but merely constitutes an evolution towards more 
explicitly defined and complex models.  
1.2.1.1 Model complexity 
Models are by definition simplifications; if a model included every aspect of the real 
world, it would no longer be a model, but it would be the world itself. Simplification 
allows us to distil and probe those aspects of the world that we are interested in. A 
good model has the right balance between complexity and fit: on the one hand, it 
should  be  simple  enough  not  to  be  misled  by  noise,  i.e.  experiment  specific 
variations that do not generalise across experiments. On the other hand, if a model 
cannot account well for important aspects of the observations, then it may not be 
complex enough. In other words, in order to create a good model, one has to make 
simplifying assumptions about the causes of events in the real world, and all other 
causes that are not represented by the model will contribute to the noise, or error in 
the model predictions.  
Critically, whether a given model is worse or better than another model depends on 
the phenomenon that is to be explained. In other words, there is no single ‘true’ 
model of the world, just different models with different (levels of) simplifications 
that can account for different situations and test different hypotheses. This underlines 
the importance of selecting the optimal model for a given question and data set. A 
generic statistical framework for handling this challenge is Bayesian model selection 
(Penny et al. 2004; Stephan et al. 2009). This approach was used for each study 
contained by this thesis and will be described in detail in Chapter 2.   30 
1.2.2  Reinforcement learning models 
1.2.2.1 RW model 
The first and most influential theoretical model of associative learning was proposed 
by Rescorla & Wagner in the early seventies (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972), and is 
based on Pavlovian classical conditioning learning (see Section 1.1). The Rescorla-
Wagner (RW) model describes this learning process in terms of the strength of the 
association formed between the CS and the US. The basic principle is that the change 
in associative strength  t V D  at a particular trial t is directly proportional to the size of 
the prediction error: 
) ( ∑ - = D t t t V V l ab             (1.1) 
Here, the prediction error  ) ( ∑ - t t V l  is the difference between the actual outcome 
t l  on a trial t, and the predicted outcome ∑ t V , which is based on the summed 
prediction across all cues present. a and  b  are learning constants that determine the 
weight  of  the  incoming  information  (i.e.  the  prediction  error)  relative  to  the 
information accumulated on previous trials (i.e. the prediction). On each trial, the 
change in associative strength  t V D  is added to the current associative strength  t V , 
such  that  the  associative  strength  reflects  the  cumulative  information  from  all 
observed trials.  
t t t V V V D + = +1               (1.2) 
The values of the learning constants a and b  reflect properties, such as salience and 
motivational value, of the CS and US stimuli, respectively. Note that each stimulus 
has an associated learning constant, but that in most paradigms there is only one type 
of CS and one type of US, or the properties of the CSs and USs are assumed to be 
constant across stimulus types. As a result, the product of these two constants is 
another constant, which is the overall learning rate. However, when for example the 
salience  of  two  different  cues  is  very  different,  one  can  use  different  associated 
learning rates (cf. Chapter 3).    31 
During learning, when the outcome is incompletely predicted, the prediction error 
will  be  positive  and  the  associative  strength  will  increase.  On  the  next  trial,  the 
prediction error will be slightly smaller, and thus the increase in associative strength 
will  also  be  slightly  smaller.  Once  the  outcome  is  completely  predicted,  the 
difference between outcome and prediction is zero, and the associative strength will 
remain unchanged. This happens when learning has reached an asymptote. However, 
when an outcome is predicted but omitted, the prediction error is negative, and the 
associative strength will be reduced. Because the learning constants determine the 
size of the update, they will determine how quickly the asymptote is reached, but not 
the actual level of the asymptote. The level of the asymptote is determined by the 
conditioning schedule, and reflects the average value of l .  
Thus, when the association between the CS and the US is constant but probabilistic, 
say the CS predicts a US reward with an 80% probability, then association strength 
V will asymptote at 0.8 (given that  l  is either 1 or 0). Note that the learning rate 
determines both the speed at which the asymptote is reached and the size of the 
fluctuations around the asymptote after learning is complete.  
1.2.2.2 Delta rule model: Connectionist implementation of the RW model 
Although  the  RW  model  describes  how  associations  form  between  (internal 
representations of) CS and US stimuli, it does not provide a mechanistic explanation 
of the learning process. McLaren proposed a neural network that could compute the 
prediction  error  using  a  negative  feedback  assembly,  as  a  potential  mechanism 
underlying error-based learning (McLaren, 1989). In this model, the weight of the 
connections between the signal (CS input) and response (prediction based on the CS) 
are controlled by a facilitatory unit F that itself is controlled by direct excitation by 
the reinforcer and a negative feedback from the response unit (see Figure 1.3). Thus, 
the prediction based on the presentation of a CS is constantly updated depending on 
the prediction error. The response unit perfectly reproduces the predictions from the 
RW model. The modulation of connection strengths by prediction errors as proposed 
by this neural network is at the heart of the work presented in this thesis where we 
aimed to investigate the role of prediction errors in modulating connection strengths 
during different types of associative learning.    32 
 
Figure  1.3.  Neuronal  network  implementing  prediction  error 
signalling. Schematic simplification of the original neuronal assembly proposed by 
McLaren for how prediction errors shape neuronal connections encoding associations 
(after (McLaren, 1989)). The response unit delivers a prediction  t V  driven by the 
signal unit which received the CS input. This driving input to the response unit is 
modulated by the facilitatory unit F. Activity in F itself is controlled by the excitatory 
output  from  the  US  unit,  carrying  information  about  the  reinforcerl   and  an 
inhibitory output from the response unit, carrying the negative of the prediction  t V . 
By summation of these two inputs, activity in F reflects the prediction error.  
1.2.2.3 Determining the learning rate 
Determining the learning rate is one of the most contentious issues with regard to the 
RW and related models. There are two main approaches to determine the learning 
rate or any other constant parameter. The first approach is to decide on a learning 
rate based on previous literature and knowledge about the particular task and stimuli 
at hand (e.g. see (O'Doherty et al., 2003;Petrovic et al., 2008)). For example, when 
the differences between a CS+ and CS- are small, learning is likely to be quite slow, 
so a small learning rate is appropriate (e.g. (Petrovic et al., 2008)). This approach is 
the easiest to implement but theoretically problematic, as one can never be sure that 
the used learning rate is indeed the optimal one. A more principled approach is to fit 
the parameters to the data (see Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion of model 
fitting using Expectation Maximisation algorithms, and see (Behrens et al., 2007) for 
an example). Once the optimal learning rate has been established, one can then test 
whether the predictions of the model explain a significant proportion of the variance. 
From a theoretical point of view this is the optimal approach, but it is sometimes 
difficult to implement. For example when the data is very noisy (e.g. reaction time 
data,  or  BOLD  responses)  it  might  be  difficult  to  find  the  optimal  values,  and 
estimation might get stuck in a local maximum. One hybrid approach often used to 
determine the learning rate is to define a range of plausible learning rates, and do a   33 
stepwise analysis of the proportion of variance explained by models with different 
learning  rates  within  this  range  (e.g.  see  (den  Ouden  et  al.,  2009;Gläscher  and 
Büchel, 2005;Seymour et al., 2004)).  
1.2.2.4 Limitations, extensions and alternatives of the RW model 
The RW model was a great step forward in formalising thought and theories about 
associative  learning,  and  can  explain  a  wide  range  of  behaviourally  observed 
learning  phenomena,  including  classical  conditioning  and  extinction,  as  well  as 
blocking, preventative learning and superlearning (described in Table 1.1). However, 
the  RW  model  is  not  appropriate  in  all  situations.  There  are  a  number  of 
behaviourally observed phenomena which cannot be explained by the reinforcement 
learning  models  discussed  above.  For  example,  the  RW  model  predicts  that  the 
history  of  conditioning  has  no  influence  on  its  present  status;  only  the  current 
association value is important. However, experiments have shown that a previously 
conditioned  stimulus  actually  needs  fewer  trials  to  reach  the  same  level  of 
conditioning, i.e. there is facilitated acquisition after extinction. Related to this is the 
observation that when a CS is not presented for a while after a CS-US association has 
been extinguished, that there is partial recovery from extinction, and furthermore that 
exposure to the US alone can reinstate the CS-US association. Another example that 
RW models cannot deal with is higher-order conditioning (see Table 1.1). When a 
novel cue is paired with a conditioned excitor, in the absence of a reinforcer, the RW 
model would predict that the novel cue becomes a conditioned inhibitor, but instead 
it becomes a conditioned excitor as well. This pairing effect also works when the CSs 
are  paired  before  the  CS-US  association  is  learned  (sensory  preconditioning; 
discussed in Chapter 3). Finally, the RW model predicts that presenting a novel 
stimulus without a US should not affect later conditioning. However, latent inhibition 
(or CS-preexposure effect) is a well established observation that after exposure to a 
CS without the US, conditioning to the CS is retarded. Below we will discuss two 
alternative  models  that  are  originally  based  on  the  RW  model  and  can  model  a 
number of the phenomena discussed above.  
1.2.2.4.1  Pearce & Hall attentional model 
A crucial property of the standard RW model is fact that the learning rate is constant. 
In other words, the balance between current observations compared to predictions   34 
based on past observations is unchanging. One would expect, however, that once an 
association  has  been  learned,  the  learning  rate  decreases.  Attentional  theories  of 
associative learning are one class of models that do allow for changes in the learning 
rates. For example the model proposed by Pearce & Hall, the prediction error does 
not  directly  impact  on  the  associative  strength,  but  rather  controls  how  much 
attention is allocated to the next stimulus (Pearce and Hall, 1980). The associability 
is determined by the following equation 
( ) 1 1 1 1 - - - - + - = ∑ t
NET
t t t V a g l g a
          (1.3) 
Here the associability of the CS with the outcome determined by the absolute value 
of the prediction error at the previous trial, and the associability at the previous trial. 
The relative contributions of these terms are determined by the parameter  g . The 
underlying idea is that the more attention is paid to a stimulus, the more readily it 
will become associated with the reinforcer, and once an association is learned and the 
US  fully  predicted,  the  associability  is  low.  This  model  can  explain  certain 
phenomena like latent inhibition, where the RW model fails. However, one of the 
drawbacks of the Pearce-Hall model is that because only the absolute value of the 
prediction error is used, the association of the CS and US can only ever increase. 
This results in the rather inelegant solution of having to invoke a second learning 
process in the form of modelling the inhibitory association of the same CS, i.e. the 
CS-noUS association. The net prediction is then the sum of the associative and ‘anti-
association’ of the CS and US: 
∑ ∑ ∑ - = t t
NET
t V V V             (1.4) 
A further problem is that introducing the parameter  g  to determine weighting of 
current and past information only shifts the problem caused by the constant learning 
rate in the RW model. One still needs to somehow determine the constant value of 
the parameter g that determines the shape of the learning curve.  
1.2.2.4.2  Temporal difference learning models  
Because the RW model can only capture between trial effects, it cannot account for 
within-trial  effects  such  as  second-order  conditioning  or  sensitivity  to  stimulus   35 
timing (cf. Figure 1.1). Temporal difference (TD) learning models are basically a 
real-time extension of the RW models that allow one to model within trial timing 
effects, and are therefore particularly suited to explain the DA prediction error signal. 
The main assumption of TD models is that the prediction Vt should be interpreted as 
the total, discounted sum of future rewards expected from time t to the end of the 
trial (Sutton and Barto, 1990). The strategy is to use a vector x that describes the 
presence of a sensory cue for each time bin in a trial, and another vector w that 
carries weights of predicted rewards in those time bins. On each trial
1, the predicted 
value  t V  is the linear product of the weights  i w  and the presence or absence of the 
CS, as encoded by the stimulus vector  t i x , : 
∑ =
i
t i i t x w V ,                (1.5) 
At each time point the prediction error  t d can be calculated as the difference between 
the prediction and the reward at that time point plus all future rewards until the end 
of  the  trial.  At  the  end  of  each  trial,  the  weights  are  updated  depending  on  the 
prediction errors and the learning rate: 
t
t
t i i x w d a∑ = D ,               (1.6) 
As  the  outcomes  become  associated  with  the  cues,  the  weights  shift  from  the 
outcome to the cue. Thus, after learning, the cues, which itself are unpredicted, will 
elicit a positive prediction error because they predict a positive summed reward until 
the end of the trial. TD models can explain higher-order conditioning because the 
reward associated with a particular cue simply shifts to a preceding cue (Seymour et 
al., 2004). The behaviour of the TD models depend strongly on the number and the 
size the time bins into which a trial is divided. A TD model with only one time bin is 
exactly the same as an RW model. 
1.2.2.5 Concluding remarks 
The RW model formed the basis of a wide range of error-based learning models. 
This  model  can  explain  a  number  of  observed  learning  phenomena,  including 
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classical conditioning and blocking, although it fails to predict a number of others, 
such  as  higher-order  conditioning  and  latent  inhibition.  Extensions  of  the  model 
including TD models and the Pearce-Hall model can account for some of these. That 
does not mean, however, that the RW model is invalid, and that these alternatives are 
necessarily ‘better’ models. Whenever choosing a model it is important to keep in 
mind its limitations and properties and select the appropriate model for a particular 
dataset. For example, when one is not interested in modelling within trial learning 
effects, because the time resolution of the data does not allow for this (cf. Chapter 
3), there is no point using a TD model, because it simply reduces to an RW model. In 
other words, it is important to choose a model that can capture the phenomena one is 
interested in, but is not unnecessarily complex.  
1.2.3  Bayesian ideal observer models 
Bayesian methods for reinforcement learning can be traced back to the 1960s, but 
until recently they have only been used very sporadically. Part of the reason for this 
is that non-Bayesian approaches described in the previous section tend to be easier to 
implement  and  work  with.  The  main  difference  between  the  classical  RW
2  vs. 
Bayesian learning models is that the former use point estimates of the associations, 
whereas  Bayesian  methods  are  based  on  using  full  posterior  distributions, 
considering not only the probabilities of the associations, but also the uncertainty 
about  theses  probabilities.  In  other  words,  the  mean  of  the  posterior  distribution 
reflects  the  current  estimate  of  the  association  strength,  and  the  variance  of  this 
distribution reflects the uncertainty about this estimate. This principled approach to 
balancing  previous  knowledge  and  current  information  is  formalised  by  Bayes 
Theorem:  
( ) ( ) ( ) | | p y p y p J J J µ             (1.6) 
Here,  ( ) y p | J  is the posterior belief about states J  (e.g. trial-by-trial estimates of 
associations) given the data y , based on the optimal combination of the likelihood 
( ) J | y p  and the prior belief in the model parameters  ( ) J p . Bayes theorem ensures 
                                                
2 Here we will refer to the term RW model for the sake of simplicity, but note that this can be replaced 
by any prediction error-based learning model with a fixed learning rate, including TD and Q-value 
learning models.    37 
optimal  integration  of  current  beliefs  based  on  past  information,  and  current 
information by weighing the prior and the likelihood by their respective precisions 
(see Figure 1.4).  
The application of Bayesian models to neuroscience and cognition research focused 
initially  on  domains  of  perception  and  sensorimotor  integration  (Bays  et  al., 
2006;Kording et al., 2007;Rao and Ballard, 1999;Whiteley and Sahani, 2008;Wolpert 
et al., 1995). More recently, however, the Bayesian approach has been applied to 
modelling learning processes, for which it is exquisitely suited, because it specifies 
how  to  optimally  update  beliefs  in  light  of  new  evidence.  Thus,  application  of 
Bayesian techniques has been extended to investigate a range of learning processes, 
from  sensorimotor  learning  (Bestmann  et  al.,  2008)  to  conditioning  and 
reinforcement  learning  (Behrens  et  al.,  2007;Courville  et  al.,  2006;Daw  et  al., 
2005;Yoshida et al., 2008).  
 
Figure  1.4. Bayes'  Rule.  Bayes'  Rule  optimally  combines  prior  knowledge 
(green) with new data (blue) by weighing their respective uncertainties, to express a 
posterior belief (red). In this example the precision of the prior is greater than that of 
the likelihood, therefore the mean of the posterior distribution is closer to the prior 
than to the likelihood. Note that when two distributions are combined in a Bayesian 
fashion  the  resulting  distribution  always  has  a  higher  precision  than  each  of  the 
source distributions.  
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1.2.3.1 Prediction errors in Bayesian models  
Although  in  the  update  equations  of  a  Bayesian  learning  model  there  is  no 
mathematical equivalent of the prediction error from RW models, surprise does play 
an  important  role.  Like  in  RW  models,  a  surprising  event  (i.e.  a  large  distance 
between  prior  and  likelihood)  will  result  in  a  large  shift  of  the  posterior  belief, 
whereas a fully predicted event (i.e. likelihood and prior fully overlap) results in no 
shift at all. Thus, Bayesian surprise is reflected by the distance between the posterior 
and prior distributions of the beliefs (Itti and Baldi, 2005).  
1.2.3.2 Limitations of Bayesian ideal observer models 
Bayesian ideal observer models are ideal in the sense that they follow Bayes rule, 
and thus generate predictions by optimally combining all available information. The 
catch here is the term ‘available’. A Bayesian model, like any other model, is ideal 
only  within  the  context  of  a  given  model  structure.  Consider  for  example  the 
following  situation:  In  a  paradigm  in  which  association  probabilities  fluctuate 
sinusoidally  around  an  average  of  0.5,  then  after  a  large  number  of  trials  the 
Bayesian observer will have a very strong belief that the association is at 0.5, and 
from that point onward, the belief will effectively be stuck at 0.5, failing to capture 
the sinusoidal shape of the fluctuations. This situation generalises to any belief after 
a  very  large  number  of  observations;  the  prior  will  have  a  very  small  variance, 
because every new observation reduces the variance. Compared to an RW model, 
this is effectively equivalent to a learning rate that over time asymptotes to zero. One 
solution for this is to reset the priors every time the probability has changed (e.g. 
(Bestmann et al., 2008)), but this assumes that the model ‘knows’ when to reset 
itself.  Thus,  this  Bayesian  is  clearly  not  a  very  good  in  this  circumstance,  even 
though it does, at every trial, optimally combine the available information.  
A more generic solution to this particular problem is to introduce an extra parameter 
that estimates the variability of the environment, such that when variability is high, 
e.g. every time the contingencies have changed, the variance of the prior is increased. 
This  is  the  Bayesian  equivalent  of  introduction  a  changing  learning  rate  (see 
(Behrens et al., 2007), and Chapter 4). With this extension, information about the 
variability of the environment will be optimally combined to weigh prior beliefs and 
new information.   39 
In summary, ‘ideal’ observers are ideal in the sense that they optimally combine all 
the  information  that  they  can  represent.  One  of  the  arguments  against  Bayesian 
models is that any phenomenon can then be explained in an "ideal" fashion given the 
right model structure. This illustrates how the often-posed question whether humans 
are  ideal  Bayesian  observers  is  not  a  very  informative  one.  Rather,  the  question 
should be what behaviour and brain processes can be modelled by which particular 
model.  
1.2.4  RW vs Bayesian models 
The most crucial distinction between standard reinforcement learning models and 
Bayesian update models, is that the former represent the state variables of the model 
(e.g.  the  contingencies)  as  point  estimators,  whereas  the  latter  provides  a  full 
posterior  distribution,  where  the  mean  reflects  the  belief  about  the  estimated 
contingency  and  the  variance  denotes  the  uncertainty  about  this  belief
3.  This 
difference has a number of important consequences.  
First of all, because the history of observed events is now recorded by two quantities, 
the mean and the variance of the parameters, Bayesian models have a ‘memory’ of 
the trial history: For a point estimate model (with unchanging learning rate), each 
new trial carries the same weight with respect to updating the estimate. It does not 
matter whether it has just observed  10 or 100 instances  of an  80% pairing of a 
stimulus and outcome; estimates on the 11
th or 101
st trial changed with equal ease. In 
contrast in the Bayesian models this weight is proportional to the number of trials 
that have been observed; the distribution of the belief about the association for a 
Bayesian observer model will be much narrower after 100 trials than after 10 trials 
(cf. Figure 1.4).  
This leads to the second difference, which is that for the RW models, the learning 
rate, which determines how much a belief is updated based on new information, is 
determined by the researcher, or is estimated from the measured data (e.g. reaction 
times).  For  the  Bayesian  models,  however,  the  balance  between  old  and  new 
information is determined by the structure of the model and the observed series of 
events.  
                                                
3 Note that one could also include higher order modes, such as the skewness and kurtosis, but most 
models make Gaussian assumptions about the distributions of state variables.    40 
In summary, RW models are simpler to implement and can model a large number of 
observed  conditioning  and  reinforcement  learning  phenomena.  However,  recently 
there has been a shift towards the use of Bayesian observer models which can take 
into account uncertainty about the estimates in a principled way. As such, Bayesian 
ideal observer models are part of a more general theoretical framework which will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.  
1.3 Summary of experimental work  
Chapters 3-5 describe the empirical research conducted for this thesis to investigate 
the role of prediction errors and connectivity changes in associative learning, using a 
combination of formal learning models and DCM for fMRI. A range of associative 
learning  tasks  was  used  with  increasing  behavioural  relevance  of  the  associative 
relationships. In Chapter 3 a combination of bilinear DCMs and a RW learning 
model is used to investigate changes in connectivity between sensory cortices as 
unchanging  and  task-irrelevant  relationships  between  affectively  neutral  sensory 
stimuli are being learned. Chapter 4 describes a study with dynamically changing 
CS-US associations in which subjects responded to affectively neutral targets. These 
target stimuli were chosen to be preferentially processed by different visual areas, 
which made it possible to assess the stimulus specificity of the prediction errors in 
visual cortex and striatum. Nonlinear DCM was combined with a Bayesian observer 
model that could optimally account for the changing probabilistic associations to 
explore  the  role  of  the  striatum  in  gating  sensorimotor  connections.  Finally  in 
Chapter 5 a pre-existing dataset is used for a nonlinear DCM study to investigate the 
role of the amygdala modulating corticostriatal connections in a fear conditioning 
paradigm.    41 
Chapter 2 
2.   Methods 
Methods 
Abstract 
The first section of this chapter describes the bilinear and nonlinear 
implementations of DCM for measured BOLD time series data. Both 
implementations  of  DCM  were  used  in  this  thesis  to  test  different 
hypotheses  related  to  changes  in  connectivity  during  associative 
learning. The second part describes Bayesian model selection, which 
was used to select the optimal model from sets of candidate models 
accounting for fMRI and behavioural data. In this chapter I will give a 
general description  for both analysis tools; specific details  for each 
implementation will be described in the results chapters (Chapters 3 - 
5). 
2.1 Dynamic Causal Modelling for fMRI 
2.1.1  Connectivity models and DCM 
Over the past decades, the predominant approach in cognitive neuroimaging has been 
to investigate functional specialisation of brain regions, based on the assumption that 
there is local specialisation of information processing. Although there is no doubt 
that  such  local  specificity  exists,  this  approach  is  clearly  incomplete  given  that 
locally  processed  information  must  be  integrated  at  some  stage.  The  aim  of 
connectivity  models  is  to  investigate  experimentally  induced  changes  in  cortical 
pathways  rather  than  cortical  areas  to  look  at  functional  integration  rather  than 
specialisation.  There  are  two  conceptually  distinct  approaches  to  connectivity 
analysis  of  fMRI  timeseries.  On  the  one  hand  there  are  models  of  functional 
connectivity,  defined  as  statistical  dependencies  between  spatially  remote   42 
neurophysiological  events,  and  on  the  other  hand  there  are  models  of  effective 
connectivity,  which  is  defined  as  the  influence  one  neuronal  system  exerts  over 
another (Friston et al., 1993a). 
Models of functional connectivity describe statistical dependencies among the data, 
thereby  providing  a  characterisation  of  the  functional  interactions,  or  context-
dependent coherence between different timeseries (Friston et al., 1993b). A simple 
example of functional connectivity analysis would consist of generating brain maps 
that  represent  voxel-wise  correlations  of  local  activity  with  the  timeseries  of  a 
particular ‘seed’ region of interest (ROI). These maps can then be compared e.g. 
under different experimental conditions. Functional connectivity analyses can be a 
useful exploratory device, because to characterise a functional network they do not 
rely on strong a priori assumptions about the underlying mechanisms. At the same 
time, this is also one of the main limitations, because this lack of specificity prevents 
one from testing detailed hypotheses about the connectivity of the underlying neural 
network. Moreover, the lack of causal (directed) effects precludes explanations at a 
mechanistic level as to the nature of the interactions between the different temporally 
correlated areas.  
Effective  connectivity  explicitly  models  the  influence  that  one  neuronal  system 
exerts over another, rather than just their statistical dependencies. It is congruent with 
the notion of ‘synaptic efficacy’ between individual neurons or neuronal populations. 
The aim of models of effective connectivity is to explain regional effects as detected 
by for example a voxel-wise GLM analysis, in terms of interregional connectivity. 
Unlike  the  exploratory  approach  of  functional  connectivity  methods,  models  of 
effective connectivity are mechanistic models, which require a clear neuranatomical 
delineation of the areas that are modelled, as well as a clear hypothesis about how 
these areas affect each other. Any type of effective connectivity analysis involves 
two steps: A first step in which the anatomical areas will form the nodes in the model 
are selected, and a second step in which the relationships between the nodes are 
described.  
DCM  is  a  model  of  effective  connectivity  to  make  inferences  about  the  neural 
processes  underlying  a  measured  time  series.  Like  other  models  of  effective 
connectivity DCM allows one to investigate the mechanisms underlying the observed   43 
dynamics  of  complex  neural  systems  in  terms  of  connection  strengths  and  their 
context-specific  modulation.  DCM  views  the  brain  as  a  deterministic  nonlinear 
dynamic  system  that  is  subject  to  external  inputs  in  the  form  of  experimental 
manipulations, and that produces outputs (Friston et al., 2003). DCM assumes that 
brain responses are driven by changes in the input, rather than by endogenous noise 
or "innovations", as is assumed by other models of effective connectivity (e.g. SEM 
and  autoregressive  models  (McIntosh  and  Gonzales-Lima,  1994)).  These 
experimental inputs can enter the system and elicit responses in one of two ways: 
Firstly they can enter as driving inputs, for example the presence of an auditory 
stimulus  would  directly  affect  an  auditory  cortex  node.  The  second  way  inputs 
influence the system is more indirectly, by modulating the coupling  between the 
nodes, for example effects of attention to visual input could modulate a top-down 
connection from frontal to primary visual areas.  
Moreover,  while  other  models,  such  as  structural  equation  modelling  (SEM, 
(McIntosh and Gonzales-Lima, 1994)) operate at the level of the measured signal, 
implicitly  assuming  an  identity  mapping  between  neuronal  processes  and 
(hemodynamic) measurements, DCM accounts for the nonlinear coupling between 
the measured hemodynamic responses and the underlying neural activity of interest 
(Penny et al., 2004b). In DCM the generative model consists of two levels. Causal 
effects in a cognitive system are modelled at the underlying (hidden) neuronal level 
using a parsimonious but plausible neurobiological model. The modelled neuronal 
population dynamics are then transformed into area-specific BOLD signals using a 
biologically  informed  hemodynamic  forward  model  (Stephan  et  al.,  2007d).  The 
general  idea  is  to  model  interactions  among  cortical  regions  by  optimising  the 
parameters  of  a  reasonably  realistic  underlying  neuronal  model  such  that  the 
modelled  BOLD  timeseries  matches  the  experimentally  measured  timeseries  as 
closely as possible.  
In  a further  diversion from  conventional models  of effective connectivity,  which 
model  instantaneous effects, DCM  is a  time series  model in  which the temporal 
evolution of the neural state vector is a function of the current state as well as the 
inputs and the system architecture. By modelling how state changes in a given node 
depend on the current state of any other node it is influenced by, DCM allows one to   44 
determine the directional influence between areas, equivalent to causal relationships 
in the sense of control theory.  
The most important application of DCM is that it can be used to answer questions 
about the modulation of effective connectivity. In the original formulation bilinear 
DCMs allow one to infer that a particular experimental manipulation (e.g. a cognitive 
set, learning, or a pharmacological manipulation) modulate a pathway, rather than a 
cortical region (see section 2.1.2 for details and Chapter 3 for implementation). 
Bilinear DCMs preclude an important aspect of neuronal interactions, namely how 
the connection between two neuronal populations is enabled or gated by activity in 
other populations. Therefore in a recent extension to DCM the bilinear approach is 
extended  such  that  now  the  effective  connectivity  between  nodes  is  not  only 
modulated by external inputs but also by activity in other nodes. In these nonlinear 
(second  order)  DCMs  the  modulation  of  connections  can  thus  be  assigned  to  a 
particular  neuronal  population  in  the  system  (see  Section  2.1.3  for  details  on 
nonlinear DCMs and Chapters 4 and 5 for implementation). 
2.1.2  Bilinear DCM 
In the bilinear formulation of DCM, the states of multiple interacting brain regions 
are modelled as a set of coupled bilinear differential equations (Friston et al., 2003). 
The neuronal states, which represent the neuronal population activity of the modelled 
brain  regions,  change  in  time  according  to  the  system's  connectivity  and 
experimentally controlled inputs u. These inputs can enter the model in two different 
ways; they can either elicit responses through direct influences on specific regions 
(“driving inputs", e.g. sensory inputs) or they can change the strength of connections 
between  regions  (“modulatory  inputs",  e.g.  task  effects  or  learning).  The  hidden 
neural dynamics are modelled by the following bilinear differential equation: 














              (2.1) 
Here,  z  is  the  state  vector  (with  each  state  variable  representing  the  population 
activity of one region in the model), t is continuous time, and ui is the i-th input to the 
modelled  system.  In  this  state  equation,  the  A  matrix  represents  the  fixed 
(endogenous) strength of connections between regions and the B
(1)...B
(m) matrices   45 
represent the modulation of these connections by (exogenous) inputs, as an additive 
change. Finally, the C matrix represents the influence of exogenous inputs on each 
area.  Note  that  DCM  allows  one  to  make  inferences  about  changes  in  effective 
connections between areas, which do not necessarily correspond to direct anatomical 
connections but may be via intermediary regions. 
The  hidden  neuronal  dynamics  described  by  Equation  2.1  are  transformed  to 
predicted BOLD responses by a hemodynamic forward model (Friston et al., 2003). 
Given  measured  BOLD  responses,  this model can  be  inverted,  using  a  Bayesian 
estimation scheme, to obtain maximum a posteriori estimates of the parameters in 
Equation  2.1  (Friston  et  al.,  2003).  Finally,  the  probability  of  the  data  given  a 
particular model can be estimated by integrating out the dependency of the joint 
density on the model parameters. This estimate, known as the model evidence or 
marginal likelihood, can be used to compare the goodness of competing models, and 
thus  to test different hypotheses  of the underlying neural network generating the 
measured responses. This procedure, known as Bayesian model selection, will be 
described in detail in Section 2.2.  
2.1.3  2
nd Order DCM 
As mentioned above, effective connectivity represents the influence of one neuronal 
population  on  another,  corresponding  to  the  notion  of  ‘synaptic  efficacy’.  The 
bilinear  term  in  DCM  models  the  effect  of  experimental  manipulations  on 
connections between neuronal populations. However, this framework precludes an 
analysis with respect to the neuronal source of these modulations, and thus omits an 
important aspect of neuronal interactions: how connections between two neuronal 
populations are gated by activity in other populations. These gating mechanisms are 
known to be mediated through interactions between synaptic inputs and are central to 
learning and attentional modulation. Therefore, a nonlinear extension to DCM has 
been developed which allows one to assign the modulation of network interactions to 
specific neuronal populations (Stephan et al., 2008).  
In the original bilinear implementation of DCM for fMRI, the temporal change of the 
neuronal state vector is modelled using a bilinear approximation that governs the 
dynamics of the system. In nonlinear DCMs, this bilinear approximation is extended   46 
to second order such that the hidden neural dynamics are modelled by the following 
equation:  
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Here, Equation 2.1 is extended with the D
(j) matrices, which encode how connection 
strengths are modulated or gated by activity in area j (for details, see (Stephan et al., 
2008)).  In  this  thesis,  the  second  order  extension  of  DCM  was  employed  to 
investigate  the  influence  of  the  putamen  and  amygdala  on  network  connectivity 
during associative audio-visual learning and during fear acquisition (see Chapters 4 
and 5, respectively). 
2.1.4  Parametric modulation of connections  
In most DCM studies to date, the inputs constituting the bilinear modulations of the 
network interactions are context dependent, such as attention or task instructions (see 
e.g. (Grol et al., 2007;Stephan et al., 2007b)). These inputs are simply either ‘on’ or 
‘off’, and are conceptually related to the main effect regressors in classical GLM 
analyses using mass univariate models (e.g. SPM, see www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). 
However, it is also possible  to assess  modulators that change  parametrically,  for 
example  dosage  of  a  pharmacological  intervention  or  the  temporal  evolution  of 
learning. The form of these parametric modulatory inputs corresponds to that of so-
called "parametrically  modulated  regressors"  in  a  classical  GLM  analysis.  In  the 
bilinear and nonlinear DCMs described in Chapters 3 and 4, association strengths 
were estimated using two different learning models, and entered the DCMs as direct 
or indirect modulatory input.  
2.2 Bayesian Inference and Model Comparison 
2.2.1  Within subject Bayesian inference  
In order to estimate the parameters of the forward model the DCMs are inverted 
using a Bayesian inversion approach. The inversion of a particular DCM involves 
approximation  of  the  posterior  probability  of  the  parameters  of  the  model,   47 
( ) m y p , | J , given a particular dataset and model. The posterior is proportional to the 
product of the prior probability and the likelihood  ( ) m y p , |J , following Bayes’ rule:  
( ) ( ) ( ) m p m y p m y p | , | , | J J J µ           (2.3) 
The  aim  of  the  model  inversion  is  to  find  the  parameters  J   that  maximise  the 
posterior probability, using empirical priors for the hemodynamic parameters and 
conservative  shrinkage  priors  for  the  neural  coupling  parameters.  The  parameter 
estimation  scheme  uses  a  Gauss-Newton  gradient  descent  embedded  in  an 
Expectation-Maximisation (EM) algorithm, which is described in detail elsewhere 
(Friston et al., 2002b). In short, in the E-step the posterior mean and covariance are 
updated, and during the M-step the hyperparameters of the noise covariance matrix 
are updated. The posterior densities of the neural parameters can then be used to 
make inferences about the effective connectivity, for example to test how certain one 
can be that a particular parameter exceeds a particular threshold (usually zero). 
However, one typically needs to compare alternative models representing different 
hypotheses  about  the  connectivity  of  the  network,  and  select  the  optimal  model 
before  making  inferences  about  the  model  parameters.  The  optimal  model  is  the 
model that has the greatest probability of representing the underlying system that 
produced  the  measured dataset;  this  probability  is  known  as  the  model  evidence 
( ) m y p | , and accounts for both model fit and model complexity (Pitt and Myung, 
2002). The model evidence can be found by integrating out any dependencies on the 
estimated model parameters J  from Equation 2.3.  
( ) ( ) ( ) ∫ = J J J d m p m y p m y p | , | |           (2.4) 
Unfortunately  in  most  cases  this  integral  cannot  be  solved  analytically,  and  is 
difficult to compute numerically (for one exception see Section 2.2.1.1). Therefore, 
instead  of  evaluating  the  integral  in  Equation  2.4,  approximations  to  the  model 
evidence must be used (Friston et al., 2007;Penny et al., 2004a). Commonly used 
approximations  are  the  Akaike  Information  Criterion  (AIC,  (Akaike,  1974)),  the 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC, (Schwarz, 1978)) and the negative free energy 
(F). All of these methods approach the true model evidence by optimising a bound on 
the integral in Equation 2.4. The difference between these approximations is how   48 
they treat the trade-off of model accuracy (model fit) and model complexity. It is 
important  to  penalise  the  model  evidence  for complexity,  because  model fit  will 
increase monotonically with complexity, but at some point the mode will start fitting 
noise,  thereby  reducing  the  generalisability  of  the  model.  Therefore  the  optimal 
model  provides  the  best  balance  between  model  fit  and  complexity.  In  all  three 
approximations  of  the  model  evidence  (AIC,  BIC  and  F),  the  accuracy  is  the 
expected log likelihood of the data under an approximating posterior density on the 
parameters ( ) J q , which is optimised iteratively.  
For the AIC and BIC the approximation to the log model evidence for model m can 
be given by  










          (2.5) 
where p is the number of parameters and n the log of the number of observations 
(e.g. scans). When looking at the complexity terms, it becomes clear that the BIC 
pays a heavier penalty than the AIC (when 1 2 log > n , i.e. when 8 > n ). Therefore 
the BIC will favour simpler models whereas the AIC will be biased towards more 
complex models. Because this could lead to contradictory results, generally models 
are only considered to be different in fit when the results from the AIC and BIC 
concur. The AIC and BIC were used in Chapter 3 to select the optimal DCM out of 
a number of models.  
The  AIC  and  BIC  are  useful  and  easy  approximations  of  the  model  evidence. 
However,  because  the  complexity  term  scales  linearly  with  the  number  of 
parameters, they both fail to account for redundant parameterisation; when adding a 
parameter  that  has  identical  effects  than  another  parameter  on  predicting 
measurements,  the  complexity  terms  of  both  AIC  and  BIC  would  increase  even 
though the ‘true’ complexity would  not  change. Often models will have (partial) 
dependencies  amongst  parameters,  and  in  this  case  the  AIC/BIC  approach  will 
overestimate model complexity. In the negative free energy approach the complexity 
is the Kullbach-Leibler divergence between the approximating posterior and the prior 
density, reflecting the amount of information obtained about the model parameters 
from the data.    49 
( ) ( ) [ ] m p q KL m accuracy F | , ) ( J J - =         (2.6) 
 
Under  the  Laplace  approximation  (i.e.  assuming  that  the  conditional  density  is  a 
multivariate Gaussian), the complexity term splits into three terms 
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where  J C   and  y C | J are  the  determinants  of  the  prior  and  posterior  covariance 
matrices, and  J m  and  y | J m the prior and posterior means. The first term increases the 
complexity with the effective degrees of freedom, taking into account dependencies 
amongst  parameters,  i.e.  additional  redundant  parameters  do  not  increase  the 
complexity. The second term decreases the penalty with the degree of independence 
that the parameters have a posteriori, because in a good model the parameters are as 
precise and independent as possible The third term shows that the complexity penalty 
increases the larger the difference between the prior and posterior means, i.e. when 
suboptimal  priors are  used.  Thus  the  free  energy  F  is  often  a  better approach  to 
approximate the log evidence than the AIC/BIC, and was used in Chapters 4 and 5 
to decide between different competing DCM models.  
For  any  of  these  model  evidence  approximations,  to  determine  how  strong  the 
evidence is in favour of one model, one can simply compute the model evidence ratio 
of the two models, also known as the Bayes Factor, or equivalently the difference 
between the log evidences. If the difference in the log evidences is greater than about 
three (i.e. the Bayes factor is larger than 20), this is considered as strong evidence in 
favour of a particular model (Raftery, 1995).  
2.2.1.1 A special case: Bayesian GLM for response speed data  
Linear Gaussian models constitute a rare case where there is an analytical solution to 
the model evidence, instead of having to resort to an approximation as described 
above. This analytical solution, under the assumption that the data and design matrix 
are Gaussian, can be viewed as the Bayesian version of a GLM. Like in a classical 
GLM,  the  model  to  be  tested  is  described  by  a  design  matrix  which  includes   50 
regressor for all explanatory variables of the model. Using flat priors, one can then 
calculate the model evidence for different models as a function of the model fit (sum 
of squared residuals) and the complexity (the number of regressors in the design 
matrix). This linear model has the following form: 
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This is the probability of the data Y  (e.g. response speeds), given the design matrix 
X , parameters b , and normally distributed errors ( )
2 , 0 ~ s e N . In order to compute 
the model evidence, or probability of the data given the model, the parameters and 
hyperparameter s need to be integrated out: 
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Here r is the number of parameters in the design matrix, d is the number of data-
points and  
( ) ( )Y X X X X I Y
T T T 1 -
- = l             (2.10) 
is the sum of squared residuals. Therefore the log model evidence is 
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Model evidences can then be compared either at the level of the individual subject, 
using the Bayes Factor, or at the group level using one of the group Bayesian model 
selection tools described below (see Section 2.2.2).   51 
2.2.2  Group level Bayesian inference 
2.2.2.1 Fixed effects analysis: Group Bayes Factor 
The  Bayes  Factor  approach  described  in  Section  2.2.1  is  suitable  for  comparing 
different  models  for  one  particular  dataset,  for  example  from  a  single  subject. 
However, one will often want to make inferences about a group of subjects, and 
select the model that best explains multiple datasets. Assuming that the datasets of 
different subjects are independent, one can simply multiply the Bayes factors for 
each model across all subjects, known as the Group Bayes Factor (GBF, e.g. see 
(Stephan et al., 2007c)). This fixed effects analysis will be used in Chapter 3 to 
select the optimal DCM from three competing models.  
2.2.2.2 Bayesian random effects analysis 
Combining BMS results from a group of subjects relying on fixed-effects analyses 
such as described above assumes that all subjects’ data are generated by the same 
model. As a result they fail to account for group heterogeneity and are vulnerable to 
outliers.  Stephan  et  al.  developed  a  novel  random  effects  Bayesian  analysis 
framework  to  cope  with  these  shortcomings  (Stephan  et  al.,  2009).  This  method 
allows one to quantify the probability that a particular model generated the data for 
any  randomly  selected  subject,  relative  to  other  models.  They  showed  that  this 
approach of calculating a conditional density of model probabilities given the model 
evidence for individual subjects, is superior both to using the group Bayes factor (as 
described  above),  and  to  applying  frequentist  tests  to  the  log  evidences.  This 
superiority was especially evident in the case of large intersubject heterogeneity and 
in the case of outliers (Stephan et al., 2009). 
Instead of assuming that the data were generated by the same model for all subjects, 
this  approach  computes  a  density  from  which  models  are  sampled  to  generate 
subject-specific  data.  In  other  words,  it  searches  for  the  conditional estimates  of 
model  probabilities  [ ] K r r r ,..., 1 = ,  that  generate  indicator  variables, 






nk m . 
These indicator variables prescribe the model for the n-th subject, where ( ) k nk r m p = . 
Since  the  model  probabilities  r  follow  a  Dirichlet  distribution ( ) a | r p ,  the   52 
conditional  expectations  ( ) K q k r a a a + + = ... 1   encode  the  expected  probability 
that the k-th model will be selected for a randomly selected subject. For details about 
the hierarchical Bayesian model that is inverted to obtain the Dirichlet parameters a  
of the posterior  ( ) a ; | y r p  see (Stephan et al., 2009).  
After optimisation of a , the posterior can be used for group level Bayesian model 
comparison, where the results can be reported in several different ways. Firstly one 
can  simply  report  the  estimate  of  [ ] K a a a ,..., 1 =   for  each  of  the  models,  where 
1 - k a  represents the number of subjects in which  k m  generated the observed data. 
One  can  also  use  the  posterior  ( ) a ; | y r p   to  compute  the  expected  multinomial 
parameters k r , and thus calculate the expected likelihood of obtaining a particular 
model for any randomly selected subject 
( ) K q k r a a a + + = ... 1             (2.12) 
Either of these models can then be used to rank the models at the group level. A third 
option is to use  ( ) a ; | y r p  to quantify an exceedance probability, defined as the 
belief that a particular model k is better than any other of the models tested given the 
group data. In this thesis we have adopted the approach to report both the Dirichlet 
parameters  a  and the exceedance probabilities when discussing the results of our 
analyses. We have used this novel random effects Bayesian model selection tool to 
show that behavioural data were well described by a sophisticated Bayesian learning 
model in Chapter 4, and to select the optimal DCM in Chapters 4 and 5.  
2.2.2.3 Model space partitioning in Bayesian random effects analysis  
The  Bayesian  random effects  analysis  can  be  used  not  only  to  compare  specific 
models, but also to test for differences between parts of ‘model space’, provided that 
each subspace contains the same number of models, i.e. the design is fully factorial 
(Stephan et al., 2009). For example, one may wish to compare the effect of adding or 
leaving out a particular connection, irrespective of any other differences between the 
tested  models.  This  model  space  partitioning  can  be  regarded  as  the  Bayesian 
equivalent of a main effects analysis in a classical ANOVA.    53 
This analysis exploits the agglomerative property of the Dirichlet distribution: Once 
the parameters  k a  for all K models have been estimated, for each subset of models a 
new Dirichlet density can be calculated simply by adding the  k a  for all models 
belonging to that particular subset. The resulting Dirichlet can be used to compare 
subsets of models in exactly the same way as for individual models, for example to 
calculate the exceedance probabilities.  
Model space partitioning will be used in Chapter 5 to compare the addition and 
removal of endogenous connections and second order modulations in a 2x3 factorial 
design.    54 
Chapter 3 
3.   A Dual Role for Prediction Error in Associative Learning 
A Dual Role for Prediction Error in Associative Learning 
 
Abstract 
In  this  fMRI  experiment  subjects  implicitly  learned  the  association 
between the presence (or absence) of a task-irrelevant visual stimulus 
and the presence (or absence) of a task-irrelevant auditory stimulus. 
Using a Rescorla-Wagner (RW) model to describe the evolution of 
fMRI responses during learning, it was shown that BOLD activity in 
primary  visual  cortex  (V1)  and  the  ventral  striatum  covaried  with 
prediction errors, or surprising events, regardless whether this surprise 
concerned  the  unexpected  presence  of  a  visual  stimulus  or  its 
unexpected  absence.  Furthermore,  DCM  analyses  suggest  that  this 
response  in  V1  is  due  to  prediction  error  dependent  changes  in 
connections from the auditory cortex (A1). To our knowledge, this is 
the first empirical evidence that (i) V1 responds to prediction errors 
engendered  by  audio-visual  probabilistic  relations,  and,  more 
generally, that (ii) prediction errors during associative learning drive 
synaptic  plasticity.  This  finding  has  important  implications  for  our 
understanding  of  general  mechanisms  of  perceptual  learning  and 
inference in the human brain.  
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3.1 Introduction  
Among the fundaments of adaptive behaviour is the ability to predict future events. 
This  ability  is  crucial  to  functions  ranging  from  sensory  processing  to  decision 
making.  In  psychology  and  neuroscience,  prediction  has  been  studied  most 
extensively in the context of Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning tasks, which 
measure how organisms anticipate (and act on) affectively significant events such as 
food delivery or electric shocks. A recent series of functional neuroimaging studies 
has investigated the neurophysiological basis of prediction and learning in humans. 
Using Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning tasks, these studies have identified 
several areas where BOLD signals correlate with trial-wise estimates from formal 
learning models like TD learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998) or the Rescorla-Wagner 
model (RW) (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972). In particular, BOLD activity in areas 
including  the  striatum  and  the  dorsolateral  prefrontal  cortex  (key  dopaminergic 
targets)  has  been  shown  to  covary  with  both  predictions  and  prediction  errors 
(Corlett et al., 2004;Fletcher et al., 2001;Gläscher and Büchel, 2005;Jensen et al., 
2007;McClure et al., 2003;O'Doherty et al., 2004;Pessiglione et al., 2006;Seymour et 
al., 2004;Turner et al., 2004). 
In  all of these previous studies, the learned  associations had  direct relevance for 
behaviour, either because they were linked to rewarding or punishing outcomes (e.g. 
(McClure  et  al.,  2003;O'Doherty  et  al.,  2004;Seymour  et  al.,  2004)  or  because 
subjects received feedback on their performance (Aron et al., 2004;Corlett et al., 
2004;Fletcher  et  al.,  2001;Turner  et  al.,  2004).  In  contrast,  it  is  unclear  whether 
incidental learning of stimulus-stimulus associations, i.e. learning of associations that 
are  irrelevant  for  current  behavioural  goals,  draws  upon  the  same  neuronal 
mechanisms. A paradigm that shows that these types of associations are learned is 
‘sensory  preconditioning’.  Here,  in  a  first  stage,  the  subject  is  exposed  to 
behaviourally meaningless CS1-CS2 associations and, in a second stage, to CS1-US 
pairings.  In  a  third  and  final  stage,  the  presentation  of  a  CS2  alone  generates  a 
conditioned response, indicating that the subject must have learned the initial CS1-
CS2 association (Brogden, 1939;Gewirtz and Davis, 2000). 
In this study we used a factorial design that extended the first stage of a classical 
sensory  preconditioning  paradigm.  Healthy  volunteers  performed  an  audio-visual   56 
target detection task, while being exposed to a stream of concurrent audio-visual 
"distractor"  stimuli  (Figure  3.1).  These  stimuli  possessed  statistical  regularities, 
which enabled prediction of the visual distractor from the preceding auditory cue 
(Figure  3.2).  Critically,  however,  these  statistical  associations  were  completely 
irrelevant  to  the  target  detection  task.  Any  learning  of  these  associations  would 
therefore  be  of  an  incidental  (task-unrelated)  nature  and,  in  the  absence  of 
behavioural  responses  to  the  learned  associations,  could  only  be  inferred 
neurophysiologically. This paradigm capitalised on previous work by McIntosh et al. 
(McIntosh et al., 1998) who used positron emission tomography (PET) to show that 
learning of associations between sensory stimuli was reflected by activity in early 
visual cortex. However, the use of PET permitted only a simple conditioning scheme 
and precluded a full investigation of dynamic changes in the brain’s representation of 
the learned association. Here, we employed a more refined conditioning scheme and 
used  fMRI  to  study  learning-dependent  changes  in  brain  activity  over  time. 
Additionally,  we  assessed  learning-dependent  changes  in  effective  connectivity 
between auditory and visual cortex using DCM. 
Using a 4-factorial design (cf. Table 3.1), this study characterised learning in terms 
of the temporal evolution (learning; factor 1) of both brain activity and interregional 
connectivity in response to a visual stimulus whose presence or absence (V
+ vs. V
-; 
factor 2) was predicted in 2 contexts, established by 2 types of auditory conditioning 
stimuli (CS+ vs. CS-; factor 3), each of which could be present or absent on each 
trial  (A
+  vs.  A
-;  factor  4).  In  other  words,  in  contrast  to  classical  sensory 
preconditioning  paradigms,  we  could  not  only  investigate  differential  learning, 
depending on CS type but could also assess whether the consequences of an absent 
CS were learned. It should be noted that both the CS+ and CS- contexts (or blocks) 
were balanced in terms of stimuli; the a priori probabilities of the auditory CS and of 
the visual stimulus occurring on a given trial were always 50%. Critically, the task 
was not related to these auditory and visual stimuli; subjects performed a target-
detection task on unrelated stimuli that were presented sporadically. 
One of the features of our factorial paradigm is that on half the trials the auditory CS 
is absent. This necessitates an additional cue that marks the beginning of each trial, 
which  was  a  visual  trial  onset  (TO)  cue.  In  other  words,  learning  of  stimulus 
associations in this paradigm has two components, one related to the auditory CS and   57 
another related to the visual TO cue. As a consequence, any model of the learning 
process  must  be  able  to  formulate  how  a  net  prediction  is  computed  from  the 
associative strengths of the two cue components. We chose the RW model since it is 
the simplest and most generic model of associative learning that accounts for cue 
interactions  (see  Discussion  Section  3.4  for  details).  The  RW-model  has  been 
validated extensively, using behavioural data from both humans and animals and can 
account for many aspects of associative learning (Pearce and Bouton, 2001;Schultz 
and Dickinson, 2000). In our study, the trial-wise associative strength predicted by 
the RW model was used to construct regressors for a voxel-wise general linear model 
of fMRI data and modulatory inputs for DCMs (Friston et al., 2003) of the effective 
connectivity  between  auditory  and  visual  areas.  Specifically,  we  addressed  the 
following two questions: 
1.  In  the  absence  of  any  behavioural  responses  to  the  audio-visual  stimulus 
associations, can we obtain neurophysiological evidence that the brain learns 
these  associations?  Specifically,  can  we  find  brain  regions  whose  activity 
correlates  with  learning
4  as  predicted  by  a  generic  model  of  associative 
learning (i.e., the RW model)? Candidate areas included early visual cortex 
and the striatum. Furthermore, do these areas show a response profile across 
cue-outcome  combinations  that  reflects  a  match  between  prediction  and 
outcome or rather a prediction error response? 
2.  Since  the  predictive  auditory  cue  temporally  precedes  the  visual  outcome, 
learning should modify neuronal activity in early visual cortex in response to 
auditory  cues.  Can  these  putative  learning-related changes  in  visual cortex 
activity be explained by changes in the effective connectivity from auditory to 
visual cortex (cf., (McIntosh et al., 1998;McLaren et al., 1989)? Specifically, 
do  these  changes  conform  to  changes  in  associative  strength  under  a  RW 
model of learning? 
Before describing our experiment, two important issues should be highlighted. First, 
the goal of this fMRI study was not to pinpoint the exact mathematical form of 
incidental learning by comparing different models of associative learning. Instead, 
                                                
4 Throughout the chapter, we will use the colloquial term "learning curve" to denote the vector of 
predicted associative strength over time, i.e. 
j
t f  in Equation 1.   58 
we  used  the  simplest  model  of associative  learning  that  could  accommodate  our 
paradigm. In the Discussion (Section 3.4), we argue why the RW model can be 
considered  an  appropriate  a  priori  learning  model  for  our  particular  paradigm, 
relative to other models of associative learning. Second, it is important to note that 
within a given experimental condition the predicted outcomes and prediction errors 
are perfectly anti-correlated when mean-corrected (see Appendix A for details). This 
means  they  cannot  be  distinguished  as  alternative  predictors  of  observed  brain 
responses.  However,  with  our  factorial  design  one  can  analyse  the  pattern  of 
parameter  estimates  across  experimental  conditions,  contrasting  expected  and 
unexpected  cue-outcome  combinations.  This  enabled  us  to  distinguish,  voxel  by 
voxel,  brain  responses  that  reflected  a  match  between  predicted  and  actual  trial 
outcomes from responses that encode prediction error or surprise. 
3.2 Methods & Statistical analysis  
3.2.1  Subjects 
Sixteen  healthy  volunteers,  25.3  ±3.3  years  of  age,  (mean  age  ±  SD,  8  female) 
participated in the study. The subjects had no history of psychiatric or neurological 
disorders. Written informed consent was obtained from all volunteers prior to the 
study,  which  was  approved  by  the  National  Hospital  for  Neurology  and 
Neurosurgery Ethics Committee. 
3.2.2  Experimental Design – fMRI  
The central idea of this study was to present subjects with "distractor" stimuli that 
were linked by predictive associations: two auditory stimuli served as conditioning 
stimuli  (CS)  and  differentially  predicted  whether  or  not  a  visual  stimulus  would 
follow. Critically, the volunteers performed an unrelated detection task on separate 
auditory and visual targets; for this task, the predictive relationships between the 
distractor  stimuli  were  completely  irrelevant.  Stimuli  were  presented  using 
Cogent2000  (www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent/index.html).  An  initial  sound  matching 
task and the subsequent learning study (4 x 10 min) were all completed inside the 
scanner. Subjects were debriefed with a post-scan questionnaire to assess whether 
they had learned the experimental contingencies.    59 
3.2.2.1 Sound matching 
Preceding the learning experiment, subjects had to match the two CS (450 Hz and 
1000 Hz) and the auditory target stimulus (white noise burst) for perceived loudness. 
Stimuli were presented sequentially and dichotically. Subjects adapted the volume of 
the  1000  Hz  tone  to  the  450  Hz  tone  until  they  perceived  them  to  be  of  equal 
loudness.  This  procedure  was  repeated  eight  times  and  the  results  averaged. 
Subsequently, subjects matched the perceived loudness of the white noise burst to the 
pure tones, each repeated four times. The adapted volumes, as a percentage of the 
volume of the low tone were 94.0 ± 6.2 % (mean ± SD) for the high tone, and 104 ± 
4.9 % for the white noise burst.  
3.2.2.2 Differential conditioning  
During the experiment, subjects were exposed to alternating blocks of trials in which 
one of two auditory conditioning stimuli (high and low tone) predicted the presence 
(CS+) or omission (CS-) of a subsequent visual stimulus with a fixed probability of 
80% (Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1). On each trial, a CS was presented (A+) with 50% 
probability. On 50% of all trials, a visual stimulus was present (V+). Every trial was 
preceded by a visual trial-onset (TO) cue.  
Our paradigm thus used a 4-factor design with the following factors for each trial: i) 
CS context (CS+ vs. CS-), ii) CS presence (A+ vs. A-), iii) visual outcome (V+ vs. 
V-)  and  iv)  learning  (or  time).  We  used  a  mixed  design  in  which  CS  type  was 
blocked, whereas the presentation of the CS and visual outcome were randomized 
(event-related) within blocks. CS+ and CS- blocks were completely balanced so that 
in each block of 10 trials, five CS and five outcome stimuli were presented. Within 
each subject, the auditory CS+ and CS- and their probabilistic relation to subsequent 
visual stimuli were fixed throughout the experiment. The assignment of tones to the 
two CSs was counterbalanced across subjects, i.e. in half the subjects the high tone 
served as CS+ (and the low tone as CS-), and vice versa the other half of the subjects. 
Each of the foursessions consisted of 20 blocks of 10 trials, interspersed with periods 
of rest (12 s), in which subjects fixated on a fixation cross. Blocks and sessions were 
balanced across and within subjects.   60 
3.2.2.3 Target detection task 
To ensure continuous attention to auditory and visual targets per se (but not their 
statistical associations), subjects performed a concurrent target detection task. The 
target stimuli were randomly interspersed between trials and consisted of either a 
white noise burst or a circle. Target stimuli occurred on average once per block (at 
most  twice).  In  total,  40  auditory  and  40  visual  target  stimuli  were  presented, 
randomised within conditions and sessions.  
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Figure  3.1.  Experimental  design.  A)  Stimuli  presented  during  the 
experiment.  The  ‘distractor’  stimuli,  whose  associations  were  being  learned 
incidentally,  comprised  two  auditory  conditioning  stimuli  (CS)  corresponding  to 
high-  and  low-frequency  tones  and  one  visual  unconditioned  stimulus  (US) 
consisting  of  three  concentric  squares.  The  target  stimuli,  to  which  the  subjects 
responded, comprised a white noise burst and a circle. B) Temporal sequence of a 
single trial. Both the CS and US could be either presented or omitted. The average 
trial duration was 2 seconds. The trial onset (TO) cue was a small central dot (100 
ms); the auditory CS was presented for 500 ms, starting 400 ms after trial onset. The 
visual stimulus was presented 750 ms after trial onset, also for 500 ms. The inter-trial 
interval (ITI) was  jittered, ranging from  350 – 1350  ms, and target stimuli were 
inserted only in the longest ITIs, lasting for 300 ms. 
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p(V p(V p(V p(V- - - -|A |A |A |A+ + + +) ) ) ) = 80% = 80% = 80% = 80%
p(V p(V p(V p(V+ + + +|A |A |A |A- - - -) ) ) ) = 80% = 80% = 80% = 80%
p(V p(V p(V p(V- - - -|A |A |A |A- - - -) ) ) ) = 20% = 20% = 20% = 20%















































































































































































p(V p(V p(V p(V+ + + +|A |A |A |A+ + + +) ) ) )= 80% = 80% = 80% = 80%
p(V p(V p(V p(V- - - -|A |A |A |A+ + + +) ) ) ) = 20% = 20% = 20% = 20%
p(V p(V p(V p(V+ + + +|A |A |A |A- - - -) ) ) ) = 20% = 20% = 20% = 20%
p(V p(V p(V p(V- - - -|A |A |A |A- - - -) ) ) ) = 80% = 80% = 80% = 80%
p(V p(V p(V p(V+ + + +|A |A |A |A+ + + +) ) ) )= 20% = 20% = 20% = 20%
p(V p(V p(V p(V- - - -|A |A |A |A+ + + +) ) ) ) = 80% = 80% = 80% = 80%
p(V p(V p(V p(V+ + + +|A |A |A |A- - - -) ) ) ) = 80% = 80% = 80% = 80%
p(V p(V p(V p(V- - - -|A |A |A |A- - - -) ) ) ) = 20% = 20% = 20% = 20%























Table 3.1. Probabilistic relationship between auditory and visual 
stimuli. Contingency tables showing the proportion of a each trial type occurring 
during  CS+  and  CS-  blocks  respectively.  Below  the  tables  are  the  resulting 
conditional probabilities of the visual stimulus being present (or absent), given the 
presence (or absence) of the auditory conditioned stimulus (CS); these probabilities 
can be inferred by comparing the frequencies within each column of the table.  
3.2.3  fMRI Data Acquisition 
A 3 Tesla Siemens Allegra MRI scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) was used to 
acquire T1-weighted fast-field echo structural images and multi-slice T2*-weighted 
echo-planar volumes with blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) contrast (TR 
= 2.08 secs). For each subject, functional data were acquired in 4 scanning sessions 
of approximately 10 minutes each. 306 volumes were acquired per session (1224 
scans in total per subject). The first 6 volumes of each session were discarded to 
allow for T1 equilibrium effects. Each functional brain volume comprised 34 2 mm 
axial slices with a 2 mm inter-slice gap, and an in-plane resolution of 3x3 mm. The 
field of view covered the whole brain, except for the cerebellum and brainstem. The 
total duration of the experiment was approximately 60 mins per subject. 
3.2.4  Data Analysis 
3.2.4.1 Functional neuroimaging analysis 
fMRI data were analysed using the statistical software package SPM5 (Wellcome 
Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The 
1200  images  from  each  subject  were  realigned  to  correct  for  head  movements, 
corrected for movement-by-distortion interactions (Andersson et al., 2001), spatially 
normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template brain, smoothed   62 
spatially with a 3-dimensional Gaussian kernel of 8mm full width half maximum and 
re-sampled to 3x3x3 mm voxels. The data were then modelled voxel-wise, using a 
GLM that included regressors for all experimental trials as well as regressors for the 
target detection task. Trial-specific effects were modelled by trains of delta functions 
convolved  with  three  hemodynamic  basis  functions  (a  canonical  hemodynamic 
response  function, and  its  temporal and  dispersion  derivatives).  Additionally,  the 
time-dependent  associative  strengths  from  the  Rescorla-Wagner  model  (
j
t i, f ;  see 
Equation 3.1) and their partial derivatives with respect to learning rate (see next 
Section) were used as parametric modulators of each trial-specific regressor. The 
data were high-pass filtered (cut-off 128 seconds) to remove low-frequency signal 
drifts, and a first-order autoregressive model was used to model the remaining serial 
correlations (Friston et al., 2002a). Contrast images of parameter estimates encoding 
trial-specific effects were created for each subject and entered separately into voxel-
wise  one-sample  t-tests  (df  =  15),  to  implement  a  second-level  random  effects 
analysis.  We  report  regions  that  survive  cluster-level  correction  for  multiple 
comparisons  (family-wise  error,  FWE)  across  the  whole  brain  at  P<0.05.  Since 
previous studies demonstrated the role of the striatum and the prefrontal cortex in 
associative learning (e.g. (Corlett et al., 2004;Fletcher et al., 2001;O'Doherty et al., 
2004), we performed an additional search restricted to these areas, using anatomical 
masks generated from the PickAtlas toolbox (Maldjian et al., 2003). Again, we only 
report activations that survived a small volume correction (SVC) at P<0.05. 
3.2.5  Rescorla-Wagner model 
We used a RW model of associative  learning to generate predictors of  learning-
dependent changes  in  brain  activity  (as  indexed  by  the  BOLD  signal)  and  inter-
regional connectivity over time. The basic principle of this model is that the size of 
the trial-specific prediction error, i.e. the degree of surprise incurred by an event, 
determines the change in associative strength. From the train of observed events a 
learning curve was computed and fitted to the fMRI data. Trial-specific cueing was 
modelled by means of two separate components (see Figure 3.1): the visual TO cue 
TO, which was present on every trial and the auditory CS per se, which was present 
on half the trials. This allowed us to model learning effects on trials where no CS   63 
was present. In the RW framework, the predicted outcome on trial t, 
j
t f  , is the sum 















t u , , f f                    (3.2) 
On  each  trial  t,  Equation  3.1  is  calculated  separately  for  each  cue  component, 
indexed by i (i.e., the auditory CS, and TO), while ui,t indexes which of the cue 
components is actually present on trial t.  t l  indicates the actual outcome at trial t, 
being 1 for V
+ and 0 for V
-;  i e  is the learning rate that determines how strongly the 
prediction  error  affects  the  update  of  the  prediction.  Separate  components  are 
summed in Equation 3.2, where 
j
t f  is the summed prediction of whether a visual 
stimulus will be presented at trial t, and j indexes whether this is a CS+ or CS- trial.
5  
3.2.5.1 Learning rate  
A challenge when applying the RW model to our experiment was to determine an 
appropriate  learning  rate.  In  principle  this  can  be  done  by  fitting  the  model  to 
behavioural data and using the resulting learning rate to construct regressors for the 
fMRI analysis. However, our experimental design deliberately precluded behavioural 
responses; instead, learning could only be assessed neurophysiologically in terms of 
changes in cortical activity and inter-regional connectivity. Alternative strategies are 
to choose the learning rate based on principled considerations (e.g. (O'Doherty et al., 
2004)) or using model  comparison (Gläscher and Büchel, 2005). Since we knew 
from a previous study that learning should occur in the visual cortex (McIntosh et al., 
1998),  we  adopted  the  approach  by  Gläscher  and  Büchel  (Gläscher  and  Büchel, 
2005)  of  optimising  the  value  of  i e   to  best  explain  putative  learning-induced 
                                                
5 When considered for a single cue per trial, Equation 1 can also be seen as a simple model of Hebbian 
or associative plasticity. In this context,  ,
j
i t f  encodes the associative strength, which changes 
according to the second term in Equation 1. This associative term comprises a (pre-synaptic) input 
, i t u  encoding the outcome on any trial, and a (post-synaptic) prediction error.   64 
responses within the main area of interest, the visual cortex. Because our volunteers 
did not notice the statistical associations (and thus learning was presumably slow) 
and since another study of perceptual association learning showed small learning 
rates  CS e  below 0.1 (Gläscher and Büchel, 2005), we tested the following values of 
CS e  in separate models: 0.01, 0.025, 0.05, 0.075, 0.1. We found that eCS=0.075 gave 
the best fit to the data in primary visual cortex for the main contrast of interest (i.e., 
the 4-way interaction in a random effects second level analysis); this learning rate 
was then used for further analysis across the entire brain and for the connectivity 
analyses  described  below.  Importantly,  we  used  a  first-order  Taylor  expansion 
around  the  learning  rate  eCS=0.075  to  make  the  model  less  dependent  on  the 
particular choice of learning rate and to account for inter-subject variability in the 
shape  of  the  learning  curves.  This  was  implemented  by  including  the  partial 
derivative  of  the  learning  curve 
j
t f   with  respect  to  the  learning  rate  i e   as  an 
additional parametric modulator in the GLM for the fMRI data.  
Given that there was no prior hypothesis about differences between the learning rates 
of  CS+  and  CS-  trials,  the  analyses  described  were  performed  using  identical 
learning rates for both CS types. However, the results from the GLM analysis of the 
fMRI data showed that learning effects were largely driven by CS+ trials, which 
suggested that for CS- trials a smaller learning rate should have been chosen than for 
CS+.  This  prompted  additional  analyses  to  test  this  possibility.  We  examined 
whether (i) a selective decrease of the learning rate for CS- trials improved the ability 
to detect learning effects during this trial type, and, more generally, whether (ii) the 
parameter estimates for the partial derivatives (of the learning curve 
j
t f  with respect 
to the learning rate  i e ) indicated that the learning rate for either CS+ or CS- trials 
was different from eCS=0.075.  
With respect to the first point, the data were re-analysed using lower learning rates 
for CS- trials (e=0.05 and 0.025, i.e. 
2/3 and 
1/3 of the learning rate e=0.075 used for 
CS+ trials). Specifically, the critical interaction (CS presence ´ visual outcome ´ 
RW learning restricted to CS- trials) was examined to check whether these lower 
learning rates would give evidence of learning effects during CS- trials. This contrast   65 
was first tested across the whole brain, and subsequently restricted to those regions 
which showed significant learning effects for CS+ trials.  
To address the second issue, the parameter estimates for the partial derivatives (with 
respect to the learning rates) of the learning curves were examined. If the learning 
rate for either CS had been set too high or too low, the parameter estimates for the 
partial derivative would have deviated significantly, across subjects, from zero. All 
learning-related contrasts were tested for CS+ and CS- trials separately. Again, this 
analysis was first performed across the whole brain and subsequently restricted to 
those areas which showed significant learning effects.  
Finally, because of its short duration and small size, the TO cue is less salient than 
the  CS.  Since  in  the  RW  model  the  learning  rate  reflects  stimulus  properties 
including  salience  (Rescorla  and  Wagner,  1972),  TO e   can  be  assumed  to  be 
considerably  smaller  than  CS e .  In  this  study  TO e   was  assumed  to  be  four  times 
smaller than  CS e . It should be noted that violations of this assumption are unlikely to 
have a dramatic effect because the inclusion of the derivatives enables the model to 
cope with deviations from the assumed learning rates, as was described above.  
3.2.5.2 Statistical analysis of learning effects 
The association strengths of the different cue components with the visual outcome 
were  determined  from  the  series  of  observed  cue-outcome  combinations  using 
Equation 3.1 and the learning rates established as described above. This resulted in 
the four "partial" learning curves shown in Figure 3.2A: two curves (TO and CS) for 
each CS type (CS+ and CS-). As described by Equation 3.2, the predicted outcome 
on a given trial is the sum of the predictions for each cue component that is present; 
Figure  3.2B  shows  this  summed  prediction  for  each  CS  type,  either  present  or 
absent.  
Each of the 8 trial types resulting from the three-factorial design (CS+/CS-) ´ (A
+/A
-
)  ´  (V
+/V
-) was represented  by a separate regressor in the general  linear model. 
Importantly, learning would be reflected by time-evolving, context-dependent brain 
responses to the visual stimuli. Learning is therefore a fourth experimental factor that 
changes, over time, how differential brain responses to visual stimuli depend on the 
presence of an auditory CS and whether it is presented in a CS+ or CS- context.   66 
Specifically, the emergence of these differential responses should follow the time-
course predicted by the RW model. In other words, learning is expressed as a 4-way 
interaction CS type ´ CS presence ´ visual outcome ´ RW learning
6. The primary 
goal of our GLM analyses was therefore to test this interaction. To establish which 
CS was driving this interaction, we also tested the simple (3-way) interactions CS 
presence ´ visual outcome ´ RW learning within each CS type. Finally, to test for 
responses reflecting the prediction (
j
t f ) entailed by the auditory CS, independently 
of the prediction error (
j
t t f l - ) elicited by the visual outcome, we tested the 3-way 
interaction CS type ´ CS presence ´ RW learning, which is independent of visual 
outcome. 
In  order  to  test  for  these  learning  effects,  the  partial  learning  curves  served  as 
parametric modulators for their respective regressors. Given that each trial always 
had a trial onset cue, all 8 trial type regressors were modulated by the TO learning 
curve. Because the CS was present on only half the trials (A
+ trials), these provided 
another 4 regressors, resulting in a total of 12 parametric modulators.  
The linear summation of these partial learning curves (as predicated by Equation 
3.2) was achieved by defining appropriate statistical contrasts for the general linear 
model.  By  assigning  equal  contrast  weights  to  the  regressors  for  both  cue 
components (Table 3.2), it was possible to test for their summed influence, so that 
the interaction contrasts were effectively operating on the compound learning curves 
as shown in Figure 3B.  
 
                                                
6 Note that when the CS is absent on a specific trial, this trial can be assigned unambiguously to the 
CS
+ or CS
- factor because trials were blocked by CS type.   67 
Figure  3.2.  Cue-outcome  association  strengths.  (A)  Partial  learning 
curves.  Trial-specific  cueing  was  modelled  with  two components: the  visual  trial 
onset cue (TO), which was present on every trial, and the auditory CS, which was 
present on half the trials. This allowed us to model learning effects on trials, when no 
CS  was  present.  To  yield  the  summed  learning  curves  in  (B)  on  each  trial  the 
associative  strengths  of  the  cues  present  on  that  trial  are  summed,  as  shown  in 
Equation 3.2. For example, on a CS+A+ trial, both the auditory CS and the TO were 
present, therefore the total prediction would be the sum of the two blue curves. On a 
CS+A- trial, the auditory CS is not present, therefore the total prediction is identical 
to the light blue curve, as only the TO is present. These partial learning curves were 
used as regressors in the SPM analysis. Note that learning is slower in the absence of 
an auditory CS than in its presence and faster for CS+ than for CS- trials.  
 
Table  3.2.  Contrast  weights  for  parametrically  modulated 
regressors. Contrast weights to test for the 4-way and 3-way interactions, across 
all 12 modulators. This contrast definition effectively linearly sums all parametric 
modulators per trial type as described by Equation 3.2. 
    CS+ block  CS- Block 
    A+  A-  A+  A- 
    V+  V-  V+  V-  V+  V-  V+  V- 
TO  -1  1  1  -1  1  -1  -1  1 
4-way interaction 
CS  -1  1      1  -1     
TO  1  1  -1  -1  -1  -1  1  1 
3-way interaction 
CS  1  1      -1  -1     
 
 
A) Partial learning curves  B) Summed learning curves 
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3.2.5.3 Prediction error versus prediction 
An important feature of our factorial design is that it enabled us to determine whether 
the responses of a particular brain region reflected the prediction of the visual target 
or  the  prediction  error.  This  is  important  because  one  cannot  include  separate 
regressors based on predictions and prediction errors in the same design matrix. This 
is due to the form of the RW equation, in which predictions and prediction errors are 
perfectly correlated (within a given experimental condition), after mean-correction 
(see Appendix A for further details). However, in a factorial design like ours such a 
distinction  can  be  made  by  analysing  the  pattern  of  parameter  estimates  across 
conditions, contrasting conditions that correspond to expected and unexpected cue-
outcome combinations. Specifically, the factorial design provided us, in a mirror-
symmetric fashion, with two expected outcomes and two unexpected outcomes for 




- trials represented expected 





trials consisted of unexpected cue-outcome combinations (conditional probability = 
20%);  cf.  Table  3.1).  This  means  one  can  effectively  compare  expected  and 
unexpected trials (with low and high prediction error, respectively), with a contrast 
that is orthogonal to the presence or absence of the visual outcome and its prediction. 
This  enabled  us  to  distinguish,  voxel  by  voxel,  brain  responses  that  reflected 
expected  visual  outcomes  from  those  that  represented  unexpected  or  surprising 
outcomes. During  learning, brain regions  encoding prediction errors should  show 
increasing activation on trials where the outcome was unexpected according to the 
learned contingencies and decreasing (or non-changing) activation on trials where 
the outcome was expected. We will call such an activation pattern a "prediction error 
response"; this activation pattern would be expected if surprise was the driving force 
for learning. In this case, surprising events, or prediction errors, signal the need for 
learning in order to update predictions. This idea is not only a core component of 
associative learning models (Schultz and Dickinson, 2000;Shanks, 1995), but is also 
central to predictive coding theories of perception (Friston, 2005a;Rao and Ballard, 
1999): that the brain should concentrate resources on representing surprising sensory 
events. 
Note that our factorial analysis was not geared towards detecting prediction error 
responses only. It was equally capable of finding opposite activation patterns, i.e.   69 
increasing  activation  on  trials  where  the  prediction  based  on  the  learned 
contingencies matched the outcome and decreasing (or non-changing) activation on 
trials where the prediction did not match the outcome (cf. Baier et al. 2006). Notably, 
for our particular design, both types of responses could be identified by the same 
statistical test, i.e. the 4-way interaction CS type ´ CS presence ´ visual outcome ´ 
learning (see above). Since it is  only the direction of  the  interaction that differs 
between the two types of responses, our factorial design enabled an analysis that 
simultaneously tested for these two aspects of associative learning. 
3.2.6  DCM  
3.2.6.1 Choice of areas and time series extraction 
The goal of the present DCM analysis was to explain the (3-way) simple interaction 
CS presence ´ visual outcome ´ RW learning for CS+ trials in V1 (see SPM findings 
in the Results Section) by a simple model, in which the strength of the A1®V1 
connection was modulated as a function of the RW predictions, 
j
t f  (i.e., learning 
curves; Figure 3.2). Representative A1 time-series were chosen by testing for the 
main  effect of  CS  presence, and V1 time series were selected by testing for the 
simple interaction described above. We did not model the 4-way interaction with 
DCM because the SPM analysis showed that the learning effect was driven by the 
CS+ (see Section 3.3.1 for the full SPM results).  
As the exact locations of activation maxima varied over subjects, we ensured the 
comparability  of  our  models  across  subjects  by  using  combined  anatomical-
functional constraints in selecting the subject-specific time series (cf. (Stephan et al., 
2007c)). Specifically, we thresholded the subject-specific SPMs at P<0.05 and chose 
the local maximum within 8 mm of the group activation maxima in primary auditory 
cortex  (A1)  and  primary  visual  cortex  (V1)  as  inferred  by  a  probabilistic 
cytoarchitectonic atlas in MNI space (Eickhoff et al., 2005). As a summary time-
series, we computed the first eigenvector across all supra-threshold voxels within a 
radius of 4 mm around the chosen local maximum. Overall, we were able to extract 
time series in 14 out of 16 subjects. In 2 subjects, V1 could not be defined due to the 
lack  of  a  significant  interaction  that  met  the  anatomical  and  functional  criteria 
described above. These 2 subjects were excluded from the DCM analysis.   70 
3.2.6.2 DCM specification 
The  question  addressed  by  DCM  was  whether  learning  effects  in  V1  could  be 
explained by changes in the connectivity of a simple auditory-visual network. Our 
DCMs modelled the entire time-series, i.e. data from all trials or conditions, trying to 
explain  regional  activations  by  condition-dependent  changes  in  connectivity.  We 
tested three simple models that could potentially account for the interaction we found 
in V1. These models were fitted separately to each subject's data and compared using 
BMS (Penny et al., 2004a). In these models, auditory and visual stimuli from all 
trials elicited activity directly in their respective primary sensory areas (see Figure 
3.3). These driving inputs were modelled as individual events. The first model only 
had a connection from A1 to V1, whereas the second and third model included the 
reciprocal connection (see Figure 3.4). The A1→V1 connection in model 1 and 2, 
and the V1→A1 connection in model 3 were modulated by the Hadamard product 
(point-wise multiplication) of the RW associative strength 
j
t f  and a vector encoding 
visual outcome (1 for visual stimulus present, -1 for visual stimulus absent) during 
CS+  trials.  In  the  first  two  models,  this  modulatory  effect  corresponds  to  the 
interaction of the auditory CS+ prediction with the visual outcome and models a 
learning-dependent  contribution  from  CS+  responses  in  auditory  cortex  to  visual 
cortex responses that depends on whether the visual stimulus was present or not (cf., 
a prediction error that rests on top-down signals from auditory areas). In the third 
model,  which  represented  a  control  suggested  by  one  of  the  reviewers,  this 
modulatory effect acted on the reverse connection, i.e. V1→A1. 
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Figure 3.3. DCMs of learning effects on audio-visual connectivity. 
For all three models, the primary auditory (A1) and visual (V1) areas are both driven 
by their respective sensory inputs. The first model (M1) had a single connection from 
A1 to V1; in model 2 (M2), the V1®A1 connection was added. In both M1 and M2, 
the A1®V1 connection was allowed to change during CS+ trials as a function of the 
visual  outcome  (V+  vs.  V-)  and  the  Rescorla-Wagner  learning  curve  (f).  This 
modulatory effect corresponds to the interaction of the auditory CS+ prediction with 
the visual outcome and models a learning-dependent contribution to V1 responses by 
CS+ related activity in A1; this contribution depends on whether the visual stimulus 
was present or not (in other words, a prediction error mediated by top-down signals 
from  A1).  In  the  third  model,  instead  of  the  A1￿V1  connection,  the  V1￿A1 
connection is modulated by the learning signal.  
3.3 Results 
The post-scan debriefing questionnaire showed that none of the subjects had become 
aware of the contingencies between the auditory and visual stimuli. Prior to the fMRI 
data analysis subjects’ performance on the target detection task was verified. On 
average, subjects responded to 93 ± 3% of the target stimuli.    72 
3.3.1  SPM results 
First, we examined the 4-way interaction CS type ´ CS presence ´ visual outcome ´ 
RW learning. We found learning-dependent responses in the primary visual cortex 
and bilateral putamen that survived whole-brain correction for multiple comparisons 
(see Figure 3.4 A, B). To characterise the nature of this interaction, we tested the 
simple interaction (CS presence ´ visual outcome ´ RW learning) within each CS 
type. This showed that the 4-way interaction was driven mainly by learning during 
the CS+ blocks (see Figure 3E for the parameter estimates of the visual cortex). As 
shown  in  Figure  3.4  A,B,  testing  the  simple  interaction  for  CS+  trials  afforded 
almost identical results in the visual cortex and the putamen as the 4-way interaction 
(see  also  Table  3.3).  In  contrast,  no  evidence  of  learning,  i.e.  no  significant 
interaction of CS presence and outcome with learning, was found for CS- trials. 
The  nature  of  the  simple  3-way  interaction  was  such  that  V1  and  the  putamen 
showed an increased response when an expected visual stimulus was omitted, or 
when  an  unexpected  visual  stimulus  was  presented  (i.e.  A
+V
-  and  A
-V
+  trials). 
Critically, this response to surprising visual outcomes  increased over time as the 
association was learned, following the form of the RW learning curve. Conversely, 
V1 responses to predicted stimuli diminished during learning. The putamen showed 
the same pattern of responses bilaterally; this activation  extended into the insula 
bilaterally (see Table 3.3). 
Because  previous  studies  have  implicated  the  right  DLPFC  in  prediction  (error) 
processing  (Corlett  et  al.,  2004;Fletcher  et  al.,  2001),  we  used  an  anatomically 
defined fronto-striatal mask to test the 3-way interaction CS type ´ CS presence ´ 
RW learning, which characterizes responses to the prediction entailed by the auditory 
CS,  independent  of  the  visual  outcome.  During  learning,  the  right  dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) became increasingly active when a visual stimulus was 
predicted compared with when it was not; activity was higher for CS+A
+ and CS-A
- 
trials compared with CS+A
- and CS-A
+ trials (compare the probabilities in Figure 
3.2). As above, we characterized the nature of the 3-way interaction by testing the 
associated  simple  interactions,  confirming  it  was  also  driven  by  CS+  trials 
(Figure3.4 C). The same pattern of activation was found in the left putamen, but this 
activation did not survive correction for multiple comparisons.    73 
 
Figure 3.4. fMRI results. (A) Significant activations in V1 as a function of 
RW learning, for the 4-way interaction (CS type ´ CS presence ´ visual outcome ´ 
RW learning; red), and the same interaction restricted to the CS+ trials (simple 3-way 
interaction, blue) displayed on the mean structural image across all subjects. The 
caudate activation is also shown. (B) The same interaction in the putamen bilaterally. 
(C). Significant  3-way  interaction CS type ´ CS  presence ´ RW  learning in the 
DLPFC and left putamen (red). Again the interaction is driven by the CS+ trials, as 
shown by the simple interaction CS presence ´ RW learning for CS+ trials only 
(blue). (D) shows the parameter estimates for the 4-way interaction in peripheral V1: 
(CS type ´ CS presence ´ visual outcome ´ RW learning), where error bars denote 
standard error across subjects. For all trials on which an auditory CS was presented 
(A+), the modulatory effects of both the TO (light colours) and the auditory CS (dark 
colours) were estimated, whereas on A- trials only the TO was present. The estimates 
show that (mainly for CS+ trials, in blue), there is an increased (summed) response to 
trials with a surprising outcome, (for CS+ these are the A+V- and the A-V+ trials) 
and a decreased response to the unsurprising trials (A+V+ and A-V-). The activation 
in  the  putamen  showed  the  same  pattern  of  responses.  (E)  shows  the  parameter 
estimates for the 3-way interaction (CS type ´ CS presence ´ RW learning) in the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). This represents increased responses when a 
visual  stimulus  was  predicted  to  be  presented,  regardless  of  the  visual  outcome. 
Again, the estimates show that the interaction effect is mainly driven by CS+ trials 
(blue), showing an increased response to A+ trials.  
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3.3.1.1 Learning rate 
Following Gläscher and Büchel (Gläscher and Büchel, 2005) the optimal learning 
rate for the RW model was determined, evaluating the primary contrast of interest 
(that  is  the  4-way  interaction  in  a  random  effects  second  level  analysis)  under 
different learning rates in the primary visual cortex (as defined by a probabilistic 
cytoarchitectonic  atlas  (Eickhoff  et  al.,  2005).  Model  fits  under  five  different 
learning rates, suggested that  CS e = 0.075 was the optimal learning rate (for details on 
the selection of the learning rates, see Figure 3.2 and Section 3.2.5.1). Given that the 
learning effects were driven by the CS+ trials, we examined whether any learning 
effects  could  be  detected  for  lower  CS-  learning  rates.  No  learning  effects  were 
found at either a corrected level (P<0.05) or at an uncorrected level (P<0.001) for the 
CS-  trials  at  either  of  the  two  lowered  learning  rates  (
1/3 and 
2/3  of  the  original 
learning  rate),  either  across  the  whole  brain,  or  when  restricted  to  those  regions 
showing  significant  learning  effects  for  CS+  trials  (i.e.,  V1,  the  striatum  and 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex - DLPFC).  
Furthermore, none of the trial-type specific tests of the partial derivatives indicated a 
learning rate that  was  different from eCS=0.075 for the CS- or CS+ trials.  If the 
learning rate had been set too high or too low, the parameter estimates for the partial 
derivative would have deviated significantly, across subjects, from zero. Again, this 
analysis was first performed across the whole brain and subsequently restricted to 
those areas in which significant learning effects had been found, and did not show 
any significant effects, neither at a corrected threshold (P<0.05) nor at uncorrected 
thresholds (P<0.001).  
Taken together, these additional analyses showed that a selective decrease of the 
learning rate for  CS-  trials  did not improve our  ability  to detect learning effects 
during this trial type, and that there no evidence for either CS+ or CS- trials that a 
learning rate different from the chosen e=0.075 is more appropriate for modelling 
learning effects in the data. This means that the lack of learning effects during CS- 
trials was not due to a suboptimal choice of learning rate for CS- trials.   75 
Table 3.3. MNI coordinates and Z-values for significantly activated regions. 
  MNI coords.     
Foci of activation  x  y  z  Z score  Cluster size 
Four-way interaction:  
CS type ´ ´ ´ ´ CS presence ´ ´ ´ ´ visual outcome ´ ´ ´ ´ RW learning 
L occipital lobe*  -6  -75  -9  4.25  41 
L insula and putamen*  -30  18  6  4.84  84 
  L putamen**  -24  12  6  3.85  20 
R insula and putamen*  36  12  3  4.72  82 
  R putamen**  27  6  -3  4.48  35 
L caudate/thalamus*  -9  -15  15  4.70  40 
L S2 cortex*  -51  -27  24  4.39  93 
L middle temporal gyrus*  -57  -39  -3  3.88  26 
Simple (3-way) interaction: 
 CS presence ´ ´ ´ ´ visual outcome ´ ´ ´ ´ RW learning (restricted to CS+) 
L occipital lobe*  -9  -78  -3  4.31  36 
L insula and putamen*  -33  12  3  4.55  57 
  L putamen**  -27  12  6  3.63  10 
R insula and putamen*  36  12  3  3.98  57 
  R putamen**  27  9  0  3.94  32 
L caudate/thalamus*  -21  -9  9  4.32  54 
  L caudate**  -15  -9  21  4.19  14 
R caudate**  15  12  18  4.24  7 
L S2 cortex*  -60  -33  15  4.15  87 
L middle temporal gyrus*  -57  -36  -6  4.30  34 
R posterior insula*  39  12  -12  5.01  38 
3-way interaction:  
CS type ´ ´ ´ ´ CS presence ´ ´ ´ ´ RW learning 
R inferior frontal gyrus**  42  27  12  4.39  10 
*significant at P<0.05 (FWE whole-brain cluster-level corrected)  
** significant at P<0.05 (SVC) 
 
3.3.2  Learning dependent changes in connectivity 
Since the learning effect was mainly driven by CS+ blocks, we focused on changes 
in connectivity between auditory and visual cortices during incidental learning of the 
predictive  attributes  of  CS+  trials  (see  Figure  3.5).  Bayesian  model  comparison 
showed that a DCM with a single connection from A1 to V1 (model 1, cf. Figure   76 
3.3) was superior to alternative models with reciprocal connections (GBF in favour 
of  model  1:  2.1´10
17  and  2.2´10
18  when  compared  to  model  2  and  model  3, 
respectively). Across subjects, the A1®V1 connection in the optimum model had an 
average strength of 0.10 s
-1 (P = 0.003, df = 13, t = 3.57). During CS+ trials, this 
connection was significantly modulated by learning, depending on whether the visual 
stimulus was present or not (i.e., CS+ ´ (V
+ vs. V
-) ´ f in Figure 3.5). Note that the 
modulatory  variable  in  the  DCM  corresponds  to  the  interaction  of  the  auditory 
prediction with the visual outcome  during CS+  trials.  It accounts for a learning-
dependent  contribution  from  CS+  responses  in  auditory  cortex  to  visual  cortex 
responses that depends on whether the visual stimulus was present or not (cf., a 
prediction error mediated by top-down signals from auditory areas). Quantitatively, 
the strength of this modulation was -0.01 s
-1 (P = 0.028, df = 13, t = 2.49). This 
corresponds  to  learning-induced  changes  in  connectivity  ranging  from  2%  (for 
CS+A
- trials) to 8% (for CS+A
+ trials)
7 (Figure 3.5).  
Critically, the negative sign of the modulatory parameter reflects the nature of the 
visual responses to auditory afferents under CS+ trials: V1 responses to predicted 
visual stimuli diminished  during learning and  the DCM explained this  through a 
decrease in the strength of the A1®V1 connection. This is exactly consistent with an 
increase in the ‘explaining away’ of predicted visual input under predictive coding; 
in other words, if top-down predictions 
j
t f  (see Equation 3.2) from auditory cues 
decrease  the  amplitude  of  V1  prediction  error  | |
j
t t f l - ,  a  better  prediction 
corresponds  to  a  decrease  in  effective  connectivity.  Conversely,  V1  responses  to 
unpredicted,  (i.e.,  absent)  visual  stimuli  increased  during  learning.  This  was 
modelled in the DCM through an increase in the A1®V1 connection strength; again 
this is consistent with an increase in V1 prediction error amplitude  | |
j
t t f l - , when 
predictions are violated. In summary, A1®V1 influences depended on whether the 
visual outcome was expected or surprising and were consistent with an ‘explaining 
away’ role. The emergence of this effect conformed to the learning curve provided 
by the RW model. 
                                                 
7 As shown by Equation 3.2, the overall strength of a connection, given a single modulatory 
parameter, is the sum of the intrinsic connection strength (A) and the modulatory parameter (B) 
multiplied with its associated input (u). In the present case, the asymptotic magnitude of the input 
function is 0.8 for CS
+A
+ trials and 0.2 for CS
+A
- trials (see Figure 3.5).   77 
 
 
Figure 3.5. Learning effects on audio-visual connectivity. Bayesian 
model comparison showed that the DCM with a single connection from A1 to V1 
was  superior  to  the  other  models.  Across  subjects,  there  was  a  significant 
"endogenous" or "fixed" strength of the A1→V1 connection (0.10s-1, P=0.003) and 
a  significant  learning-induced  modulation  (magenta  arrows)  of  this  connection 
(P=0.028). The insets show the parameter estimates for the main effects in both A1 
and peripheral V1. The magenta arrows indicate how the main effect in peripheral 
V1 is modulated by changes in connectivity from A1 to V1 during CS+ trials: over 
time the response to surprising visual outcomes is up-regulated, whereas the response 
to unsurprising visual outcomes is down-regulated. Note that in this plot the magenta 
arrows designate the direction in which V1 responses change due to modulation of 
connectivity; for quantitative information on this modulatory  effect, see the main 
text. 
3.4 Discussion 
McIntosh  and  colleagues  showed  that  after  a  predictive  relationship  between  an 
auditory stimulus and a visual stimulus had been learned, the auditory stimulus alone 
was able to evoke responses in the visual cortex (McIntosh et al., 1998). The current 
study  extended  this  work,  pairing  a  visual  stimulus  with  a  predictive  auditory 
stimulus in a 4-factorial design, with the factors CS type (CS+, CS-), CS presence 
(A
+, A
-), visual stimulus presence (V
+, V
-) and learning (over time). Both CS+ and 
CS- blocks were exactly balanced in terms of sensory stimulation, so that the a priori   78 
probabilities of the auditory CS and of the visual stimulus occurring on a given trial 
were  always  50%.  Critically,  the  volunteers  did  not  make  any  responses  to  the 
stimuli  whose  associations  were  being  learned;  instead,  they  performed  a  target-
detection task on unrelated stimuli. Our factorial design enabled us (i) to characterise 
changes  in  neurophysiological  responses  due  to  learned  associations  that  were 
incidental to behaviour, and (ii) to investigate whether activity in specific brain areas, 
and the connection strengths amongst them, reflected a match between predictions 
and outcome or prediction errors respectively. 
The results demonstrate that during incidental learning of audio-visual associations 
changes  in  both  regional  activity  and  underlying  connectivity  reflect  prediction 
errors.  Furthermore,  learning-dependent  responses  in  visual  cortex  were  elicited, 
even in the absence of visual stimuli. This finding can be explained by changes in 
top-down influences from auditory regions that are consistent with predictive coding 
models of perceptual inference. 
3.4.1  RW model: predictions & prediction error 
The goal of this study was not to pinpoint the exact mathematical form of learning by 
comparing different models of associative learning. Instead, we focused on changes 
in  regional  activity  and  interregional  connectivity  that  could  be  explained  by  a 
specific learning model, namely the RW model. The RW model is a generic and 
well-established model of associative learning that has been successful in modelling 
a wide range of learning processes (Pearce and Bouton, 2001;Rescorla and Wagner, 
1972;Schultz and Dickinson, 2000). We chose this model because it is the simplest 
learning model appropriate for our particular paradigm. In the absence of interactions 
among  multiple  cues  per  trial,  the  RW  model  is  mathematically  equivalent  to  a 
Hebbian model of associative learning (Montague and Berns, 2002). A crucial aspect 
of our paradigm, however, is that on each trial the net prediction resulting from two 
interacting cue components (the auditory CS and the visual trial onset cue) must be 
considered  (see  Methods  Sections  for  details).  This  excludes  the  use  of  any 
associative learning model that cannot accommodate cue interactions (e.g. Hebbian 
models). In contrast, the RW model accommodates this aspect gracefully.  
The RW model has one problematic limitation, however: as detailed in Appendix A, 
in its equation predictions and prediction errors are perfectly correlated under mean-  79 
correction. In situations where mean-correction is mandatory (e.g., when using them 
to form interaction terms) this makes it impossible to disambiguate/interpret their 
contributions to  a dependent variable.  However,  the factorial design  in our  study 
allows us to circumvent this problem, as it comprises conditions that correspond to 
congruent  and  incongruent  prediction/outcome  combinations,  respectively. 
Analysing the 4-way interaction between our experimental factors, we found that 
responses in the primary visual cortex and the putamen were sensitive to surprising 
events; over time, these areas became significantly more active when presented with 
a surprising cue-outcome combination. Learning was stronger for the CS+ blocks 
than  for  the  CS-  blocks,  which  is  in  line  with  previous  behavioural  evidence 
(Fletcher et al., 2001;Wasserman et  al.,  1993). Previous fMRI studies  in humans 
have demonstrated that BOLD activity in the striatum is correlated with (signed) 
prediction errors during reinforcement learning (Jensen et al., 2007;McClure et al., 
2003;Menon et al., 2007;O'Doherty et al., 2004;O'Doherty et al., 2003;Seymour et 
al., 2004) and other associative learning tasks (Corlett et al., 2004). In these studies, 
the learned associations, and the sign of the resulting prediction errors, were of direct 
relevance for behaviour. The current study shows that the putamen is sensitive to 
unexpected outcomes even when the cue-stimulus association is learned incidentally 
and has no relevance to behaviour. However, in contrast to the previous studies, the 
pattern of putamen activity does not appear to be sensitive to the direction of the 
prediction  error,  only  to  its  amplitude.  This  difference  may  reflect  the  fact  that 
learning was perceptual as opposed to operant. In other words, the occurrence of an 
unpredicted or surprising event may play the role of negative reward, irrespective of 
whether the surprising event entailed the presence of absence of a stimulus. This 
issue will be discussed further in the Section on predictive coding below.  
3.4.2  Role of prediction errors beyond reinforcement learning 
Our  finding  that  learning-induced  responses  in  primary  visual  cortex  and  the 
putamen reflected prediction errors accords with a basic principle emerging from 
many previous studies: prediction errors, or surprise, constitute a driving force for 
learning  because they  signal  the  need  for  learning  in  order  to  update  predictions 
(Schultz et al., 1997;Schultz and Dickinson, 2000;Shanks, 1995). Although the role 
of prediction errors has been mainly explored for reinforcement learning so far, there   80 
is  growing evidence that prediction errors  may  be equally important for  learning 
statistical relationships that are affectively neutral and behaviourally irrelevant. In 
other words, the same mechanisms that optimise the learning of stimulus-response 
links may operate during the perceptual learning of stimulus-stimulus associations 
(Friston, 2005a;Rao and Ballard, 1999). Evidence that  organisms learn  predictive 
associations between initially neutral stimuli is seen in classical conditioning effects 
such as sensory preconditioning (Brogden, 1939). Some forms of sensory learning 
also exhibit such features, e.g. the mismatch negativity paradigm, in which responses 
to  sensory  stimuli  decrease  with  predictability  (Baldeweg,  2006;Friston,  2005a), 
regardless of whether stimuli are attended. A mechanism similar to predictive coding 
has  been  proposed  in  the  motor  domain  for cancellation  of  self-generated events 
(Blakemore et al., 1998;Shergill et al., 2005;Wolpert et al., 1995). Moreover, the 
learning  of  predictive  relationships  that  are  affectively  neutral  and  task-irrelevant 
may engage similar computational and neural mechanisms as those for predicting 
significant events (Wittmann et al., 2007;Zink et al., 2006).  
The results of the present study support the notion that the role of prediction errors in 
learning transcends the simple reinforcement of stimulus-response links and plays a 
more pervasive and general role in various forms of learning. Indeed a hallmark of 
adaptive  systems  is  their  ability  to  minimise  surprising  exchanges  with  their 
environment (Friston et al., 2006). This entails adjustments to their internal models 
of  the  environment  so  that  potentially  surprising  event  can  be  predicted.  Almost 
universally,  this  adjustment  involves  changes  in  the  system's  connections;  it  is 
therefore perhaps a little surprising that most previous imaging studies on learning 
and conditioning have exclusively searched for brain areas whose activity correlated 
with specific variables of a particular learning model (e.g., prediction or prediction 
error), but have not investigated how these variables change interactions among areas 
(although some studies have investigated learning-dependent changes in connectivity 
without using a learning model; (Büchel et al., 1999;McIntosh et al., 1998)). Changes 
in connectivity are central to the physiological implementation of learning; it has 
long been suggested that plasticity in connection strengths between neurons underlies 
the learning of predictive associations (Hebb, 1949). Put simply, two neural units 
encoding associated entities increase their synaptic connections to encode the learned 
associative strength of the stimuli. More precisely, for RW and similar ‘caching’   81 
models (Daw et al., 2005) the connection strength at time t should carry the predicted 
association  at  time  t  (McLaren  et  al.,  1989;Schultz  and  Dickinson,  2000).  This 
hypothesis requires models of effective connectivity, in which connection strengths 
vary as a function of the associative strength predicted by the learning model. To our 
knowledge,  the  present  study  has  implemented  this  approach  for  the  first  time, 
modelling  how  learning,  as  described  by  a  RW  model,  modulates  the  effective 
connectivity, as assessed by a DCM, between primary auditory and visual areas. 
3.4.3  Changes in connectivity between auditory and visual areas 
In accordance with the considerations above, we investigated whether the learning-
related changes in visual cortex responses could be explained by a simple model of 
effective connectivity, in which the strength of A1→V1 connection changed as a 
function  of  the  associative  strength  predicted  by  the  RW  model.  We  modelled 
observed responses in the primary visual cortex by means of a simple 2-area DCM in 
which activity in the visual cortex was modelled by two components, (i) a direct 
effect of visual stimulation and (ii) a modulation of the A1→V1 connection by the 
interaction of the time-evolving prediction with the visual input (in CS+ blocks; see 
Figure 6). Across subjects, this DCM showed a significant change in the strength of 
the A1®V1 connection congruent with the pattern of responses in V1: the A1→V1 
connection strength increased on trials where the visual outcome did not match the 
auditory prediction and decreased on trials where prediction and outcome matched. 
In  other  words,  the  learning-induced  changes  in  A1→V1  connection  strength 
reflected the same pattern of surprise or prediction errors as the regional activity in 
V1. This demonstrated that the response of V1 to visual stimuli was modulated by 
learning-dependent  changes  in  top-down  auditory  influences  that  were  consistent 
with the notion of predictive-coding, a general framework for perceptual inference 
and learning that is discussed in the next section (Friston, 2005a). 
Although connections in models of effective connectivity do not need to correspond 
to monosynaptic anatomical connections, it is of interest to note that the surprise-
related response in visual cortex appears to be in the peripheral visual field (Figure 
3.3 A), and anatomical connections from primary auditory cortex to peripheral visual 
cortex  have  been  demonstrated  in  recent  monkey  studies  (Falchier  et  al., 
2002;Rockland  and  Ojima,  2003).  Additionally,  numerous  fMRI  studies  have   82 
demonstrated that auditory stimulation or auditory attention affect activity in visual 
cortices  during  simultaneous  processing  of  visual  stimuli  (e.g.  (Baier  et  al., 
2006;McIntosh et al., 1998;Watkins et al., 2006)). 
3.4.4  Predictive coding in visual cortex 
In  previous  neurophysiological  studies  of  reinforcement  learning,  a  negative 
prediction error, i.e. the unexpected absence of a reinforcer (e.g. a reward), often led 
to  a  decrease  in  neuronal  or  BOLD  activity  (McClure  et  al.,  2003;Schultz, 
1998;Tobler et al., 2007). Such directed excursions are thought to reflect the fact that 
the prediction error is a signed quantity: it signals not just that predictions need to be 
updated, but in which direction. In contrast, in our study we found an increase in 
striatum and visual cortex activity not only for unexpectedly presented stimuli, but 
also for the unexpected absence of a stimulus. Similarly, the strength of the A1®V1 
connection decreased whenever the visual outcome was expected, and it increased 
whenever the outcome was surprising.  
A useful perspective that explains our two main findings (the implicit encoding of 
surprise by V1 responses and its mediation by learning-dependent changes in input 
from  the  auditory  cortex)  is  provided  by  the  framework  of  predictive  coding. 
Predictive coding posits a hierarchy of connected brain areas in which each level 
strives to attain a compromise between information about sensory inputs provided by 
the  level  below  and  predictions  (or  priors)  provided  by  the  level  above  (Friston, 
2003;Murray  et  al.,  2002;Rao  and  Ballard,  1999;Summerfield  et  al.,  2006).  The 
central learning principle is to establish a good model of the world, which is achieved 
by changing connection strengths such that prediction errors are minimised at all 
levels of the hierarchy. The hierarchy of a predictive coding architecture is often 
defined anatomically (in terms of forward and backward connections) and within one 
sensory modality, but it is equally possible to examine cross-modal predictive coding 
relationships (cf. (von Kriegstein and Giraud, 2006)). In the present study, a temporal 
hierarchical relation between auditory and visual areas is induced by presenting the 
auditory cue prior to the visual stimulus. 
Predictive coding may be a general principle of brain function in which statistical 
relationships in the world are monitored, even when they are not attended and not 
relevant for ongoing behaviour. This would allow the brain to ignore predictable and   83 
therefore uninteresting events in the environment, thereby enhancing the saliency of 
unexpected events. A good example of this notion is given by the so-called mismatch 
negativity  (MMN),  the  difference  between  the  event-related  potential  to  an 
unexpected  "deviant"  and  predictable  "standard"  stimuli  (Naatanen  et  al.,  2001). 
Importantly, the relationship between the MMN and learning was not established on 
the basis of behavioural data; in fact, it was initially not even recognised (Naatanen 
et  al.,  1978).  This  relationship  was  only  subsequently  inferred  from  striking 
relationships between the probability of deviants and neurophysiological time-series 
(e.g.  (Csepe  et  al.,  1987;Pincze  et  al.,  2002).  Current  theories  of  MMN,  which 
interpret  it  as  a  paradigmatic  example  of  learning  based  on  predictive  coding 
(Baldeweg, 2006;Friston, 2005a), have recently received empirical support by DCM 
studies of electroencephalographic measurements (David et al., 2006;Garrido et al., 
2007). These studies demonstrated that MMN can be understood as a prediction error 
signal,  which  results  from  deviant-induced  changes  in  inter-regional  connection 
strengths. A similar conclusion is offered by the present study. Here, we found that, 
at least during CS+ trials, BOLD responses in area V1 increased when the prediction 
provided  by  the  auditory  cue  did  not  match  the  subsequent  visual  stimulus 
(analogous  to  MMN  elicited  by  deviants).  This  surprise  signal  progressively 
increased as the predictive properties of the auditory cue were learnt. Moreover, in 
direct analogy to DCM studies of the MMN (David et al., 2006;Garrido et al., 2007), 
we found a decrease in the A1→V1 connection strength on "standard" trials (where 
the prediction by the auditory cue was correct), and an increase on "deviant" trials 
where the visual outcome did not match the prediction by the auditory cue. In the 
context  of  predictive  coding,  learning  involves  a  more  efficient  suppression  of 
sensory events,  which  is manifest  by an  apparent reduction in evoked  responses, 
mediated  by  top-down  predictions  (which  explain  away  bottom-up  sensory 
afferents). Within the framework of our bilinear DCM, this is modelled as a decrease 
in  top-down  effective  connectivity  for  visual  stimuli  that  match  the  current 
prediction. 
3.4.5  Limitations and future directions 
We conclude this chapter by discussing a number of limitations of the present study. 
First, because we wished to study brain responses to stimulus associations that were   84 
irrelevant to behaviour, we did not obtain behavioural evidence for learning. Instead, 
as  with  the  MMN  paradigm  described  above,  learning  is  characterised 
neurophysiologically as a change in activity over time. Chapter 4 will describe the 
results of a follow up experiment with stimuli that do require a behavioural response 
and thus provide a behavioural assessment of the learning process. It might be useful 
to  emphasise  that  a  neurophysiological  characterisation  of  incidental  associative 
learning processes only requires that the statistical associations between the CS/US 
stimuli are irrelevant for task performance. In contrast, it is not essential that the CS 
and US stimuli themselves are behaviourally irrelevant. In fact, the stimuli had some 
behavioural relevance insofar as they constitute distractors to which responses must 
be suppressed. 
Secondly, the  DCM presented here does not make any assumptions about where in 
the brain the predicted associative strength is calculated; i.e. which brain area exerts 
the  modulatory  influence  onto  the  A1→V1  connection.  Given  the  responses  that 
were observed  in the putamen,  it  is possible  that the modulation of the A1→V1 
connection is mediated via this region. Testing this hypothesis, however, requires the 
inclusion  of non-linear  terms  in the  neuronal state equation of DCM which  goes 
beyond  its  bilinear  mathematical  framework.  Chapter  2  described  a  nonlinear 
extension of DCM (Stephan et al., 2008), which allows one to investigate the source 
of  the  modulatory  influences.  Chapter  4  describes  how  this  approach  has  been 
applied to a different associative learning study. Nevertheless, notwithstanding these 
limitations, the current study has presented a novel combination of dynamic system 
models and formal learning theory, which were used to model human neuroimaging 
data.  This  is  a  further  step  towards  the  long-term  goal  of  constructing  invertible 
models that unite the neurophysiological and computational aspects of learning (cf. 
(Stephan, 2004)).    85 
Chapter 4 
4.   Striatal Prediction Error Activity Drives Cortical Connectivity Changes During Associative Learning  
Striatal Prediction Error Activity Drives Cortical 
Connectivity Changes During Associative Learning 
Abstract 
Both  perceptual  inference  and  motor  responses  are  shaped  by  our 
estimates of probabilistic relations among events in the world. Here, 
we  investigated  how  (failures  of)  learned  predictions  about  sensory 
stimuli  influence  subsequent  motor  responses.  In  an  associative 
learning  paradigm  auditory  cues  differentially  predicted  subsequent 
visual  stimuli.  Critically,  the  predictive  strengths  of  cues  were 
unknown  and  varied  over  time,  requiring  subjects  to  continuously 
update  estimates  of  stimulus  probabilities.  This  dynamic  inference, 
which  we  modeled  using  a  hierarchical  Bayesian  observer,  was 
reflected  behaviourally:  speed  and  accuracy  of  motor  responses 
significantly  increased  with  trial-by-trial  predictability  of  visual 
stimuli. Dynamic causal modeling of fMRI data showed that activity in 
the  putamen  (i)  increased  the  more  surprising  the  current  visual 
stimulus was and (ii) enhanced the strength of connections from visual 
areas to dorsal premotor cortex by non-linear gating. Thus, the degree 
of striatal trial-by-trial prediction error activity controlled the plasticity 
of visuo-motor connections.  
 
4.1 Introduction  
One of the major reasons for the remarkable flexibility and adaptive repertoire of 
human behaviour is that the human brain can construct, and rapidly update, estimates 
of  conditional  probabilities  that  describe  causal  relationships  in  the  world.  For   86 
example, human subjects can infer changing conditional probabilities among sensory 
events (Behrens et al., 2007;Brodersen et al., 2008), even when these probabilities 
are currently not relevant for behaviour (den Ouden et al., 2009). Such learning of 
stimulus probabilities has been shown to be reflected by activity changes in visual 
(Summerfield et al., 2008;Summerfield and Koechlin, 2008), auditory (Pincze et al., 
2002) and somatosensory areas (Akatsuka et al., 2007). The general principle, across 
all modalities, is that sensory responses increase with the size of prediction error, i.e. 
the more surprising they are. This is in accordance with current theoretical accounts 
of  brain  function,  e.g.  predictive  coding  (Friston,  2005a;Rao  and  Ballard,  1999), 
which  posit  a  fundamental  role  of  prediction  errors  for  adaptive  behaviour  and 
learning. 
Efficient learning of probabilities can be used to form predictions which guide motor 
behaviour. For example, once the predictive strength of a cue has been learned, the 
premotor cortex shows preparatory activity (Crammond and Kalaska, 2000;Tanji and 
Evarts, 1976;Wise and Mauritz, 1985) and reaction times decrease (e.g. (Bestmann et 
al., 2008;Requin and Granjon, 1969;Strange et al., 2005).  
A  critical  question  is  what  neurobiological  mechanisms  underlie  the  adaptive 
changes in motor behaviour that are needed when predictions fail, e.g. in rapidly 
changing environments. According to predictive coding theories, any prediction error 
should  induce  learning  and  thus  synaptic  plasticity,  reconfiguring  connection 
strengths  in  somato-motor  networks  such  that  prediction  error  is  eventually 
minimised both at sensory and motor levels (Friston and Stephan, 2007). In a similar 
vein, Bestmann et al. (Bestmann et al., 2008) suggested that "... the brain tries to 
minimise prediction error ... that is then continuously channelled into motor regions 
to control the excitability of expected motor outputs". In this study, we provide direct 
empirical evidence for this idea, exploiting recent advances in computational models 
of learning (Behrens et al., 2007) and nonlinear  DCMs of fMRI data (Stephan et al., 
2008). In particular, we link the physiological mechanisms proposed by predictive 
coding, i.e. prediction error dependent changes in connectivity, to a large body of 
literature which have described prediction error responses in the striatum (Corlett et 
al., 2004;Jensen et al., 2007;McClure et al., 2003;Menon et al., 2007;O'Doherty et 
al., 2004;O'Doherty et al., 2003;Seymour et al., 2004). Specifically, we show that the 
observed  learning-dependent  changes  in  BOLD  activity  are  compatible  with  a   87 
mechanistic model in which the strengths of visuo-motor connections are modulated 
by prediction error related activity in the striatum. 
4.2 Methods & Statistical analysis  
Twenty healthy right-handed volunteers, 24.4 ± 2.1 years of age, (mean age ± SD, 10 
female) took part in  this study. The participants  had no  history of  psychiatric  or 
neurological disorders. Written informed consent was obtained from all volunteers 
prior to participation, which was approved by the National Hospital for Neurology 
and Neurosurgery Ethics Committee. 
The central idea of this paradigm was to present participants with auditory stimuli 
that  differentially  predicted  upcoming  visual  stimuli.  Participants  had  to  report 
whether the visual stimulus was a face or a house. They were instructed that the 
relation between auditory and visual stimuli was probabilistic, that these probabilistic 
relations were changing unpredictably in time and that there was no underlying rule 
to be  learned or  discovered.  They  were neither informed about the  magnitude  or 
distribution of the probabilistic relations nor about the temporal intervals at which 
they changed.  
4.2.1  Conditioning 
On each trial, one of two auditory cue stimuli (CS1 and CS2) was followed by a 
visual  target  stimulus  (Figure  4.1A).  Participants  were  instructed  to  respond  as 
quickly as possible by button press (right middle and index finger, counterbalanced 
across subjects) and report whether the target stimulus was a face (F) or a house (H). 
Auditory and visual stimuli were presented for 300 ms and 150 ms, respectively. In 
order to prevent automatic responses or guesses, both the inter-trial interval (2000 ± 
650 ms) and visual stimulus latency (150 ± 50 ms) were jittered randomly (Figure 
4.1A).  
The two tones differentially predicted the identity of the visual target stimulus, and 
these  contingencies  were  changing  in  time  (Figure 4.1B).  Because  each  CS  was 
followed by one of two stimuli (F or H), the probability of one visual stimulus, given 
a particular auditory CS, was one minus the probability of the other visual stimulus:   88 
( | ) 1 ( | ),   {1,2} i i p F CS p H CS i = - Î          (4.1) 
To prevent that participants' responses could be biased by learned expectations (e.g. 
about the relative frequencies of the visual stimuli), we constrained the sequence of 
changes in probabilities such that at any point in time the marginal probabilities of 
faces and houses were identical. First, the probability of one visual outcome given 
CS1 was the same as the probability of the other visual outcome given CS2 (compare 
Figure 4.1B): 
1 2 ( | ) ( | ) p F CS p H CS =             (4.2) 
Secondly, each block contained equal numbers of randomly intermixed CS1 and CS2 
trials. With these two manipulations, we ensured that on any given trial, before the 
CS was presented, the a priori probability of a face (or house) occurring was always 
50%. Thus, any expectations about the visual stimulus could exclusively be evoked 
by and were time-locked to (the onset of) the auditory stimulus.  
Each  subject  completed  five  sessions  of  200  trials  each.  In  each  session,  the 
predictive strengths of the two CS types were changing pseudorandomly over time, 
taking one of 5 different discrete levels of predictive association; the probability of 
the visual outcome stimulus (poutcome) could be (i) strongly predictive (p = 0.9), (ii) 
predictive (p = 0.7), (iii) non-predictive (p = 0.5), (iv) anti-predictive (p = 0.3), and 
(v) strongly anti-predictive (p = 0.1). Each predictive level was presented as a block 
of stimuli once per scanning session. Predictive block lengths varied between 14-20 
trials per CS type, so that participants could not predict when exactly a change in 
contingencies would occur. Furthermore, blocks with predictive cues alternated with 
short blocks (6-10 trials) containing non-predictive cues (i.e. p = 0.5) in order to 
avoid complete reversals of the contingencies.    89 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Experimental design. (A) Timeline for a single trial. At  trial 
onset the auditory cue stimulus (CS) was presented for 300 ms. The visual stimulus 
lasted for 150 ms and was presented 150 ± 50 ms after the CS. The inter-trial interval 
lasted for 2000 ms on average (± 650 ms). (B) Temporal evolution of the probability 
of a face, p(F), occurring given either CS. Note that the probability of a house being 
presented is simply the mirror image of this sequence.  
 
4.2.2  Stimuli  
Eight pictures of neutral facial expressions drawn from the Ekman Series of Facial 
Affect (Ekman and Friesen, 1976) and eight pictures of houses were used as visual 
stimuli.  Stimuli  were  matched  for  overall  luminance  and  presented  on  a  gray 
background.  The  auditory  stimuli  were  matched  for  perceived  loudness  under 
scanning  conditions  as described  previously  (Chapter 3).  The frequencies  of  the 
auditory stimuli used in this experiment were 1125 Hz and 500 Hz, and the adapted 
volume of the high tone was 98 ± 4.1 % (mean ± SD) with respect to the low tone. 
To  maintain  identical  visual  input  conditions,  all  visual  stimuli  were  presented   90 
centrally  and  for  a  duration  of  150  ms  to  prevent  saccades,  and  subjects  were 
required to fixate a central cross throughout the experiment. Stimuli were presented 
using the software package Cogent (www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent). 
4.2.3  fMRI Data Acquisition 
A 3 Tesla head scanner (Allegra Magnetom, Siemens Medical, Erlangen, Germany) 
was used to acquire a T1-weighted fast-field echo structural image and multi-slice 
T2*-weighted echo-planar volumes with blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) 
contrast (TR = 2.73 sec, TE = 30 ms). Furthermore, prior to the functional scans, a 
B0 field map was acquired using a gradient echo field map sequence. Functional data 
were acquired in five scanning sessions of approximately eight minutes each. 189 
volumes were acquired per session (945  scans in  total per subject). The first  six 
volumes of each session were discarded to allow for T1 equilibrium effects. Each 
functional brain volume comprised 42 axial slices with 2 mm thickness and a 2 mm 
inter-slice gap and an in-plane resolution of 3x3 mm. The field of view was chosen 
to  cover  the  whole  brain,  except  for  the  brainstem.  The  total  duration  of  the 
experiment was approximately 90 minutes per subject. 
4.2.4  Data Analysis 
4.2.4.1 Behavioural data analysis 
First, the data were screened for outliers in reaction times. Responses faster than 150 
ms were excluded. We then tested whether the distributions of reaction times (RT) 
and response speeds (RS; i.e. inverse reaction times) showed significant deviations 
from normality using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Since RS, but not RT, were well 
described  by  a  Gaussian  distribution,  the  former  were  entered  into  a  repeated-
measures  analysis  of  variance  (ANOVA)  with  outcome  probability,  CS  type 
(CS1/CS2)  and  outcome  type  (F/H)  as  within-subject  factors.  The  Greenhouse-
Geisser correction was employed where significant non-sphericity was detected. We 
tested for any main effects and interactions between these factors that were expressed 
in the RS. Furthermore we also assessed the main effect of outcome probability on 
error rates.    91 
4.2.4.2 Bayesian learning model 
The above ANOVA indicated that there was a significant acceleration of reactions 
with increasing probability (for details, see Results Section 4.3 and Figure 4.3C). 
This  simple  linear  model  of  the  behavioural  data  is  not  very  realistic,  however, 
because  it  assumes  instantaneous  and  precise  knowledge  of  the  probabilities  that 
generated the stimulus sequence. In reality, the participants had to estimate these 
unknown probabilities from the observed stimulus sequence. One possibility is that 
subjects behave like Bayesian observers which continually update their estimates of 
the hidden contingencies by combining prior information from the past with current 
observations  in  the  present.  As  described  in  Chapter  1,  in  standard  Bayesian 
observer models, the learning rate, and thus the relative influence of past vs. current 
observations on the estimates, is unchanging. This, however, is not an ideal approach 
for our experimental paradigm where the underlying probabilistic associations are 
changing in an unknown and irregular fashion. In such an environment, an optimal 
learner would not only estimate the probabilities, but also their instability in time, i.e. 
volatility,  and  would  increase  the  weight  of  current  observation  relative  to  past 
experience with increasing volatility of the environment.  
Behrens  et  al.  (2007)  developed  a  hierarchical  Bayesian  learning  model  that 
represents such an ideal observer (Behrens et al., 2007). Given a series of observed 
events, this model estimates, at any given point in time, the posterior probability 
density function (PDF) of both the probabilistic associations and the volatility of the 
environment  (Figure  4.2).  Here,  we  adopted  this  model  (see  Appendix  B  for 
implementation details) and used the posterior mean of the PDFs as estimates of the 
probability  and  volatility.  In  order  to  verify  that  the  probability  estimate  of  this 
Bayesian model were better linear predictors of the behavioural RS than the true 
probabilities that generated the stimulus sequence, we used Bayesian model selection 
as described in the next section. Given the clear superiority of probability estimates 
from the Bayesian model in explaining the behavioural data, they were subsequently 
used in the analyses of the fMRI data.  
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Figure  4.2. Trial-by-trial probability  and volatility estimates.  (A, 
top): evolution of the posterior probability density function (PDF) of p(F|CS1) across 
the entire experiment. (A, bottom) The posterior mean of p(F|CS1) (solid line) for 
session  three  clearly  tracks  the  underlying  blocked  probabilities  (dashed  line). 
Because blocks of stable probabilities are short, however, the estimated probabilities 
never quite reach  their true values during a given  block. Note that the estimates 
change  rapidly  at  block  transitions.  When  an  unexpected  stimulus  occurs,  the 
estimates briefly move towards p = 0.5 (visible as "spikes" in the trajectory of the 
posterior mean). 
(B, top) The posterior PDF of the volatility shows the initially high uncertainty about 
the volatility of the environment, which converges in the course of the experiment. 
The estimated posterior mean of the volatility (B, bottom) decreases over the course 
of a block, particularly when the probability is very high or very low (p = 0.9 and p = 
0.1), and spikes between blocks. Additional spikes within blocks are present when an 
unexpected stimulus occurs. 
4.2.4.3 Bayesian model selection (BMS) 
When comparing different models for observed data, it is critical that the decision is 
not  only  based  on  the  relative  fit,  but  also  on  the  relative  complexity  of  the 
competing models (Pitt and Myung, 2002). For comparing competing models, both 
of behavioural and of fMRI data, BMS provides a principled foundation for such 
model comparisons (Penny et al., 2004a). In this study, we used a novel hierarchical   93 
method  for  BMS  that  allows  for  group-level  random  effects  inference  about  the 
relative goodness of multiple competing models (cf. Chapter 2 and (Stephan et al., 
2009)). In brief, for all models considered we computed the evidence  ( | ) p y m , i.e. 
the  probability  of  the  data  y  being  generated  by  model  m,  for  each  subject. 
Integrating  out  the  model  parameters,  the  model  evidence  balances  fit  and 
complexity,  enabling  one  to  compare  non-nested  models  with  different  levels  of 
complexity. For the linear models that were applied to the behavioural data, there is 
an analytic expression for the model evidence (see Chapter 2 for details). For the 
nonlinear    DCMs  of  the  fMRI  data  described  below,  we  used  the  negative  free 
energy approximation to the log model evidence (cf. (Friston et al., 2007;Stephan et 
al., 2007d). 
Subsequently the models were compared at the group level, using a new method for 
random effects BMS (Stephan et al., 2009). This method uses hierarchical variational 
Bayes to infer the posterior density of the models per se. This rests on treating the 
model  as  a  random  variable  and  estimating  the  parameters  α  of  a  Dirichlet 
distribution describing the models' probabilities r. One can then use the cumulative 
probability density of  ) ; | ( a y r p  to quantify an exceedance probability  k j , i.e. our 
belief that a particular model k is more likely than any other model (of the K models 
tested), given the group data. Exceedance probabilities are particularly intuitive when 
comparing two models (as in our analysis of the behavioural data; see Figure 4.3D). 
For example, when comparing two models, m1 and m2, the probability that m1 is a 
more likely model than m2 can be written as  
1 1 ( 0.5| ; ) p r y j a = >              (4.3) 
This hierarchical Bayesian approach has been shown to be considerably more robust 
than either the conventional fixed effects analysis using group Bayes factors (Penny 
et  al.,  2004a),  or  frequentist  tests  applied  to  model  evidences,  especially  in  the 
presence of outliers (Stephan et al., 2009). 
4.2.4.4 Functional neuroimaging analysis 
fMRI data were analysed using the SPM5 software package (Wellcome Trust Centre 
for  Neuroimaging,  London,  UK;  http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm).  The  915  EPI 
images  from  each  subject  were  corrected  for  geometric  distortions  caused  by   94 
susceptibility-induced field inhomogeneities. A combined approach was used which 
corrects  for  both  static  distortions  and  changes  in  these  distortions  due  to  head 
motion  (Andersson  et  al.,  2001;Hutton  et  al.,  2002).  The  static  distortions  were 
calculated for each subject by acquiring a B0 field map and processing it using the 
FieldMap toolbox implemented in SPM5 (Hutton et al., 2004). The images were then 
realigned  and  unwarped  using  SPM5  (Andersson  et  al.,  2001)  which  allows  the 
measured static distortions to be included in the estimation of distortion changes 
associated  with  head  motion.  The  data  were  temporally  interpolated,  using  the 
middle slice in time as a reference, to account for slice-timing effects. The structural 
image  was  then  coregistered  with  the  mean  unwarped  functional  image  and 
processed using the unified segmentation procedure implemented in SPM5, with the 
default  tissue  probability  maps.  This  procedure  combines  segmentation,  bias 
correction and spatial normalization through the inversion of a single unified model 
(Ashburner  and  Friston,  2005).  The  same  normalisation  parameters  were  then 
applied to normalise the unwarped and realigned EPI images. Finally the EPI images 
were  smoothed  spatially  with  a  three-dimensional  Gaussian  kernel  of  8  mm  full 
width half maximum and re-sampled to 3x3x3 mm voxels.  
The  data  were  then  modelled  voxel-wise,  using  the  GLM  for  each  of  the  20 
participants. In the GLM, correct and error trials were modelled as separate events. 
For correct trials, face and house trials were modelled as the two main conditions of 
interest.  These  were  collapsed  across  the  two  different  CS  types,  because  the 
predictive strengths of the two CSs were counterbalanced over time and thus no 
differential  effects  were  to  be  expected  (analysis  of  the  behavioural  data  also 
indicated the absence of such effects). Condition-specific effects were modelled in an 
event-related  fashion,  convolving  a  sequence  of  delta  functions  with  a  canonical 
hemodynamic  response  function.  The  probability  estimates  from  the  Bayesian 
observer as well as the subject-specific response speeds were included as first-order 
parametric  modulators  of  face  and  house  trials  such  that  the  delta  functions 
representing the presence of a face were modulated by the trial-specific probability 
estimate that a face should have occurred on this trial (equivalently for house trials). 
We also included the volatility estimates from the Bayesian observer as parametric 
modulators  (orthogonalised  to  the  probability  estimates).  Finally  the  6  parameter   95 
vectors from the realignment procedure were included as regressors of no interest to 
account for variance caused by head motion.  
After computing subject-specific contrast images of interest, random effects group 
analyses across all 20 subjects were performed (Friston et al., 2005), using one-sided 
one-sample t-tests and testing for both positive and negative activations. We report 
any activations that survived whole brain correction at the cluster-level (P<0.05). For 
anatomically  constrained  a  priori  hypotheses  concerning  stimulus-specific  visual 
areas,  putamen  and  ACC,  we  used  masks  and  report  activations  that  survived 
correction at the cluster-level within the region of interest (P<0.05). For the putamen 
and ACC, these masks were generated using the PickAtlas toolbox (Maldjian et al., 
2003);  for  stimulus-specific  visual  areas,  we  used  in-built  localiser contrasts  that 
were orthogonal to all other contrasts of interest. 
Firstly we assessed the main effect of probability, that is, in which brain regions the 
activity reflected the probability of the stimulus occurring, independently of which 
stimulus it was. We tested both for activations that increased with the likelihood of 
the outcome and for activations that increased the less likely, i.e. more surprising, the 
outcome was. In other words, this contrast tested for stimulus-independent responses 
that reflected predicted or surprising outcomes, respectively. Given the results from 
our previous study (den Ouden et al., 2009), our a priori hypothesis was that activity 
in the putamen would increase the more surprising the outcome was.  
Secondly,  we  tested  for  stimulus-by-probability  interactions,  that  is,  probability-
dependent responses that differed between faces and houses. Our a priori hypothesis 
was that activity in stimulus-specific areas should scale inversely with the probability 
of the presented stimulus. In other words, responses of the fusiform face area (FFA) 
to face stimuli should decrease the more likely the presentation of a face had been on 
a  given  trial,  and  responses  of  the  parahippocampal  place  area  (PPA)  to  houses 
should  decrease  with  the  probability  of  a  house  being  presented.  This  can  be 
regarded equivalently as testing for surprise-dependent increases in the activity of 
stimulus-specific  areas.  To  accommodate  inter-subject  variability  in  the  exact 
location of FFA and PPA, we performed a region-of-interest analysis. Concerning 
the functional definition of FFA and PPA, we did not need a separate localiser scan 
since our factorial design provided an in-built localiser contrast (i.e. the main effect   96 
of faces versus houses). Note that this contrast is orthogonal to the contrast testing 
for interactions and can thus be used to define regions of interest. In each subject the 
individual maximum within an 8 mm radius from the group maximum of face- and 
house-specific responses (see Table 4.1) was determined. Subsequently, given these 
voxels  with  individually  maximal  stimulus-specificity,  we  tested  for  (orthogonal) 
stimulus-by-probability interactions by entering the parameter estimates of regressors 
encoding trial-by-trial stimulus probability estimates into two-tailed one-sample t-
tests.  In  other  words,  this  procedure  tested  whether  face-  and  house-specific 
responses  in  FFA  and  PPA,  respectively,  were  modulated  by  the  trial-by-trial 
probability estimate of a face or a house occurring. 
4.2.4.5 Nonlinear DCMs 
Numerous studies have demonstrated previously that activity in the putamen reflects 
prediction  errors  or  surprise  (e.g.  (den  Ouden  et  al.,  2009;Jensen  et  al., 
2007;McClure  et  al.,  2003;O'Doherty  et  al.,  2004;Pessiglione  et  al.,  2006)). 
According  to  theoretical  models  of  learning,  the  size  of  prediction  errors  should 
control the magnitude of synaptic plasticity, and thus changes in connection strength, 
that underlies the learning process (Friston, 2005a;McLaren et al., 1989;Schultz and 
Dickinson, 2000). In this study, we tested this notion directly by modelling how 
activity in the putamen gated the information flow from visual areas to the dorsal 
premotor  cortex  (PMd;  Figure  4.5).  We  expected  that  increased  activity  in  the 
putamen, induced by a surprising face, should gate the strength of the FFA→PMd 
connection, thus enhancing the influence of face information on PMd activity and 
facilitating an update of the motor plan. This type of analysis, which requires one to 
study  non-linear  (second  order)  modulatory  effects  on  connectivity,  has  become 
possible with the recent introduction of nonlinear DCMs described in Chapter 2 
(Stephan et al., 2008). 
4.2.4.5.1  DCM specification 
Based on our  SPM results, we constructed  a nonlinear DCM  including the right 
putamen, PPA and FFA, and the left PMd. As shown in Figure 4.4 and Table 4.1, 
several  other  areas  showed  a  surprise  dependent  response  and  are  likely  to  be 
involved in the visuomotor transformation; the present model with the above four 
regions should be regarded as the most parsimonious model that enabled us to test   97 
whether  surprise-related  activity  in  the  putamen  gated  visuomotor  connections. 
While putamen, FFA and PPA showed peak activations in the right hemisphere, we 
included the left premotor cortex as participants were responding with their right 
hand.  
We constructed and compared several alternative models. A basic DCM shown by 
Figure 4.5A included connections from FFA and PPA to the PMd, and modulations 
of these connections by activity in the putamen, which was driven by the trial-by-
trial probability estimates provided by the Bayesian learning model. The endogenous 
connectivity structure of this DCM was subsequently optimised systematically by 
BMS (see Figure 4.5 for a graphical representation of all models tested).  
After the endogenous connections had been optimised, we conducted a final and 
critical model comparison. Since the putamen and the PMd showed similar surprise–
related activations (Figure 4.4), we wanted to establish the specificity of our model 
and  demonstrate  that  putamen  activity  gated  visuo-motor  connections,  instead  of 
PMd gating visuo-putamen connections. We therefore tested a DCM, in which the 
roles  of  the  PMd  and  the  putamen  were  reversed,  and  in  which  PMd  activity 
modulated the connection between the visual areas and the putamen (Figure 4.5C). 
4.2.4.5.2  Time series extraction 
Since the exact locations of activation maxima varied across participants, we ensured 
the comparability of our models across participants by combining anatomical and 
functional constraints in selecting the subject-specific time series (cf. (Stephan et al., 
2007c)). In brief, a regional time series was extracted if (i) it passed a threshold of 
P<0.05 (uncorrected) and (ii) was located within the same anatomical structure as 
and within a certain radius from the group maximum. For FFA and PPA (identified 
by  the  contrast  testing  for  main  effect  of  faces  vs.  houses,  F>H  and  H>F, 
respectively)  the  individual  maxima  were  required  to  be  within  an  8  mm  radius 
around the group maxima.  For  the  putamen and  PMd  (identified  by the  contrast 
testing  for  a  [negative]  main  effect  of  probability)  the  individual  maxima  were 
required to be within a 16 mm radius around the group maximum (PMd) and within 
the putamen as defined by the participants’ individual structural scan. As a summary 
time  series,  we  computed  the  first  eigenvector  across  all  supra-threshold  voxels 
within a radius of 4 mm around the chosen local maximum. Overall, following this   98 
procedure, we were able to extract time series for all four areas in 15 out of 20 
participants. We could not obtain a putamen time series in three participants and a 
PMd time series in two participants due to the lack of an activation that met the 
anatomical and functional criteria described above. Since we could not specify the 
complete model in these participants, they were excluded from the DCM analysis. 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1  Behavioural data  
On average, subjects responded correctly on 91 ± 3.4% (mean ± SD) of the trials, on 
5% of the trials they gave the wrong response or pressed multiple buttons, and on the 
remaining 4% they did not respond before the end of the trial.  
Averaging  reaction  times  (RT)  across  the  blocks  of  different  association  levels 
showed  that  subjects  did  learn  the  changing  contingencies,  such  that  subjects 
responded faster to more likely outcomes (Figure 4.3A). The difference in average 
RT between unexpected (p = 0.1) and expected outcomes (p = 0.9) across subjects 
was 32 ms (Figure 4.3A). However, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for normality 
showed that the RT distributions differed significantly from a normal distribution in 
13 out of 20 subjects; they were skewed towards the larger RT (P<0.05, Bonferroni 
corrected). However, in accordance with previous work (e.g. Carpenter & Williams 
1995), response speed (RS) distributions were not significantly different from normal 
in all but 4 subjects, and therefore these were used for further analysis.  
A repeated measures ANOVA significantly refuted the null hypothesis that RS did 
not differ across experimental conditions (F(2.4; 45.4)=43.9; P<0.001). A post hoc t-
test showed that RS increased linearly with the probability of the outcome target 
(P<0.001, Figure 4.3A). Furthermore, subjects responded slightly faster to faces than 
to houses, (P<0.05), and slightly faster to trials with a high-frequency CS compared 
to trials with a low-frequency CS (P<0.05). However, in neither case was there an 
interaction  with  probability  (F=1.03;  P=0.4  and  F=0.69;  P=0.6),  nor  a  threeway 
interaction  between  all  factors  (F=1.17,  P=0.33),  showing  that  there  was  no 
differential learning for the different event types. A repeated measures ANOVA also 
rejected  the  null  hypothesis  that  error  rates  did  not  differ  across  experimental   99 
conditions (F(1.5; 334.0)=12.52; P<0.001). Again, there was a significant main effect 
of probability (P<0.001), such that subjects made more errors to more unexpected 
outcomes (Figure 4.3B).  
Finally, we used BMS to decide whether the trial-by-trial probability estimates of the 
Bayesian learning model or the true (but unknown) probabilities that had generated 
the stimulus sequence were better linear predictors of the RS. The distribution of the 
log evidences across subjects (Figure 4.3C) and the subsequent BMS at the group 
level indicated that the Bayesian learning model was vastly superior: the exceedance 




Figure 4.3. The effect of outcome probability on RTs and error 
rates. RTs (A) and percentage of errors (B) are shown as a function of outcome 
probability (mean ± standard error (SE)). Correct trials were averaged within each 
level of probability and collapsed across CS and visual outcome type (F/H). Subjects 
speed  up  and  make  fewer  errors  the  higher  the  probability  of  the  outcome.  (C) 
Difference in log model evidence for using the trial-by-trial probability estimates 
from  the  Bayesian  model  versus  the  true  probabilities  as  linear  predictors  for 
behavioural  measured  response  speeds.  In  all  but  two  subjects,  there  is  greater 
evidence for the Bayesian model. (D) The Dirichlet density describing the probability 
of model m1 (based on the probability estimates from the Bayesian learning model) 
relative to the alternative model m2 (based on the true, blocked probabilities), given 
the  measured  response  speeds  across  the  group.  The  shaded  area  represents  the 
exceedance probability of m1 being a more likely model than m2. This exceedance 
probability of Φ1 = 100.0% was strongly favouring m1 as a more likely model than 
m2.   101 
4.3.2  Analyses of fMRI data 
The main results of our SPM analysis are summarised graphically in Figure 4. 4. 
Note that panels A, B and F show the results of a whole-brain analysis, whereas 
panels C, D, E and G result from region of interest analyses that were either defined 
by orthogonal localiser contrasts (panels C and D) or an anatomical mask (panel 
E,G); see the Section 4.2 for details. 
The  key  questions  of  interest  for  this  study  is  characterization  of  stimulus-
independent and stimulus-specific surprise responses and connectivity analyses. For 
completion,  the  results  of  additional  analyses  are  reported,  including  a  detailed 
analysis of the main effects of the stimuli as well as an analysis of regional responses 
associated with the volatility of the probabilistic associations. Although the use of a 
volatile environment was not a phenomenon of primary interest for this study, but 
merely a means of enforcing continuous learning (and thus maximising induction of 
synaptic plasticity and hence connectivity changes), it is noteworthy that our analysis 
of volatility effects replicated previous results by Behrens et al. (2007).  
4.3.2.1 Stimulus main effects in FFA and PPA 
As expected, the mid fusiform gyrus was activated more strongly to face stimuli than 
to house stimuli (FFA, Figure 4.4A and Table 4.1), and the parahippocampal gyrus 
showed the opposite effect (PPA, Figure 4.4B and Table 4.1). In the random effects 
analysis main effect for houses in the PPA has a much greater spatial extent than the 
main effect for faces in the FFA. This is possibly due to the greater variability in the 
location  of  the  FFA  than  the  PPA:  At  the  group  level  the  FFA  activation  is 
significant at whole brain corrected level only in the right hemisphere, but at the left 
FFA is significant within an ROI for the fusiform gyrus (Table 4.1).  
4.3.2.2 Regional responses reflecting stimulus-independent surprise 
Activity in the bilateral putamen decreased significantly with increasing probability 
of  the  visual  stimulus,  regardless  whether  face  or  house  stimuli  were  presented 
(Table 4.1 and Figure 4.4E). In other words, putamen activity increased the more 
surprising the presented stimulus was, given the trial-by-trial probability estimates of 
the Bayesian learning model. Several areas that are involved in preparation of motor 
responses showed equivalent stimulus-independent surprise-related responses. These   102 
included the left dorsal premotor cortex (PMd), right intraparietal sulcus and right 
superior parietal gyrus (Table 4.1 and Figure 4.4F). The homotopic counterparts of 
these areas in the opposite hemisphere also showed increased responses to surprising 
stimuli, but these activations did not survive whole brain correction (Table 4.1).  
4.3.2.3 Surprise-related responses in stimulus-specific areas 
Using the main effect of stimuli, we functionally defined FFA and PPA in each 
participant (for details on group main effects, see supplementary material). In each 
subject, we then determined the peak voxels in right FFA and right PPA that showed 
maximally  selective  face  and  house  responses,  respectively,  and  tested  for 
(orthogonal) stimulus ´ probability interactions, i.e. a difference in the modulation of 
stimulus-specific responses by the probability of that stimulus occurring. In the FFA, 
there was a pronounced negative modulation of its responses to faces by the trial-by-
trial probability estimates for faces (b = -2.05 ± 0.52). In other words, FFA responses 
to faces increased with the magnitude of prediction error, i.e. the more surprising the 
occurrence of a face was. In contrast, the modulation of FFA responses to houses by 
the trial-by-trial probability estimates for houses was marginal (b = -0.09 ± 0.78; see 
Figure 4.4C). This interaction was significant (p = 0.037). 
When examining activity in PPA, we found that its responses to houses showed a 
strongly negative modulation by the trial-by-trial probability estimates for houses (b 
=  -2.29  ±  0.54;  see  Figure  4.4D).  That  is,  in  analogy  to  the  FFA  results,  PPA 
responses to houses increased the more surprising the presentation of a house was. In 
contrast,  PPA  responses  to  faces  were  positively  modulated  by  the  trial-by-trial 
probability estimates for faces (b = 1.91 ± 0.67); this corresponds to a decrease in 
activity the more surprising the presentation of a face was. Again, as for FFA, this 
interaction was significant (p < 0.001).  
In summary, responses of PPA and FFA to their preferred stimuli were strongly 
modulated  by  surprise  (or  prediction  error)  about  these  stimuli  (i.e.  showed  a 
negative  modulation  by  trial-by-trial  probability  estimates  for  these  stimuli  as 
provided  by  the  Bayesian  observer  model),  and  this  modulation  by  surprise  was 
significantly higher than for their non-preferred stimuli.    103 
4.3.2.4 Volatility dependent brain activations 
For completion, we also tested in which areas activity increased or decreased with 
the trial-by-trial volatility estimates. Following the results by Behrens et al., (2007), 
who  demonstrated  that  ACC  activity  correlated  with  volatility  estimates  during 
reward learning, we tested whether volatility encoding in the ACC would also be 
present in our learning paradigm which did not include any rewards. Indeed, activity 
in  the  dorsal  and  rostral  ACC  and  the  ventromedial  prefrontal  cortex  correlated 
significantly with the volatility estimates (Table 4.1 and Figure 4.4G). 
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Figure  4.4.  Main  effects  and  modulation  of  outcome  stimulus 
processing. All parameter estimates show mean ± SE across all subjects and all 
activations are displayed on the average anatomical scan. A) Main effect of F>H in 
the right FFA, also showing the left FFA activation (see supplementary material). B) 
Main effect  of H>F in  the  bilateral PPA. C) Parameter estimates across  subjects 
(located at the individual maxima in the F>H contrast in the FFA) of the modulatory 
effect of stimulus probabilities. There was a pronounced negative modulation of FFA 
responses to faces by the trial-by-trial probability estimates for faces (b = -2.05 ± 
0.52). In contrast, the modulation of FFA responses to houses by the trial-by-trial 
probability estimates for houses was marginal (b = -0.09 ± 0.78). This interaction 
was significant (p = 0.037). D) Parameter estimates across subjects (located at the 
individual  maxima  in  the  H>F  contrast  in  the  PPA)  of  the  modulatory  effect  of 
stimulus  probabilities.  PPA  responses  to  houses  showed  a  strongly  negative 
modulation by the trial-by-trial probability estimates for houses (b = -2.29 ± 0.54). In 
contrast,  PPA  responses  to  faces  were  positively  modulated  by  the  trial-by-trial 
probability estimates for faces (b = 1.91 ± 0.67). This interaction was significant (p < 
0.001).  (E,  top)  Bilateral  effect  of  surprise  in  the  anterior  putamen.  (Bottom) 
Parameter estimates from the putamen showing the negative dependency  on both 
p(F) and the p(H). (F, top) Bilateral effects of surprise in dorsal premotor cortex 
(PMd)  and  the  parietal  cortex.  (Bottom)  Parameter  estimates  for  the  left  PMd, 
showing  the  same  surprise  dependent  effect  as  the  putamen.  G)  Parametric 
modulation of the VMPFC/ ACC by volatility.    105 
 
Table 4.1. MNI coordinates and Z-values for significantly activated regions. 
  MNI coords.   
Foci of activation  X  y  z  Z score 
Surprise effects: negative correlation with p(F) and p(H) 
Motor areas         
L precentral gyrus (dorsal 
premotor cortex)* 
-18  -18  60  4.13 
R precentral gyrus (dorsal 
premotor cortex)** 
33  -15  57  3.40 
R intraparietal sulcus*  42  -33  39  4.02 
L intraparietal sulcus **  -42  -39  39  3.72 
R superior parietal gyrus*  15  -60  63  4.16 
L superior parietal gyrus**  -15  -57  63  3.42 
Striatum         
R putamen
**  27  3  6  3.42 
L putamen
**  -24  15  3  3.39 
Probability effects: positive correlation with p(F) and p(H) 
No significant activations.         
Volatility effects: positive contrast 
Ventromedial prefrontal ctx
*  3  48  -9  3.64 
ACC
**  -12  45  9  4.11 
Ventral ACC / subgenual ctx 
**  -6  36  -3  3.57 
L caudate/thalamus*  -21  -9  9  4.32 
Volatility effects: negative contrast 
No significant activations.         
Main effects of sensory stimulation 
House>Face         
R parahippocampal gyrus
*  30  -51  12  7.01 
L parahippocampal gyrus
*  -24  -57  -18  6.70 
Face> House         
R mid fusiform gyrus
*  45  -57  -24  5.42 
L amygdala
*  -21  -12  -9  4.31 
L mid fusiform gyrus
**  -45  -54  -21  3.47 
* significant at P<0.05 FWE cluster-level corrected across the 
whole-brain 
** significant at P<0.05 cluster-level corrected for a priori region 
of interest 
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4.3.3  Nonlinear DCM 
Based on our  SPM results, we constructed  a nonlinear DCM  including the right 
putamen, PPA and FFA, and the left PMd as parsimonious model for testing whether 
surprise  activity  in  the  putamen  gates  visuomotor  connections.  This  initial  DCM 
included connections from FFA and PPA to PMd and a modulatory influence from 
the putamen on these connections (Figure 4.5 - m1), and thus included the minimal 
number of connections necessary to test the hypothesis. All additional models were 
derived by expanding this basic architecture. Hierarchical BMS was then used to 
select the optimal model at the group level (Stephan et al., 2009).  
In  a first step, all possible combinations of endogenous connections  between the 
PPA, FFA and PMd were compared using Bayesian model comparison (Figure 4.5 - 
m1-4). Compared to all other models, there was greater evidence for the model with 
full  connectivity  between  all  these  areas  (Table  4.2).  Model  4,  including  full 
reciprocal connectivity between the sensory and premotor areas was clearly the best 
model (exceedance probability f 4 = 0.99).  
In  a  subsequent  step,  two  more  models  were  tested  to  look  at  endogenous 
connections to the putamen from the sensory and premotor cortex. Firstly a model 
was  tested  in  which  connections  from  the  sensory  areas  to  the  putamen  were 
included, to test whether there was any direct influence of these areas on the putamen 
(Figure 4.5 - m5). This model turned out to be worse than the model that did not 
include these connections (f4 = 0.99). Secondly, because there are known to be direct 
projections from the premotor cortex to putamen (Leh et al., 2007;Takada et al., 
1998), m6 included a direct connection from the PMd to the putamen (Figure 4.5 - 
m6). Here, the evidence for m4 was still greater than for m6, although less decisively 
than  for  the  other  models  (f4  =  0.64).  Note  that  this  does  not  mean  that  this 
connection does not exist anatomically, but just that it is unlikely to play a major role 
in the process modelled here.    107 
 
Figure  4.5.  DCMs  tested  to  establish  the  optimal  endogenous 
connectivity. Set of 6 DCMs testing the hypothesis that the putame modulates 
connectivity  between  the  sensory  and  motor  cortices,  designed  to  establish  the 
optimal  endogenous  connectivity.  The  dotted  lines  are  the  connections  that  are 
included in addition to the most parsimonious model m1. m4 was the optimal model 
(see main text). 
Table 4.2. BMS with regard to endogenous connectivity between PPA, FFA and 
PMd 
    Dirichlet 
parameters α 
Exceedance 
probability f f f f 
m 1  1.79    0.00 
m 2  5.79  0.15 
m 3  1.81  0.00 
m 4  9.62  0.84 
 
Thus, the optimal model was a model with reciprocal connections between PMd, 
FFA  and  PPA  (see  Figure  4.6A).  In  this  model,  the  parameter  estimates  that   108 
described  gating  effects  of  putamen  activity  on  visuo-motor  connections,  were 
consistently positive across subjects (PPA→PMd: d = 0.01 ± 0.003 (mean ± SE), p = 
0.010; FFA→PMd: d = 0.011 ± 0.004, p = 0.017). Therefore, in accordance with our 
hypothesis, prediction error related activity in the putamen significantly modulated 
the strength of visuo-motor connections. 
However, because putamen and PMd showed similar surprise–related activations (cf. 
Figure 4.4), it was necessary to demonstrate the specificity of our model and exclude 
the possibility that, instead of putamen activity gating visuo-motor connections, the 
PMd might be gating visuo-putamen connections. Therefore a final crucial model 
comparison was made to verify the directionality of the putamen influence. In this 
model (m7) the role of the putamen and the PMd were swapped, such that PMd 
activity  modulated  the  connection  between  FFA/PPA  and  the  putamen  (Figure 
4.6C). BMS showed that this reversed model was clearly inferior to the original 
model;  the  exceedance  probability  that  the  data  were  more  likely  to  have  been 
generated by the original model rather than by the reversed model, was 99% (Figure 
4.6D).  Finally,  Table  4.3  we  report  a  final  comparison  of  all  models  at  once, 
showing once more that m4 is the optimal model.  
Table 4.3. BMS among all tested DCMs 
    Dirichlet 
parameters α 
Exceedance 
probability f f f f 
m 1  1.55    0.02 
m 2  3.60    0.16 
m 3  1.57    0.02 
m 4  4.82    0.36 
m 5  2.83   0.08 
m 6  4.12    0.23 
m7  3.50  0.14 
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Figure  4.6.  DCMs  testing  the  respective  roles  of  putamen  and 
PMd. A) A basic DCM (cf m1, Figure 4.5) for investigating modulation of visuo-
motor connections by prediction error related activity in the putamen. B) The optimal 
DCM  (cf  m4,  Figure  4.5),  resulting  from  a  systematic  model  search  procedure, 
included full connectivity between the PMd, PPA and FFA. Activity in the putamen 
significantly enhanced the connections from the PPA/FFA to the premotor cortex: p 
=  0.010  and  p  =  0.017  for  the  modulation  of  the  PPA→PMd  and  FFA→  PMd, 
respectively. C) Alternative DCM in which the roles of the putamen and the PMd 
were swapped (cf m7, Table 4.3). D) The Dirichlet density describing the probability 
of  model  m4  (panel  B)  relative  to  the  alternative  model  m7  (Panel  C),  given  the 
measured fMRI data across the group. The shaded area represents the exceedance 
probability of m4 being a more likely model than m7. This exceedance probability of 
Φ1 = 99.1% was strongly favouring m4 as a more likely model than m7. 
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4.4 Discussion 
In  this  study,  we  used  an  associative  learning  paradigm  in  which  auditory  cues 
differentially predicted subsequent visual stimuli (faces or houses) to which subjects 
made a speeded response. We ensured that on any given trial the a priori probability 
of a face (or house) occurring was always 50%. Thus, any expectations about the 
visual stimulus were entirely dependent on the auditory cue. Critically, the predictive 
strengths  of  cues  were  unknown  and  varied  over  time,  requiring  subjects  to 
continuously  update  their  estimates  of  cue-stimulus  associations  and  thereby 
maximising demands on changes in network connectivity via synaptic plasticity. We 
modeled this dynamic inference process using a hierarchical Bayesian observer that 
inferred the associations from the observed cue-outcome combinations, taking into 
account the volatility of the environment (Behrens et al., 2007). These trial-by-trial 
probability estimates were subsequently used as predictor variables in the analysis of 
both  behavioural  and  fMRI  data.  Behaviourally,  speed  and  accuracy  of  motor 
responses significantly  increased with trial-by-trial predictability of  visual stimuli 
(Figure  4.3).  Analysis  of  the  fMRI  data  showed  that  FFA  and  PPA  reflected 
prediction errors that were specific for their preferred stimulus (Figure 4.4A,B). In 
contrast,  both  the  putamen  and  dorsal  premotor  cortex  represented  stimulus-
independent prediction errors in that their activity increased the more surprising the 
current  visual  stimulus was  regardless  of  its  type  (Figure  4.4E,F).  Comparing  a 
series of nonlinear DCMs by Bayesian model selection, we found that the activity in 
dorsal premotor cortex  was best explained by a model in which prediction error 
related activity in the putamen enhanced the strength of connections from FFA and 
PPA to premotor cortex by a non-linear gating mechanism (Figure 4.5).  
Two recent studies have shown that during learning of stimulus probabilities visual 
areas show increased responses to unexpected visual outcomes (den Ouden et al., 
2009;Summerfield and Koechlin, 2008). Both studies, however, only used a single, 
and relatively unspecific, stimulus type (squares and gabor patches, respectively). It 
thus remained unclear whether this represented a general, stimulus-independent or a 
stimulus-specific  surprise  response.  Moreover,  the  probabilities  used  remained 
stationary throughout both studies. An additional limitation of the previous study 
(den Ouden et al., 2009;Summerfield and Koechlin, 2008) was that it investigated 
incidental  learning  of  stimulus  associations  and  could  thus  not  provide  direct   111 
behavioural evidence for learning. All of the above limitations were avoided by the 
design of the current study. 
Our present results show a double dissociation among face- and house-specific areas 
that represents a stimulus-specific surprise response (Figure 4.4A-D). While FFA 
responses to faces increased with the magnitude of prediction error, i.e. the more 
surprising the occurrence of a face was, its responses to houses were unaffected by 
prediction  error.  In  PPA,  responses  to  houses  increased  with  the  magnitude  of 
prediction error whereas responses to faces even decreased with prediction error. In 
both cases, this stimulus ´ probability interaction was significant. 
In contrast to the visual areas, the bilateral putamen, left dorsal premotor cortex, right 
intraparietal  sulcus  and  superior  parietal  gyrus  showed  a  stimulus-independent 
prediction error response (Figure 4.4F). That is, whenever an unexpected stimulus 
was presented, independently of whether this was a face or house, the activity in 
these areas increased. The parietal activations are co-extensive with the dorsal visual 
stream and play an important role in attentional reorientation (Corbetta and Shulman, 
2002). Their increased activity in response to surprising stimuli may therefore reflect 
increased attention to the unexpected visual stimuli. In contrast, the surprise-related 
activity in the premotor cortex is more likely to reflect the updating of the motor plan 
that becomes necessary when the prediction evoked by the auditory cue turns out to 
be  wrong  (Mars  et  al.,  2007;Nakayama  et  al.,  2008).  Finally,  prediction  error 
responses in the putamen (Figure 4.4E) have been reported by numerous previous 
studies, and for very different types of learning. This suggests that the putamen is 
generally  sensitive  to  violations  of  learned  contingencies,  whether  these 
contingencies signal reward (Jensen et al., 2007;McClure et al., 2003;Menon et al., 
2007;O'Doherty  et  al.,  2004;O'Doherty  et  al.,  2003;Seymour  et  al.,  2004),  guide 
decision making (Corlett et al., 2004), or predict target stimuli (as in the current 
study), and even when these contingencies are not behaviourally relevant at all (den 
Ouden et al., 2009).  
The above considerations imply that the increase of premotor activity for surprising 
visual outcomes could at least partially be due to a re-weighting of stimulus-specific 
visual inputs that is controlled by the degree of prediction error encoded by activity 
in the putamen. In other words, the strength of connections from FFA and PPA to   112 
premotor cortex, which provide information about the appropriateness of the planned 
action,  might  change  from  trial  to  trial,  depending  on  the  mismatch  between 
predicted and observed visual outcome that is signalled by the putamen. To address 
this hypothesis, we used a recently developed nonlinear  DCM (Stephan et al., 2008), 
which allowed us to model how connections from FFA and PPA to premotor cortex 
were modulated or gated by ongoing activity in the putamen. Anatomically, there are 
indirect  projections  from  the  putamen  to  the  premotor  cortex  via  the  thalamus 
(Alexander  and  Crutcher,  1990;Schultz,  2000)  which  could  mediate  this  gating 
process. To demonstrate the directionality of this mechanism, we compared this type 
of model to a control model in which the role of the putamen and premotor cortex 
were  reversed,  i.e.  the  connections  from  visual  areas  to  the  putamen  were  now 
modulated by premotor activity (Figure 4.6C). Bayesian model selection showed 
that the original model was clearly superior to the alternative one (Figure 4.6D).  
Previous neurophysiological and neuroimaging investigations of associative learning 
have focused on identifying region-specific prediction error responses, e.g. in the 
ventral tegmental area (D'Ardenne et al., 2008;Yacubian et al., 2006) or the striatum 
(Corlett  et  al.,  2004;Jensen  et  al.,  2007;McClure  et  al.,  2003;Menon  et  al., 
2007;O'Doherty  et  al.,  2004;O'Doherty  et  al.,  2003;Schultz  and  Dickinson, 
2000;Seymour et al., 2004;Tobler et al., 2006), but have not investigated effects of 
prediction  errors  on  connectivity.  An  exception  was  the  precursor  to  the  present 
study (den Ouden et al., 2009). As in the present study, this previous work used an 
audio-visual associative learning paradigm and found a prediction error response in 
the putamen bilaterally and in visual cortex. However, the DCM in this previous 
study only described an anatomically uninformed influence of prediction errors per 
se on connectivity, but did not specify their source, because the required nonlinear 
models where not yet established at the time of analysis.  
To our knowledge,  the present study is the first to  demonstrate  that trial-by-trial 
prediction error related activity in a specific region (here the putamen) controls the 
plasticity of connections among other regions. This is in accordance with several 
theoretical  concepts  which  have  proposed  that  learning  should  be  implemented 
neurophysiologically  by  prediction  error  dependent  synaptic  plasticity  (Friston, 
2005a;McLaren  et  al.,  1989;Schultz  and  Dickinson,  2000).  Deploying  synaptic 
plasticity depending on the magnitude of prediction error is an intuitively sensible   113 
mechanism: the larger the prediction error, the greater the need for changing one's 
predictions and hence to reorganise the neuronal system producing these predictions. 
The model in the present study represents prediction error dependent learning as a 
nonlinear (second order) interaction between outputs from FFA/PPA and putamen 
that target the dorsal premotor cortex. Several neurobiological mechanisms for this 
type  of  plasticity  have  been  suggested  by  invasive  recordings  studies,  including 
nonlinear dendritic integration of inputs due to voltage-dependent ion channels or 
activation of dendritic calcium conductances by back-propagating action potentials 
(for details and references, see (Stephan et al., 2008)). 
In  summary,  the  present  study  has  used  a  combination  of  fMRI,  computational 
learning models and DCM to demonstrate that learning-induced synaptic plasticity in 
the  human  brain  during  a  simple  audio-visual  association  learning  task  can  be 
characterized  in  terms  of  prediction  error  dependent  changes  in  effective 
connectivity. Such approaches may become useful for model-based inference about 
neurophysiological processes that cannot usually be studied non-invasively but are of 
clinical importance, such as synaptic plasticity and its regulation by neuromodulatory 
transmitters  (Stephan  et  al.,  2006).  An  important  future  step  will  be  to  combine 
model-based  approaches  as  the  present  one  with  pharmacological  designs  that 
manipulate prediction error dependent changes in plasticity.   114 
Chapter 5 
5.   Amygdala Modulates Cortico-Striatal Connections During Fear Acquisition 
Amygdala Modulates Cortico-Striatal Connections During 
Fear Acquisition 
Abstract 
This  DCM  study  is  based  on  a  dataset  which  has  previously  been 
analysed using conventional statistical parametric mapping by Petrovic 
et al. (Petrovic et al., 2008). In the original study the authors focussed 
on the role of the fusiform gyrus and the amygdala in processing of 
learned affective values for faces. In the current study the acquired 
fMRI data were reanalysed, focussing on the role of the amygdala in 
CS+  processing.  In  this  reanalysis,  using  DCM  and  BMS,  we 
compared different putative mechanisms of amygdala involvement in 
learning  the  CS+US  association.  Specifically,  we  investigated 
amygdala-dependent  gating  of  corticostriatal  connections  during 
processing of CS+ stimuli.  
5.1 Introduction  
A wealth of research in both animals and humans have identified a critical role of the 
amygdala  in  Pavlovian  fear  learning,  in  which an affectively  neutral conditioned 
stimulus (CS) is presented with an aversive unconditioned stimulus (US), such as an 
electric  shock  (e.g.  see(LeDoux,  2003;Maren,  2001)).  After  a  number  of  paired 
presentations,  a  CS  alone  elicits  a  fear  response,  such  as  freezing  or  increased 
sweating.  Amygdala  damage  in  both  humans  and  animals  results  in  severely 
impaired fear conditioning (Bechara et al., 1995;Blair et al., 2005;LaBar et al., 1995). 
For example, LaBar et al showed reduced conditioned skin conductance responses to 
a CS associated with a loud noise burst in unilateral temporal lobectomy patients 
with temporal lobe epilepsy patients (LaBar et al., 1995).    115 
The exact details of the physiology of fear learning mechanisms in the amygdala are 
yet to be elucidated, but it is generally agreed that sensory information from the 
cortex and thalamus is received by the basolateral part of the amygdala (Delgado et 
al.,  2006).  The  lateral  part  especially  is  considered  as  the  ‘gatekeeper’  to  the 
amygdala (LeDoux, 2007). The underlying mechanism of the CS+ induced activity 
might  be  as  follows:  CS-US  convergence  induces  synaptic  plasticity  in  lateral 
amygdala such that after conditioning CS information is conveyed more effectively 
by the lateral amygdala, via intra-amygdala connections, to elicit activation in the 
central amygdala. The central amygdala is normally only activated by behaviourally 
relevant USs, as it interfaces with the motor system and prefrontal areas, controlling 
the expression of conditioned behavioural and autonomic fear responses (LeDoux, 
2007). 
In humans, a number of studies have shown differential responses in the amygdala to 
stimuli  that  have  been  associated  with  an  aversive  outcome  (CS+),  compared  to 
stimuli that do not predict an aversive stimulus (CS-). However, while all studies 
show overall increased activity in the amygdala to the CS+ compared to the CS- (e.g. 
(Buchel et al., 1998;LaBar et al., 1998;Marschner et al., 2008;Tabbert et al., 2005)), 
the precise timecourse of these differential responses is variable. Several studies have 
reported an initial increase in the response to CS+ stimuli in the amygdala, followed 
by a later decrease (Buchel et al., 1998;LaBar et al., 1998;Marschner et al., 2008) 
whereas some studies show a differentiation between CS+ and CS- during the late 
acquisition phase, such as a study by Tabbert et al. where differentiation between 
CS+ and CS− within the amygdala was observed during a late acquisition phase 
(Tabbert et al., 2005). One explanation for these inconsistent results could be that the 
speed of learning differs between these different paradigms.  
Learning  speed  will  depend  on  several  features  of  the  conditioning  paradigm, 
including the similarity of the CS+ and CS-, the aversiveness of the US, and the 
reinforcement schedule. Easily differentiated CSs with deterministic reinforcement 
schedules are  likely  to  induce  very  fast  learning,  and  might  show  differentiation 
within the first couple of trials (e.g. (Marschner et al., 2008)). A complementary 
explanation could be that two processes evolve simultaneously in different parts of 
the  amygdala  that  cannot  be  resolved  at  the  spatial  resolution  of  human  fMRI. 
Results in favour of this suggestion come from rodent studies, in which single cell   116 
recordings  in  the  dorsal  subnucleus
  of  the  lateral  amygdala  in  rats  during  fear 
conditioning showed differential responses in two distinct cell populations (Repa et 
al.,  2001).  Cells  in  the  dorsal  tip  of  lateral  amygdala,  exhibited  short-latency 
responses (<20 ms) that were only transiently changed. Cells in the more ventral part 
of  the  lateral  amygdala,  had  longer  latency  responses,  but  maintained  enhanced 
responding throughout training. This sustained response could reflect the fear/anxiety 
induced by the CS+, whereas as Marschner et al. suggest, the transient signal is 
reminiscent  of  prediction  error  response  (Marschner  et  al.,  2008):  The  amygdala 
encodes sensory contingencies
 to rapidly learn CS–US associations, so that when the 
CS is first paired with the US, this surprising stimulus elicits a large response, but 
when the CS-US association is subsequently learned, little response is elicited and 
the response decreases. However, to fully test for such a prediction error response, 
one would have to test not only the learned response to a presented US, but also to its 
absence. In the study by Marschner et al. this was not possible because the CS+ was 
always followed by a US.  
The study presented here is a reanalysis of a previously published dataset (Petrovic et 
al., 2008). We used a refined model for the initial SPM analysis, obtaining results 
that go beyond those reported by Petrovic et al. and support the prediction error 
hypothesis proposed by Marschner et al. (Marschner et al., 2008). In a subsequent 
step,  we  used  DCM  to  investigate  the  mechanisms  of  how  fear  learning  in  the 
amygdala can influence corticostriatal processing of conditioned stimuli. It has long 
been thought that the amygdala  guides and initiates motor responses to  affective 
stimuli, with the ventral striatum playing a pivotal role as the interface between the 
extended amygdala and motor systems coordinating responses to conditioned stimuli 
(e.g.  (Haber  et  al.,  1995;Mogenson  et  al.,  1980)).  More  specifically,  it  has  been 
suggested that output from the basal amygdala to the striatum controls actions in 
response to conditioned stimuli ((LeDoux, 2007). In the present study, we therefore 
compared  a  set  of  nonlinear  DCMs  embodying  different  mechanisms  how  the 
amygdala might mediate the processing of sensory information in the striatum and 
prefrontal cortex.   117 
5.2 Methods & Statistical analysis  
5.2.1  Experimental Design – fMRI  
The dataset used in the current study was previously analysed by Petrovic et al. who 
used a conventional SPM analysis to investigate differential CS processing for social 
stimuli(Petrovic et al., 2008). While being scanned using fMRI, the participants were 
subjected to a fear conditioning paradigm where two visually presented faces were 
associated  with  aversive  electric  shocks  in  a  50%  reinforcement  schedule.  Two 
further faces were presented but never associated with a shock (i.e. 0% contingency 
reinforcement schedule). For each of the CS types, one of the faces directly looked 
into the camera, whereas for the other stimulus the gaze was averted (see Figure 
5.1). Since Petrovic et al. did not find very strong behavioural or fMRI effects for 
gaze direction, this factor was neglected in the present reanalysis. The basic design 
thus  had  a  2x2  factorial  structure,  the  factors  being  CS  type  (CS+:  50% 
reinforcement; CS-: 0% reinforcement) and trial outcome (US present vs. absent). 
However, due to the use of a 0% reinforcement schedule there are, by definition, no 
CS- US trials; therefore, the design included only 3 different trial types. Additionally, 
we  focused  on  learning  effects,  distinguishing  between  trials  in  the  first  vs.  the 
second half of the experiment. This resulted in 6 trial types overall. 
The subjects were instructed for each presented face to decide as quickly as possible 
whether the face was in the centre or offset (by 5 mm) to the left or right of the visual 
field.  On  any  given  trial,  the  face  appeared  for  990  ms,  with  a  stimulus-onset 
asynchrony (SOA) that was jittered between
 10.8 and 14.4 seconds for each trial (see 
Figure 5.1). For the CS+US trials, the electric shock was delivered at the end of the 
face  presentation,  for  a  duration  of  1  ms  at  80%  of  the  most  painful  sensation 
imaginable as determined by a visual analogue scale (for details see (Petrovic et al., 
2008)). Each subject completed 30 trials of each of the four CSs, being exposed to a 
total of 30 shocks. The total scanning duration was 24 min.  
Although the majority of the subjects (n = 20/27) could not correctly identify which 
faces were associated with the shocks in a post-experimental interview, both skin 
conductance  responses  (SCR)  and  explicit  ratings  showed  that  the  cue-shock 
association  had  been  learned;  in  the  second  half  of  the  experiment  the  skin   118 
conductance  response  (SCR)  to  (unpaired)  CS+  stimuli  was  larger  than  to  CS- 
stimuli, and subjects rated CS- faces as more likeable, and CS+ faces as less likeable, 
after the experiment than before. Furthermore, using a reinforcement learning model 
to specify regressors, analysis of the fMRI data showed increasing activity in both 
amygdala and fusiform
 gyrus in response to the CS+ stimuli (Petrovic et al., 2008).  
 
 
Figure 5.1. Timeseries of a single trial. The CS stimuli were presented for 
990 ms, and in case of the CS+ stimuli, these were followed in 50% of the cases by a 
painful electric shock at the end of the CS presentation. Subjects performed an offset 
detection task on the CS stimuli.  
 
5.2.2  Subjects 
27  healthy  male  subjects  (aged  18-36  years)  with  no  history  of  neurological  or 
psychiatric  disorder  were  included  in  this  study.  Written  informed  consent  was 
obtained from all volunteers prior to the study, which was approved by the National 
Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery Ethics Committee. 
5.2.3  fMRI Data Acquisition 
A 1.5 Tesla Siemens Sonata MRI scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) was used to 
acquire T1-weighted fast-field echo structural images and multi-slice T2*-weighted 
echo-planar volumes with blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) contrast (TR 
= 3.96 s, TE = 50 ms). For each subject, 360 scans were acquired in one continuous 
session.  The  first  four  volumes  of  each  session  were  discarded  to  allow  for  T1   119 
equilibrium effects. We used a 30° tilted orbitofrontal sequence (Deichmann et al., 
2002) with a flip angle of 90° covering the whole
 brain in 44 slices.  
5.2.4  fMRI Data Analysis 
fMRI data were analysed using the statistical software package SPM5 (Wellcome 
Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The 
356  images  from  each  subject  were  realigned  to  correct  for  head  movements, 
corrected for movement-by-distortion interactions (Andersson et al., 2001), spatially 
normalized  to  the  Montreal  Neurological  Institute  (MNI)  template  brain  and 
smoothed spatially with a 3-dimensional Gaussian kernel of 8 mm full width half 
maximum.  The  data were  then  modelled  voxel-wise, using a GLM that included 
regressors for six experimental trial types (described below) consisting of trains of 
delta functions convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function. The 
data were high-pass filtered (cut-off 128 seconds) to remove low-frequency signal 
drifts, and a first-order autoregressive model was used to remove serial correlations 
(Friston et al., 2002a). In distinction to the previous analysis (Petrovic et al., 2008), 
we  used  a  more  precise  temporal  model  of  the  stimulus  onsets,  and  a  more 
appropriate  microtime  bin  for  defining  regressors  (minimising  the  overall  timing 
error  across  slices).  Contrast  images  of  parameter  estimates  encoding  effects  of 
interest were created for each subject and entered separately into voxel-wise one-
sample t-tests (df = 26), to implement a second-level random effects analysis. We 
report regions that survive cluster-level correction for multiple comparisons (family-
wise error, FWE) across the whole brain at P<0.05, or for predefined regions of 
interest  (small  volume  correction,  SVC)  at  P<0.05.  These  regions  of  interest 
included the amygdala, striatum and the prefrontal cortex. 
5.2.5  SPM contrasts 
In  order  to  assess  these  learning  effects  at  a  neurophysiological  level,  the  three 
different trial types (see Table 5.1) were split between the first and second half of the 
experiment, following previous fear conditioning studies, (Buchel et al., 1998;LaBar 
et al., 1998), resulting in 6 regressors.  
The contrasts used in the current analysis are described in Table 5.2. In order to 
assess the main effect of ‘face’ stimulation, the regressors for CS+USC were not   120 
used in order not to contaminate our results with shock events. Because ‘face’ stimuli 
are known to activate the fusiform gyrus (e.g. see Chapter 4), we will refer to the 
face  responsive  part  of  the  fusiform  gyrus  as  the  fusiform  face  area  (FFA)  for 
simplicity. One should keep in mind, however, that the nonspecific nature of the 
contrast  (‘face’  vs  ‘fixation’)  prevents  any  strong  claims  about  the  degree  of 
specificity for face stimuli exhibited by the identified area. 
The main effect of pain contrast was restricted to CS+ trials, as CS- stimuli were 
never paired with a painful stimulus. The crucial contrast to test for learning effects 
was the change in response to the presence or absence of shocks over time. Since we 
were  specifically  interested  in  the  roles  of the striatum,  amygdala and prefrontal 
cortex in fear learning, we performed an additional restricted search in these areas, 
using anatomical masks generated from the Anatomy Toolbox (amygdala, (Eickhoff 
et al., 2005)) and the PickAtlas toolbox (prefrontal cortex mask included the inferior, 
middle  and  superior  frontal  gyrus,  and  striatum,  (Maldjian  et  al.,  2003)).  The 
Anatomy  toolbox  is  a  probabilistic  cytoarchitectonic  atlas  based  on  histological 
investigation of a group of post mortem brains, whereas the PickAtlas is based on 
topographical landmarks alone. Thus, the Anatomy toolbox was used preferably.  
 
Table 5.1. Design and stimulus frequency. Note that the design is not 
entirely factorial, because by definition there are no CS- US trials, resulting in 3 
different trial types.  
  shock (US)  no shock  
CS+  30  30 
CS-  0  60 
 
Table 5.2. Contrast definnitions.  
  early  late 
  CS+  CS+US  CS-  CS+  CS+US  CS- 
main effect of ‘face’  1  0  1  1  0  1 
main effect of ‘pain’  -1  1  0  -1  1  0 
pain x time (+)  -1  1  0  1  -1  0 
pain x time (-)  -1  1  0  1  -1  0 
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5.2.6  DCM  
5.2.6.1 DCM specification 
As described in the results section below and as shown in Figure 5.2, the SPM 
analysis demonstrated that amygdala, striatum and prefrontal cortex showed a time x 
shock interaction, such that the response to an unpaired CS+ over time increased, 
whereas the response to a CS+ paired with a shock decreased. Based on these SPM 
results,  a  set  of  alternative  nonlinear  DCMs  were  constructed  that  could  all 
potentially  account  for  the  interactions  observed  in  these  areas.  All  DCMs 
additionally included the FFA as an input region that was driven by the face stimuli; 
the sensory effects of shocks entered the system via the amygdala (see Figure 5.3). 
These driving inputs were modelled as individual events. The direct input into the 
amygdala  represents  a  lumped  influence  via  three  possible  pathways  since  the 
basolateral amygdala receives noxious information from the insula, the thalamus and 
the parabrachial nucleus (Shi and Davis, 1999). 
In order to reduce computational complexity, the DCM analysis proceeded in two 
steps. The first step was to determine the most likely mechanism, in terms of shock-
induced  modulation  of  connection  strengths,  for  explaining  the  shock  x  time 
interaction in the amygdala. This was done using a reduced 3-area model that did not 
include the PFC. The second step was to investigate how shock x time interactions in 
striatum and PFC could be best explained in terms of nonlinear gating of connections 
to the striatum and prefrontal cortex by amygdala activity. This hierarchical approach 
was necessary for computational reasons: testing all relevant variants of the full 4-
area DCM would have taken a very long time. 
In the first step, three 3-area DCMs that all could explain the shock x time interaction 
in the amygdala, were constructed and fitted to the data (see Figure 5.3A). In the 
first model, the time modulation for both the paired and unpaired CS+ trials affected 
the self-connection of the amygdala; this model reflects learning that was occurring 
within  the  amygdala,  such  that  over  time  the  response  to  paired  CS+  would  be 
dampened and to unpaired CS+ stimuli it would be enhanced. In a second model, 
both  trial  types  were  allowed  to  modulate  the  connection  from  the  FFA  to  the 
amygdala.  This  model  reflects  how  transfer  of  the  CS+  input  to  the  amygdala 
changed over time, depending on whether it was paired with a shock or not. Finally,   122 
in  a  third  model  the  effects  of  the  paired  and  unpaired  CS+  were  modelled 
separately: the unpaired CS+ modulated the FFA￿amygdala connection, whereas 
the paired CS+ affected the intrinsic self connections of the amygdala. Note that the 
sensory effects of shocks entered the system via the amygdala; therefore the opposite 
arrangement (i.e. the paired CS+ modulating the FFA￿amygdala connection) was 
not a sensible alternative.  
In the second step, the 3-area model that was identified as optimal in the first step 
was extended to include the PFC as fourth region and was systematically varied 
along two dimensions. The main question of interest was to test systematically for 
modulatory  (gating)  influences  on  the  FFA  ￿  Striatum  and  Striatum￿  PFC 
connections that depended on amygdala activity (see Figure 5.3B). Either of these 
gating  connections  alone  could  potentially  explain  the  observed  shock  x  time 
interaction  in  the  striatum  and  prefrontal  cortex,  via  the  reciprocal  connections 
between these areas. Secondly, although the observed SPM results could in principle 
be explained without any connections from the prefrontal cortex and the striatum to 
the amygdala, there is evidence for such anatomical connections (e.g. (Haber and 
Fudge, 1997)) , and therefore we also tested whether inclusion of these connections 
improved the model. In summary, the 4-area models varied across two dimensions: 
(i) gating influences by the amygdala and (ii) prefrontal and striatal connections to 
the amygdala (see Figure 5.3B).  
5.2.6.2 Choice of areas and time series extraction 
As the exact locations of activation maxima varied over subjects, we ensured the 
comparability  of  our  models  across  subjects  by  using  combined  anatomical-
functional constraints in selecting the subject-specific time series (cf. (Stephan et al., 
2007c)). As a summary time-series, we computed the first eigenvector across all 
supra-threshold voxels within a radius of 4 mm around the chosen local maximum 
for the left FFA, left amygdala, right striatum and left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC). For the amygdala, we thresholded the subject-specific SPMs at P<0.05 
(uncorrected) for the shock x time interaction and determined the local maximum 
within a mask combining the main effect of pain (at the same threshold) with an 
anatomical mask of the amygdala generated from the probabilistic cytoarchitectonic 
atlas in MNI space (Eickhoff et al., 2005). For the striatum and PFC, the subject   123 
specific SPMs for the shock x time contrast were also thresholded at P<0.05. For the 
striatum the individual maximum within an anatomical mask (putamen, (Maldjian et 
al., 2003)) was determined, and for the PFC the maximum within 8 mm from the 
group maximum.  
The left rather than the right prefrontal activation was included in the DCM based on 
the pattern of parameter estimates of the interaction; whereas the left PFC showed 
the same interaction pattern as the amygdala and striatum, the interaction in the right 
PFC was driven by the changing response to paired CS+ trials, and could be due to 
habituation  to  the  pain  response  alone  (see  parameter  estimates  in  Figure  5.2). 
Finally, for the FFA, the maximum within 8 mm of the group maximum from our 
previous study ([-45 -54 -21], see Chapter 4) was chosen. The reason to use the 
maximum from this previous study was the nonspecific nature of the ‘face’ contrast 
in this study; in the previous study a more specific (face>house) contrast was used. 
Figure 5.2 shows the parameter estimates across subjects from the extracted areas. 
Time series could be extracted for all four areas in 16 out of 27 subjects. In the 
remaining subjects, one or more of the areas could not be defined due to the lack of a 
significant interaction that met the anatomical and functional criteria described above 
(amygdala: 6; FFA: 0; PFC: 3; striatum: 7). These subjects were excluded from the 
DCM analysis. 
5.2.6.3 Model comparison 
The optimal models for each of the two sets of DCMs (3- and 4-area model, see 
Figure  5.3)  were  determined  using  BMS.  In  brief,  the  negative  free  energy  (F) 
approximation to the model evidence for each subject and each model were used to 
estimate the exceedance probability and Dirichlet parameters a . Given the factorial 
nature of the tested model space for the 4-area models, we were able to use model 
space partitioning in order to test for the effects of (i) varying the modulatory effects 
of the amygdala and (ii) including or excluding the prefrontal/striatal connections to 
the amygdala respectively.  
5.2.6.4 Group level inference on parameters 
Because in one subject the parameter estimates deviated by more than 3 standard 
deviations from the rest of the group, normality assumptions were violated, rendering   124 
standard  parametric  statistical  tests  inappropriate.  Therefore,  to  test  whether  the 
coupling  parameters  were  consistently  different  from  zero  across  subjects,  we 
applied a  nonparametric test (Wilcoxon’s  signed-rank  test) and report Bonferroni 
corrected p-values. 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1  SPM results 
As expected, whenever a face was presented, compared to baseline fixation, activity 
in the primary visual cortex and the fusiform face area increased (see Table 5.3). 
Furthermore, the main effect of pain showed widespread increases in activity in a 
collection  of  brain  areas  known  as  the  ‘pain  matrix’,  including  the  insula  and 
amygdala  bilaterally,  anterior  cingulate  cortex  (ACC),  brainstem,  primary  and 
secondary somatosensory cortex (S1 and S2) on the right (stimulation was on the 
left). The critical shock x time interaction contrast was significant in the amygdala, 
prefrontal cortex and the ventral striatum (putamen) such that over time responses to 
the unpaired CS+ increased but to the paired CS+ decreased (Table 5.3 and Figure 
5.2).  Although  the  resolution  of  our  fMRI  procedure  precludes  any  definite 
conclusions, the activation in the amygdala was located medially and might have 
been situated in the central nucleus.   125 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Main and time effects for face and shock stimuli. Panels 
A-C show the SPM for the pain x time interaction at the group level, with sections 
showing the amygdala, striatum and prefrontal cortex; for illustrative purposes, the 
SPM is thresholded at p <0.001 (uncorrected, df = 26), and displayed on a section of 
the averaged anatomical scan. Panel D shows the main effect of face presentation 
within the fusiform gyrus anatomical mask, at the same threshold. Panels E-H show 
the associated parameter estimates from the individual local maxima (as determined 
following the functional and anatomical constraints described in the main text) across 
the 16 individuals who were included in the DCM analysis. Note that these parameter 
plots  are  only  displayed  for  illustrative  purposes  and  are  not  used  for  further 
inference tests. The amygdala, striatum and left DLPFC (E-G) all show the same 
pattern of interaction: over time the response to a paired CS+ decreases, whereas the 
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medial PFC; here the interaction is driven by the decreasing response to the painful 
stimulus, while the response to the unpaired CS+ stays the same.  
Table 5.3. MNI coordinates and Z-values for significantly activated regions. 
  MNI coords.     
Foci of activation  X  y  z  Z score  Cluster size 
Main effect of ‘face’ 
L occipital cortex*
†  -16  -104  6  7.82   
R occipital cortex*
†  -16  -104  6  7.66   
L fusiform gyrus*
†  -26  -84  -18  Inf   
  L FFA – DCM**  -45  -54  -24  5.60   
R fusiform gyrus*
†  34  -66  -12  7.67   
  R FFA – DCM**  45  -57  -24  5.43   
Main effect of ‘pain’ 
L insula*
†  40  -14  16  6.74   
R insula*
†  -38  -16  14  5.91   
L amygdala*
†  -34  2  -22  6.27   
R amygdala*
†  30  2  -22  4.58   
L thalamus*
†  -8  -4  6  5.42   
R thalamus*
†  8  -2  10  4.54   
R S1*
†  34  -30  66  5.25   
ACC*
†  2  26  24  4.87   
Interaction ‘pain x time (+)’ 
L amygdala**  -12  2  -16  3.83  32 
L dorsolateral PFC **  -18  46  38  4.02  62 
R dorsomedial PFC**  10  38  36  4.03  103 
R Putamen / Ventral striatum**  20  8  -6  4.16  48 
Interaction ‘pain x time (-)’ 
No activations above threshold 
*significant at P<0.05 (FWE whole-brain cluster-level corrected)  
** significant at p <0.05 (SVC) 
† Given the rather unspecific nature of these contrasts, the activations are all part 
of one large cluster. These activations are all significant at cluster level as well 
as for height level whole brain correction, and cluster sizes are therefore not 
reported.  
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5.3.2  DCM results 
Due to the computational demands of nonlinear DCMs, especially with increasing 
numbers  of  areas,  an  initial  set  of  3-area  DCMs  was  fitted  to  determine  which 
connection  should  be  modulated  to  optimally  model  the  pain  x  time  interaction 
observed in the amygdala (see Figure 5.3A). BMS showed that the optimal model 
was  m2  where  the  time  effect  for  both  shock  and  non-shock  trials  affected  the 
connection  from  the  FFA  to  the  amygdala  (see  Table  5.4).  In  this  model,  the 
parameter estimates describing the modulatory influence of time on the connection 
from the FFA to amygdala was consistently negative for the shock trials (median
8 b 
= -0.19, Pcorr = 0.0008 ), and consistently positive (mean b = 0.16, Pcorr = 0.0008 ) 
for the no-shock trials, consistent with the increasing response to no-shock trials and 
the decreasing response to shock trials.  
In a second step, this optimal 3-area model was extended to include the left PFC and 
systematically varied to test for the modulatory influence of the amygdala on forward 
connections  from  the  sensory  to  striatal  and  prefrontal  areas.  This  variation  was 
along two dimensions: (i) connections which were gated nonlinearly by amygdala 
activity (3 options) and (ii) existence vs. absence of backward connections from PFC 
and striatum to amygdala (2 options). Given this 2x3 factorial model space for the 4-
area  DCM  (see  Figure  5.3B),  model  space  partitioning  could  be  applied  to  test 
separately  whether  there  was  convincing  evidence  for  (i)  modulation  by  the 
amygdala of  the  FFA￿ STR and STR ￿  PFC connections and (ii) endogenous 
connectivity from the prefrontal cortex and striatum to the amygdala.  
With  respect  to  the  former,  there  was  clear  evidence  for  modulation  of  both 
connections by amygdala activity: the exceedance probability that models including 
both modulatory influences (m3 and m6) had a higher probability of having generated 
the group data set than models including just a modulatory influence on the FFA￿ 
STR connection (m1 and m4) or on the STR ￿ PFC connections (m2 and m5), was 
80% (see Table 5.5).  
However, concerning backward connections to the amygdala, the evidence was less 
clear. Models without these connections (m1-3) fared marginally better than models 
that did include them (m4-6), but the difference was small; the exceedance probability 
                                                
8 Because we used a nonparametric inference method, we report the median rather than the mean.    128 
that  the  data  were  more  likely  to  have  been  generated  by  a  model  without  the 
amygdala  connections  was  0.53,  versus  0.47  for  models  that  did  include  these 
connections (see Table 5.5). Given this lack of differentiability between the two 
model classes, one would prefer the more parsimonious model class, i.e. without 
backward connections (cf. Occam's razor).  
From this analysis based on model space partitioning it is apparent that model m3 
(both modulatory influences, no backward connections) should be used for inference 
about the model parameters. This was corroborated by BMS amongst all models 
treated individually: here, model m3 had the highest exceedance probability of all six 
models (xp = 0.42, see Table 5.5)
9.  
In model m3 the parameter estimates describing gating effects of amygdala activity 
on ascending connections were consistently positive across subjects (FFA→striatum: 
mean  d  =  0.23,  Pcorr  =  0.0018;  striatum→PFC:  mean  d  =  0.013,  Pcorr  =  0.019). 
Furthermore, the time dependent modulatory effects of the paired and unpaired CS+ 
trials were consistently different from zero, reproducing the results of the reduced 3-
area model (unpaired CS+: mean b = -0.14, Pcorr = 0.0018, paired CS+: mean b = 
0.10, Pcorr = 0.0018).  
 
                                                
9 It is possible that this lack of evidence to distinguish between these two sets of models is due to the 
fact that one of the two connections does increase model fit, but the other one doesn’t. Thus to fully 
test for evidence for the presence of either of these two fixed connections, one needs to extend the 
model space and add an additional 6 models, which include either the STR￿AMY connection or the 
PFC￿AMY connection. We did indeed run these models, and the results stay the same; there is no 
good evidence in favour of including either of these connections. However, for reasons of brevity 
these results are not included here.   129 
 
Figure 5.3. 3- and 4-area nonlinear DCMs to model the shock x 
time interaction. (A) Shows the reduced (3-area) model to determine the site of 
the modulatory learning effect. In m1 the time x pain interaction modulated the self-
connection of the amygdala. In the m2, shock and non-shock trial x time interaction 
modulated the FFA￿amygdala connection. In m3, the effect of the shock and non-
shock trials was separated, such that the self-connection was affected specifically by 
the interaction of shock x time.  
(B)  Shows  the  full  (4-area)  DCM  testing,  in  a  factorial  fashion,  firstly  for  the 
presence of a gating influence of the amygdala on FFA￿striatum connection (m1 and 
m4), the striatum￿PFC connection (m2 and m5), or both of these (m3 and m6), and   130 
secondly for the presence of backward connections from the prefrontal cortex and 
striatum (absent in (m1-3 and present in m4-6).  
Table 5.4. BMS results for the 3 area model.  




m1  2.66   0.00 
m2  15.60  1.00 
m3  1.74  0.00 
 
 
Table 5.5. BMS results for 4-area model. Models varied with regard to the 
presence or absence of backwards connections to the amygdala, and the modulatory 
influence of the amygdala on forward connections.  
Amygdala activity modulating:   
 
FFA￿ ￿ ￿ ￿STR  STR ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ PFC 
FFA￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ STR 




α = 3.19 
xp = 0.086  
m2 
α = 2.53 
xp = 0.043 
m3 
α = 5.46 
xp = 0.415 
m1-3 
α = 11.2 







α = 3.27 
xp = 0.092 
m5 
α = 2.58 
xp = 0.046 
m6 
α = 4.97 
xp = 0.317 
m4-6 
α = 10.8 
xp =0.47 
  Total 
m1,4 
α = 6.5 
xp = 0.14 
m2,5 
α = 5.1 
xp = 0.06 
m3,6 
α = 10.4 
xp = 0.80 
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5.4 Discussion 
This study was a reanalysis of a previously published fear conditioning fMRI study, 
in which four different face stimuli were presented to subjects (Petrovic et al., 2008). 
On each trial, subjects had to decide whether the presented face was off centre or not. 
Two of these faces (CS+) were followed by a shock with a 50% contingency, while 
the  other  two  faces  (CS-)  were  never  paired  with  a  shock.  Skin  conductance 
responses (SCR) showed that subjects slowly  learned the predictive relationships 
between the faces and the shocks; the SCR for (unpaired) CS+ trials significantly 
increased from the first to the second half of the experiment compared to the CS- 
trials. This result suggests that learning happened rather slowly; if learning occurred 
within a few trials, one would not expect to find noticeable differences between the 
first and second half of the experiment. The fact that only 25% of the subjects could 
identify, on post-experimental debriefing, which faces were associated with shocks 
further  corroborates  this  notion  (Petrovic  et  al.,  2008).  This  slow  timescale  of 
learning seems  to be  at  odds  with previous fear conditioning studies in humans, 
where responses to unpaired CS+ rapidly adapt (Buchel et al., 1998;LaBar et al., 
1998;Marschner et al., 2008), and is likely to be due to the fact that in the current 
study, there were two CS+ and two CS- stimuli, that were all very similar (compare 
Figure 5.1). Furthermore, the task was unrelated to the CS stimulus in that subjects 
had to detect displacement of the stimulus, which would probably direct attention 
away from the the stimulus identity. This differs from most previous studies, where 
subjects did attend the stimulus identity, performing a gender discrimination task 
(Kalisch et al., 2006). This prolonged time course of learning allowed us to look at 
the differences in BOLD responses during the first and second half of the experiment 
to assess changing responses to paired and unpaired CS+ trials.  
5.4.1  Prediction errors in the amygdala? 
The amygdala is the prime anatomical substrate for fear conditioning, especially the 
lateral nucleus where CS and US inputs converge, inducing synaptic plasticity which 
changes amygdala responses to CS+ stimuli. Results from the current study support 
this central role of the amygdala, which was the only brain structure to show both a 
main effect of painful stimulation and an interaction of pain and time. The nature of   132 
this interaction  was  such that while the response to unpaired CS+ increased, the 
response to paired CS+ trials decreased. This pattern of responses is reminiscent of 
the prediction error responses described in Chapter 3; both the surprising presence 
and absence of a shock elicits an increased response.  
Previous studies indeed suggested that the amygdala is sensitive not only to noxious 
stimuli, but also to how predictable these stimuli are. In general amygdala responses 
to  a  noxious  stimulus  are  rapidly  attenuated  /  habituated,  due  to  feedforward 
inhibition  mechanisms  in  the  amygdala  itself  (LeDoux,  2007).  When  comparing 
predictable  versus  unpredictable  stimulation,  most  studies find  that the amygdala 
responds more to unpredictable stimulation (but see (Carlsson et al., 2006)). In a 
cross-species  study  of  mice  and  humans,  Herry  and  colleagues  reported  that  the 
amygdala  responds  more  strongly  to  unpredictable  noxious  stimuli  than  to 
predictable ones, and even responds to temporal unpredictability per se, which might 
be  aversive  in  itself  (Herry  et  al.,  2007).  Furthermore,  using  fMRI,  Knight  and 
colleagues  have  shown  that  amygdala  activity  increased  when  experimental 
contingencies were changed during Pavlovian fear conditioning. This implies that the 
amygdala  might  be  particularly  important  for  forming  new  associations  among 
stimuli with behavioural relevance (Knight et al., 2004). In the present study, we 
built on this previous line of research and investigated where, in a simple network 
model of associative learning of aversive stimuli, synaptic plasticity was most likely 
expressed  to  account for  the  shock  x time  interaction  responses  identified  by  an 
initial SPM analysis. We were particularly interested whether there was evidence for 
modulatory (gating) influences by the amygdala on cortico-striatal connections.  
Model comparison of a set of three DCMs showed that the shock x time interaction 
was best explained by a model in which both paired and unpaired CS+ trials were 
allowed to modulate the FFA￿ amygdala connection. In this model processing of 
the CS+ input to the amygdala changed over time, depending on whether it was 
paired  with  a  shock  or not.  These  modelling  results  from  healthy  volunteers are 
nicely consistent with anatomical studies in animals and lesion studies in patients. 
Amaral et al. showed that in macaques the amygdala is extensively connected to the 
fusiform  gyrus  and  the  primary  visual  cortex  (Amaral  et  al.,  2003).  In  addition, 
Vuilleumier  et  al.  reported  that  patients  with  amygdala  lesions  do  not  show  the 
increased  response  to  fearful  faces  the  occipital  cortex  and  fusiform  gyrus  that   133 
healthy  controls  exhibit,  and  furthermore  that  the  level  of  amygdala  damage 
predicted the level of visual modulation (Vuilleumier et al., 2004).  
5.4.2  Amygdala influences CS+ processing in the cortico-striatal circuit 
The  SPM  results  indicated  a  central  role  of  the  amygdala  in  fear  conditioning; 
although two other areas, the striatum and the PFC, also showed the time x shock 
interaction, only the amygdala showed an additional main effect of pain. Comparing 
a  set  of  4-area  nonlinear  DCMs  we  showed  that  the  observed  shock  x  time 
interaction in the striatum and PFC could be modelled by a gating influence of the 
amygdala on the connectiona from the FFA to the putamen and from the putamen to 
the PFC, respectively. 
As described in the introduction, the amygdala is well known to mediate the effects 
of conditioned reinforcers on behaviour. It has been suggested that the underlying 
mechanism is a modulation of cortico-striatal circuits by amygdala activity (LeDoux, 
2007;Mogenson et al., 1980). The striatum, especially its ventral part, is a site of 
convergence for amygdala and prefrontal projections (Haber and Fudge, 1997). Such 
connections would allow the amygdala to initiate the motor response to affective 
stimuli and affect subcortical habit memories putatively stored in striatal circuits. 
The ventral striatum has long been considered to be an interface between cortical 
areas  involved  in  processing  the  emotional  valence  of  stimuli  and  cortical  areas 
mediating motor responses to those stimuli (e.g. (Haber et al., 1995;Mogenson et al., 
1980)).  
Finally, given the extensive anatomical connections from the prefrontal cortex and 
striatum to  the amygdala  (Haber et al., 1995;Haber and Fudge,  1997),  we tested 
whether there was any evidence that these connections played a functional role in the 
fear  conditioning  paradigm  used  in  the  current  study.  Our  model  comparison 
approach  did  not  provide  such  evidence.  This  might  be  explained  by  previous 
observations that the (ventral) PFC seems to play a role mostly in fear extinction 
rather than fear acquisition (Sotres-Bayon et al., 2009).   134 
5.4.3  Limitations and future directions 
The amygdala, striatum and PFC showed a pattern of responses that was similar to 
the pattern of prediction error responses to non-affective CS+ stimuli observed in a 
previous study (Chapter 3): unexpected shocks elicited a larger response as than 
unexpected shocks, as did the unexpected absence of a shock. However, there are 
possible other interpretations of these findings. For example, it is possible that two 
separate  processes  together  explain  the  observed  response  pattern.  The  increased 
response  to the unpaired stimulus could reflect the increased  (negative) affective 
value that the CS+ has acquired as it becomes associated with the shock (e.g. (Friston 
et  al.,  1994;LeDoux,  2007;Morris  and  Dolan,  2004)),  whereas  the  decreasing 
response to the paired CS+ could be due to habituation to the shock itself. These two 
processes  would  probably  take  place  in  different  subnuclei  of  the  amygdala 
(LeDoux, 2007). However, because of the fast stimulus presentation (Figure 5.1) and 
the long duration of the BOLD response, it is difficult to temporally separate the 
response to the CS+ and to the (presence or absence of) the shocks, nor can we, 
because  of  the  limited  spatial  resolution  of  standard  fMRI  methods,  distinguish 
between processes in the different subnuclei of the amygdala.  
There are a number of different approaches that could shed light on these questions. 
One could use electrophysiological recordings which have a much higher temporal 
resolution. However, scalp-based recording methods such as MEG or EEG do not 
allow one to measure activity in subcortical structures, including the amygdala, with 
sufficient signal-to-noise ratio. A better option might be to use an adapted paradigm, 
in which the CS+ US association probability is changing over time. This would allow 
one to separate habituations responses, which are likely in the form a of a linear 
decay function, from a prediction error like response, which would be proportional to 
the current association strength.  Furthermore,  one could use very high resolution 
fMRI optimised for the amygdala to image the processes taking part in the different 
subnuclei, for example responses to the CS+ and the US.  
In  conclusion,  despite  the  fact  that  we  remain  somewhat  agnostic  to  the  exact 
interpretation of the time dependent responses in the amygdala, striatum and PFC in 
this fear conditioning paradigm, the results from this study support a role for the 
amygdala in influencing CS+ processing in cortico-striatal pathways. The functional   135 
role of such a mechanism may reside in providing striatal and cortical regions with 
information about the emotional valence of the CS+US association. In other words, 
the modulatory influence exerted  by the amygdala  on cortico-striatal connections 
could represent the mechanism by which the amygdala mediates motor responses to 
affective stimuli, including habit formation through striatal circuits, and emotional 
colouring of the fear experience in the prefrontal cortex.    136 
Chapter 6 
6.   General Conclusions 
General Conclusions 
6.1 Contributions 
The  aim  of  this  thesis  was  to  establish  experimental  models  which  characterise 
synaptic plasticity in terms of connectivity changes between neural populations in a 
range of associative learning tasks. Specifically, we wanted to investigate the role of 
prediction errors in mediating this plasticity. In Chapter 1 we discussed animal work 
suggesting that changes in connectivity underlie learning (Genoux and Montgomery, 
2007;Gu, 2002;Ji et al., 2005;Morris, 1989;Tye et al., 2008). Furthermore, prediction 
errors, or surprising events, are thought to signal the need for updating beliefs; they 
thus play a central role for associative learning in animals and humans (cf. Section 
1.1.1).  Indeed,  surprise  appears  to  be  at  the  heart  of  not  only  to  reward-based 
learning, but any form of (associative) learning (Section 1.1.2). Taken together, this 
suggests  that  surprising  outcomes  could  drive  the  modulation  of  connection 
strengths,  i.e.  synaptic  plasticity,  during  associative  learning.  Although  a  large 
number of animal electrophysiology and human fMRI studies have shown surprising 
outcomes to elicit responses in the striatum and in sensory areas, to our knowledge, 
the notion that surprise dependent changes of connectivity mediate learning has not 
been investigated empirically means before.  
In this thesis, I employed standard and Bayesian associative learning models (see 
Section 1.2) to estimate the surprise engendered by observed events, and combined 
these with plausible physiological models of connectivity (Chapter 2) to investigate 
surprise dependent modulation of connections during associative learning.  
In Chapter 3, I used a carefully balanced design with auditory cues predicting visual 
outcomes to investigate whether previously described responses in the visual cortex 
were driven by predictions or prediction errors. Critically, learning was shown to 
occur at a neurophysiological level, even though the audiovisual associations were   137 
irrelevant to the behavioural task and outside the subjects’ awareness. We observed 
prediction error dependent responses in the (peripheral) primary visual cortex and the 
ventral striatum, as predicted by an RW model of associative learning. This response 
could  be  explained  in  terms  of  changes  in  connectivity  from  auditory  to  visual 
cortex, where the connections were modulated by the prediction errors.  
In  Chapter  4  we  extended  the  paradigm  from  the  previous  study  such  that  the 
learned  associations  were  now  task-relevant.  In  this  study  we  employed  a 
hierarchical Bayesian ideal observer model that could capture changing audiovisual 
associations.  Again  both  sensory  areas  and  the  striatum  showed  prediction  error 
dependent responses; in the sensory areas, this response was specific to the presented 
visual stimulus, whereas the striatal responses reflected prediction errors per se. In 
parallel  to  these  striatal  responses  we  observed  prediction  error  responses  in  the 
motor planning areas. Using a nonlinear DCM, we showed, for the first time, that 
these prediction error responses in motor planning areas could be explained by a 
modulation of sensory-motor connections by the prediction error dependent output of 
the striatum.  
In Chapter 5 we reanalysed a pre-existing fMRI dataset to investigate prediction 
error like responses in the amygdala during fear conditioning. Here we showed that 
prediction errors modulate amygdala processing of sensory input, and furthermore 
that amygdala activity modulates cortico-striatal connections as neutral cues become 
associated with noxious outcomes.  
Model  selection  to  decide  between  different  DCMs  relied  on  Bayesian  model 
comparison methods as described in Chapters 3-5. In Chapter 3 the selection of the 
best  model  was  based  on  the  group  Bayes  factor,  which  was  calculated  by 
multiplying the individual Bayes factors for each subject. However, this fixed effects 
approach does not take into account random variations in optimal model structure 
across subjects. Therefore, in Chapters 4-5 we used a newly developed second level 
Bayesian random effects analysis which accounts for such random effects. 
6.2 Limitations 
In addition to the limitations of the specific designs and paradigms discussed in the 
results chapters (Chapter 3-5), what follows are some general considerations on the   138 
use and usefulness of dynamic causal models. DCM for fMRI is a state-space model 
that explains observed BOLD responses in specific regions of the brain in terms of 
changes in effective connectivity between these areas. Crucially, this connectivity 
can be modulated by external inputs, or, in case of the nonlinear DCM extension, by 
outputs from other areas.  
6.2.1  Effective connections are not anatomical connections 
One  common  misconception  about  DCMs  is  that  the  presence  of  an  effective 
connection between two areas equates to a single synapse at the anatomical level. 
Instead,  an  effective  connection  may  also  be  a  summary  of  multisynaptic 
connectivity between two areas. In other words, we remain agnostic with respect to 
the precise anatomical nature of the connection. What effective connectivity does 
reflect  is  a  causal  influence  of  one  area  on  another.  For  example,  the  visual  to 
premotor  connections  described  in  Chapter  4  are  unlikely  to  be  monosynaptic 
connections;  yet  we  showed  a  directed  causal  influence  from  the  sensory  to  the 
premotor areas.  
6.2.2  Interpreting causality 
The course temporal resolution of the fMRI as well as the smoothness of the BOLD 
response itself do not allow for interpretations about temporal causality in cortical 
network models of fMRI data. This often leads to the question how one can then 
make  a  claim  about  causal  influences  between  areas  in  DCM  for  fMRI.  This  is 
explained by the fact that the shape of the modelled BOLD responses differ when 
areas receive direct external inputs versus input from another area. Direct inputs with 
elicit a sharp peak and then rapid decline, whereas in downstream areas the response 
rises and falls more slowly. Thus, causality in DCM for fMRI is determined by the 
shape of the modelled BOLD response.  
6.2.3  Exploring and defining model space 
DCM is a method for hypothesis testing and has very limited use as an explorative 
tool. Completing a full search of all possible models, or hypotheses, within a given 
set of nodes and inputs is simply too computationally demanding as soon as one 
deals with models with more than two areas. Consider for example a nonlinear DCM   139 
with 4 areas, as employed in Chapter 4-5. Currently, each model of that sort takes 
roughly 30 minutes to run on a standard PC. Let us simplify the model space and 
assume that we know where the driving and modulatory inputs enter, so that all we 
have to do is explore the endogenous connection part of model space. There are 12 
potential  endogenous  connections,  so  systematically  testing  for  all  possible 
combinations of endogenous connections would result in 2
12 = 4096 models, i.e. over 
2000  hours  or  85  days  of  processing  time  per  subject,  still  disregarding  the 
modulatory inputs and connections. Thus, one has to make principled decisions as to 
which models constitute a sensible set of models to test, constraining model space 
using biological and theoretical constraints.  
Even if one could exhaustively search model space, and use a partitioning approach 
(Chapter 2) to investigate the contribution of different connections and modulatory 
inputs, questions might always arise as to whether the right areas have been included 
in the model. Because one cannot compare models that relate to different datasets, it 
is not possible, in the context of DCM for fMRI, to compare models that include 
different nodes. However, it is important to keep in mind here again that DCM is a 
hypothesis-driven method, set up to test very specific mechanistic hypotheses about 
interactions between different areas in the brain. Thus, rather than trying to build a 
model of the entire brain, only areas that are thought to be involved in the process 
regarding the underlying hypothesis, should be included.  
Finally, it is important to keep in mind (cf. Chapter 1, Section 1.3) that there is no 
single ‘right’ model of the world that can describe the world in all its facets; there are 
only better or worse approximations to particular aspects of reality.  
6.3 Future Research 
6.3.1  MEG to resolve temporal resolution 
Due to the course temporal resolution of fMRI as well as the smoothness of the 
BOLD response in combination with the rapid stimulus designs used in the work 
described in this thesis, it was not possible to investigate the within trial temporal 
evolution of prediction responses evoked by the cues, and prediction error responses 
evoked  by  the  outcomes.  Magnetoencephalography  (MEG)  would  provide  an   140 
excellent tool to evaluate within-trial predictions and learning. These data could then 
be combined with TD learning models or extensions of Bayesian models that model 
within  trial  timing  effects, in  combination  with  DCM  for  M/EEG  (Kiebel et  al., 
2008).  
6.3.2  Pharmacology 
As was described in the introduction, brain connectivity speaks to three key issues: 
synaptic strength, changes in synaptic strength (plasticity), and modulation of this 
plasticity.  Synaptic  plasticity  is  likely  to  underlie  the  changes  in  effective 
connectivity during associative learning as demonstrated in the work presented in 
this  thesis.  Having  established  experimental  models  of  connectivity  in  two  very 
simple,  non-reward  based  associative  learning  paradigms  in  Chapters  3-4,  these 
could now be repeated using pharmacological manipulations, to investigate the role 
of different neurotransmitters. The most obvious candidate to start with would be 
ACh receptor agonists and antagonists. ACh is one of the most important modulators 
of synaptic plasticity in the context of associative learning in the perceptual domain; 
in humans in has been shown to affect perceptual learning effects such as the MMN 
(Baldeweg  et  al.,  2006)  and  repetition  priming  (Thiel  et  al.,  2002c),  as  well  as 
associative fear learning using auditory cues (Thiel et al., 2002b;Thiel et al., 2002a). 
DCM  would  be  an  ideal  tool  to  investigate  the  modulatory  effects  of  these 
neurotransmitters on effective connectivity in humans.  
6.3.3  Associative learning, connectivity & schizophrenia 
Connectivity is the basis of physiological neural information processing and may be 
central to the pathophysiology of various neurological and psychiatric diseases, most 
notably  schizophrenia  (for  detailed  reviews  see  (Friston,  2005b;Stephan  et  al., 
2006)). The mechanistic models of connectivity underlying the associative learning 
paradigms discussed in Chapter 3-4 were deliberately designed to be suitable for 
assessing changes in connectivity in patients with schizophrenia. The behavioural 
tasks are extremely simple, such that patients could easily perform them, and yet they 
evoke  consistent  changes  in  connection  strengths.  In  the  future,  using  simple 
physiological models of  this sort in combination  with formal theoretical learning   141 
models may help to obtain a mechanistic understanding of abnormalities of synaptic 
plasticity in schizophrenia.   142 
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Appendix A 
Prediction vs. Prediction Error in the Rescorla-Wagner 
(RW) Model 
Here we show that predictions and prediction errors computed by the RW model are 
linearly related under mean-correction. In fact, one is identical to the negative of the 
other.  This  linear  dependence  between  predictions  and  prediction  errors  is 
problematic  for  GLM  analyses  since  it  precludes  separate  testing  for  the 
contributions of prediction errors and predictions to the dependent variable. Note that 
whenever there is any experimental factor other than the learning process itself, it is 
necessary to model the interaction among these factors and learning, and this requires 
mean-correction of the vectors involved before computing their Hadamard product 
(cf. (Friston et al., 1997). In SPM, these interaction terms are known as "parametric 
modulation". 
At trial t, the prediction error PEt is the difference between the predicted outcome ft 
and the actual outcome lt: 
t t t PE f l - =                (A.1) 
The prediction (error) at trial t is the sum of the mean-corrected prediction (error) 
and the mean:  
PE PE PE t corr t + = ,               (A.2) 
f f f + = t corr t ,                 (A.3) 
For  typical  reinforcement  schemes,  the  outcome  t l   takes  on  the  values  1 
(unconditioned stimulus is present) or 0 (unconditioned stimulus is absent). For both 
trial types, the mean-corrected prediction error is exactly the negative of the mean-
corrected prediction, as we will show below:   145 
For λt = 1 
t t PE f - =1                 (A.4) 
f - =1 PE                 (A.5) 
1 = + t t PE f                 (A.6) 
Substituting Equations A.2,3,5 into Equation A.6 gives: 
t corr t corr PE , , f - =               (A.7) 
Similarly, for λt = 0,  
f - = PE                 (A.8) 
t t PE f - =                 (A.9) 
Substituting Equations A.2,3,8 into Equation A.9 gives: 
t corr t corr PE , , f - =               (A.10) 
This shows that independent of the outcome λt, the meancorrected prediction error is 
always the negative of the meancorrected prediction.  
   146 
Appendix B 
Bayesian Volatility-Based Associative Learning Model 
We start with the premise that subjects represent or infer the causes of their sensory 
inputs and optimise their behaviour on the basis of this inference. From a Bayesian 
perspective, the brain is an observer of its own sensory signals. This means subjects 
invert  some  forward  or  generative  model  of  sensory  inputs  to  represent  the 
unobserved (hidden) causes of that input.  
Any learning then relies strongly on the subject’s model of the world (the perceptual 
model), which can have dramatic effects on both predicted behaviour (Kording et al., 
2007;Trepel et al., 2005) and modelled neurophysiological signals (Pessiglione et al., 
2007;Tom et al., 2007). 
In what follows, we describe the volatility-based perceptual model used in this study 
to  estimate  the  volatility  and  probabilities  of  the  observed  events.  This  model 
subsumes the set of probabilistic assumptions the brain encoded in order to represent 
the causes of paired audio-visual stimuli. 
The perceptual model generates sensory input  u (e.g., experimental stimuli) from 
hidden causes,  x  (e.g., experimental factors or environmental  states)  and can be 
expressed in terms of a likelihood model  ( ) | p u x  and prior beliefs  ( ) p x . The states 
of the world  x are unknown to the subject but might be under experimental control. 
In our example, u  is a series of cue-outcome pairs, presented to the observer and  x 
encodes an experimentally controlled cue-outcome association that is hidden from 
the subject. The prior  belief itself is decomposed into a hierarchy  of conditional 
probability density functions, as will be described bellow.  
Let  t u  be the outcome at trial t be a multinomial random variate such that:   147 
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where ( )
1,..., i n i
t r
=
 is a nx1 vector of probabilities describing completely the distribution 
of the n possible outcomes. 
This forms the likelihood of our generative model. Note that from there on, we will 
consider  that  each  of  the  cues 
c
t u   is  associated  with  its  own  likelihood,  and 
consequently, its own generative model. This means that everything we state below 
is conditional on the given cue. As a consequence, the Bayesian inversion of such a 
set of generative models is also conditional on each cue, and has to be replicated for 
all different cues. 
This vector of cue-outcome association probabilities follows a priori the following 
Dirichlet distribution: 
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This transition density is actually a martingale, i.e. it is a first order Markov process 
whose current first order moment is equal to its previous realization: 
1 t t r r- = .                (B.3) 
Furthermore, the precision of the transition from  rt-1 to  r t  is parameterized by a 
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              (B.4) 
The volatility itself is assumed to vary over time as a martingale, and the above 
parameterization makes a simple AR(1) model possible:   148 
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,      (B.5) 
where K  is the prior variance of the volatility, i.e. the volatility’s volatility. 
The prior on K  itself is supposed to be non-informative, i.e.: 
( ) 1 p K µ . 
To  summarize,  the  generative  model  assumes  the  following  cascade  of  events 
(illustrated in the graph in Figure B.1): 
1-  A value for the volatility variance K  is randomly drawn from its prior pdf 
( ) p K . 
2-  This value determines the transition pdf of the volatility. Then, a first value 
1 v  is randomly drawn from  ( ) 1, t t p v v K - . 
3-  Knowing the volatility  1 v  then allow us to derive the transition density for  1 r . 
Then, a first value for the cue-outcome association probability is drawn from 
( ) 1, t t t p r r v - . 
4-  This finally defines the likelihood of the outcome itself: the first outcome  1 u  
is then drawn randomly from  ( ) ,
c
t t t p u u r . 
5-  The steps 3, 4 and 5 are repeated in time, giving rise to three time series for 
the volatility  t v , the cue-outcome association probability  t r  and the observed 
outcomes  t u .   149 
 
Figure B.1. Graph illustration of the volatility model. ut=  observed 
outcome  at  trial  t;  rt  =  cue-outcome  association  probability;  vt=  volatility;  K  = 
variance of the volatility. 
Then, the model assumes that the observer actually updates its posterior belief ‘on 
the fly’, in the light of incoming data, in a Kalman filter-like manner. The joint 
posterior  pdf  over  the  full  set  of  unknown  variables,  namely  { } , , x K v r = ,  then 
follows the following prediction and update steps: 
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These two steps are iterated as long as new data are measured and, after each cue-
outcome observation, yield estimates of both the current cue-outcome association 
probability  t r  and the environmental volatility  t v , as well as an estimator of the static 
volatility’s variance  K , given all previously observed data. The trajectory of these 
estimates as a function of time (trialt) then served as predictors for behavioural data 
(response  speeds)  and  neuroimaging  data  (BOLD  responses  in  SPM  and  DCM 
analyses).   150 
Abbreviations  
Brain Areas and Neural Properties 
5HT    Serotonin 
A1    Primary auditory cortex 
ACC    Anterior cingulate cortex 
ACh    Acethylcholine 
AMPA   a-amino-3-hydroxyl-5-methyl-4- isoxazole-propionate  
AMY    Amygdala 
DA    Dopamine 
DLPFC  Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
FFA    Fusiform face area 
LTP/D   Long term potentiation/depression 
NE    Norepinephrine 
NMDA  N-methyl-D-aspartate  
PFC    Prefrontal cortex 
PPA    Parahippocampal place area 
S1    Primary somatosensory area 
S2    Secondary somatosensory area 
STR    Striatum   
V1    Primary visual cortex 
VTA    Ventral tegmental area 
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Methodological Terminology 
AIC    Akaike information criterion 
AR(1)   First order autoregressive moving-average model 
BF    Bayes factor 
BIC    Bayesian information criterion 
BMS    Bayesian model selection 
BOLD   Blood oxygen level dependent 
DCM    Dynamic causal modelling 
df    Degrees of freedom 
EEG    Electroencephalography 
EM    Expectation-Maximization 
EPI    Echo-planar imaging 
F    Free energy 
fMRI    Functional magnetic resonance imaging 
FWE    Family wise error 
GLM    General linear model 
ME    Main effect 
MEG    Magnetoencephalography 
MNI    Montreal neurological institute 
MRI    Magnetic resonance imaging 
PDF    Probability density function 
PET    Positron emission tomography 
ROI    Region of interest 
RT    Reaction time   152 
RS    Response speed 
SD    Standard Deviation 
SEM    Structural equation modelling 
SPM    Statistical parametric mapping 
SVC    Small volume correction 
SCR    Skin conductance response 
 
Theoretical Terminology 
CR    Conditioned response 
CS    Conditioned stimulus 
MMN    Mismatch negativity 
nlDCM  NonLinear dynamic causal model 
RW    Rescorla Wagner 
UR    Unconditioned response 
US    Unconditioned stimulus 
TD learning  Temporal difference learning 
TO cue    Trial onset cue 
PE    Prediction error 
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